

# Evaluation of Schokland and Millennium Agreements 2008-2013

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# Acronyms

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<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Description</b>
ADIP	Association pour le Développement Intégré des paysans
AIM	Alliance against Malnutrition
BA	Business Alliance
BATIDE	Bureau d'appui et d'Assistance Techniques aux Initiatives de Développement
BDD-BOMA	Bureau Diocésain de développement –Caritas
BeMo	Beoordelings Memorandum (Appraisal Document)
BSCIC	Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation
BTC	Belgian Development Agency
CHASL	Christian Health Association Sierra Leone
CHAZ	Churches Health Association of Zambia
CIDD	control of iodine deficiency disorders
COOPEKI	(Centre de Développement Agricole et Social du Congo
DDE	Sustainable Economic Development Department
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSO	Social Development Department
FAD	Femmes et Actions Agro pastorales pour le Développement)
FDOV	Facility for Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Food Security
FDW	Sustainable Water Fund
FESA	Food Early Solutions for Africa
FLIP	Farming and Livelihood Improvement Programme
GPF	Global Premix Facility
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

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IDH	The Sustainable Trade Initiative
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
KNOV	the Dutch Association of Midwives
KPA	Small embassy-supported activities
LDC	Least developed countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFS	Medefinancieringsstelsel (Dutch financing arrangement for NGOs)
MHOS	Ministry of Health and Sanitation
MI	Micronutrient Initiatives
MoFA	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRC	Medical Research Centre
MRT	Medical Research Trust
MTR	Mid-term Review
NCDO	Dutch expertise and advisory centre for citizenship and international cooperation
NDA	National Drug Authority
NDP	National Development Plan
NFA	National Fortification Alliances
NWP	Netherlands' Water Partnership
ODA	<i>Official Development Assistance</i>
PIDR	Programme Intégré de Développement Rural
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRC	Partnerships Resource Centre
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSOM	Programma Samenwerking Opkomende Markten
SLMA	Sierra Leonean Midwives Association

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SOMF	School of Midwifery Freetown
SOMM	School of Midwifery Makeni
SSLDF	Swiss Sierra Leone Development Foundation
TMF	Thematische Medefinanciering (Dutch financing arrangement for NGOs)
UnSL	University of Sierra Leone
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
ZCA	Zambian Communication Authority
ZSP	Zebra Special Products

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## Executive summary

In 2007, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) organised the Pact of Schokland, a massive event where businesses, civil society organisations, knowledge institutes, public bodies and 2.000 individuals pledged to work together and accelerate the Dutch contribution towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To stimulate partnerships and innovation, the Schokland Fund was established with a maximum value of 60,5 million €. In two tenders in 2008, 27 projects were selected for co-financing from the Fund. These projects were all initiated by cross-sectoral partnerships and aimed at one or more MDGs. In 2010, another 27 projects targeting the MDGs were added as Millennium Agreements to the Schokland portfolio, although they were not supported from the Schokland Fund. These projects were co-financed from MoFA departments' regular budgets. As a result, different eligibility criteria and reporting requirements were applied across the Schokland portfolio. The scope of the current evaluation includes both the projects supported by the Schokland Fund and 27 additional projects, and in addition also the partnerships that initiated and implemented these projects.

This evaluation was commissioned by the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a view to improving PPP policy in the context of development cooperation and trade. The goals are to (a) assess the results (output, outcome, impact) of the Schokland and additional Agreements, to (b) take into account results of other PPPs reported in earlier evaluations, and (c) make policy recommendations concerning the factors determining the success and failure of PPPs. Desk research was performed on a sample of 39 projects (of 54). A subset of 16 projects was submitted to an intermediate assessment consisting of further desk research, and interviews and an online survey among the primary partners involved. And as a final subset six elaborate case studies, including field visits and stakeholder interviews, were conducted in this evaluation.

The evaluation shows that the selected portfolio of projects is very diverse in terms of budget, scope and activities. This very large diversity in the Schokland portfolio has made an analysis of the projects and partnerships a very difficult endeavour. This report is an attempt to provide structure the experiences, but still it remains difficult to express a judgement if the Schokland portfolio as a whole as contributed to accelerated achievement of Millennium Development Goals, although several specific projects in the portfolio certainly did. The most frequently found themes in the Schokland portfolio were financial services, health, safety and security, integral local development, food security, value chain development and water and sanitation (WASH). On the level of the ultimate project goals, there is some convergence: a majority of projects targets MDGs 1, 7 or 8, and this is often done in combination with each other. About half of the projects focus on Africa, while others focus on different continents including Africa. A smaller number is targeting Asia and only 1 project targeted Latin America only. The vast majority of projects in the sample showed process, technological, financial or product innovation, and a quarter of the projects in the Schokland portfolio showed at least two types of innovation.



In most of the Schokland partnerships an NGO acted as the lead partner. The partnerships involved an average of 7 partners. More than half of the partnerships were between organisations that had not worked together before, although many of them were acquainted with each other. Changes in partnerships were frequent and in some cases conflicts have occurred between partners, which in a few occasions caused the partnership or the project to come to a stop. It seems that conflicts that have occurred were aggravated by a lack of shared ground-rules for partnering and could not be resolved because of lack of conflict resolution mechanisms within the partnership.

Many partnerships were established quickly and rather informally. Division of tasks and roles between partners were not always made explicit let alone formalised in contracts and this has also contributed to the aggravation of conflicts that arose during the implementation of some of the Schokland projects.

The Schokland projects on average scored well on relevance and reasonable on output and outcome. Many projects have had to downscale on their ambitions, partly due to high optimism and time pressure in the project design phase that resulted in sometimes very ambitious project proposals. Also, some partnerships encountered difficulties to realise the required matching in funding within the original timeframe resulting in delays of outputs. On the other hand, some projects outperformed their original plans and also some of the downscaled projects have shown positive outcomes. The collective performance on sustainability is less positive. A significant number of projects ceased to exist after the ending or even during the funding period, whereas the plan had been to continue or expand operations.

In order to assess good practices and discover success factors, the evaluators have constructed a composite indicator for 'overall performance' of Schokland projects, consisting of a score on 'development results' (combination of output and outcomes in projects); sustainability (perspective for replication) and innovation in the projects and partnerships. The majority of projects scored 'medium' to 'very good' on this indicator (the top three of five categories). Smaller partnerships (i.e. less partners), partnerships focusing on a business case and partnerships that delegated project management to a dedicated project unit or separate entity (e.g. a foundation) were more successful in achieving development results and good overall performance.

The search for success and failure factors was hindered by the fact that project narrative reports contained limited qualitative information on the partnership, such as the type of leadership, the (balance in the) division of tasks, learning between partners or the development of these aspects over the years. It was also not possible to interview all partners of all partnerships and complement the written information. Nonetheless, the success factors for partnerships found in the literature were present to a larger extent in partnerships that scored better on overall performance and produced more development results. Vice versa, partnerships that showed few success factors produced less development results and performed lower. There were also some surprising findings, such as that the more successful projects were not balanced in terms of inputs of partners and their respective levels of effort in building trust. As the amount of observations is small, due to the lack of information on these aspects, further research is needed before more sound conclusions on success factors are justified.

This evaluation presents the following main conclusions:

- It is not possible to determine whether Schokland projects have accelerated the achievement of MDGs and also not if Schokland projects have performed better than other types of development interventions focusing on MDG's, because the portfolio is too diverse to enable an analysis at the overall level of the Schokland Portfolio. Additional characteristics of a quick start, few bureaucratic procedures and central administration of the fund, limited monitoring of partnership specific aspects of the Schokland projects has enabled mobilising significant efforts of a large number of partners but at the same time too much diversity, differences in quality and performance that at the end of the experience is difficult to analyse;
- The Pact of Schokland has boosted partnerships in the Dutch development cooperation and the Schokland Fund has delivered several partnerships that will continue to contribute to development initiatives in the future;
- Private sector participation in Partnerships has had a small effect on increased effectiveness and overall performance of partnerships, but the participation of private sector partners has not generated significant extra funds for development initiatives;
- Because of the experimental, multi-stakeholder and innovative nature of the Schokland projects it is reasonable to expect a higher failure rate than in more traditional development projects, but it is impossible to say whether the yields of these evaluated projects out- or underperform expectations;
- Considering the complex dynamics and possibility of conflicts occurring in the partnerships, it is remarkable that at the start of the Schokland projects limited time and effort was invested in capacity assessments of partnerships (and not only individual partners in a partnership) and the setting of ground-rules for the partnership;
- The exit phase was often overlooked in project design, leading to financial unsustainability or absence of intended expansion or replication. 11 out of 37 projects that could be scored on sustainability were terminated soon after the end of the Schokland funding period or even prior to reaching the end. This high number of undesired termination of projects clearly shows that attention for sustainability was not enough, not only by the project partners themselves but also by MoFA in the assessment and monitoring of Schokland partnerships and project;
- Partnerships function better when they are small or managed by a separate project entity with partners sitting in a board. This implementation model allows for involvement of partners in the strategic direction of the projects and in dissemination and replication of results without creating complex multi-partner arrangements in the day-to-day implementation of projects.

These conclusions lead to the following main recommendations:

- MoFA is recommended to continue engaging in multi-stakeholder partnerships for development, because these partnerships have potential to bring innovation, new competencies and expertise to development initiatives and some partnerships have resulted in long-term strategic and valuable partnerships for MoFA. While doing so it is recommended to not only look at Public-Private Partnerships but also consider other relevant partners, according to what the development challenges require;
- MoFA is recommended, in case it wants to consider new modalities for multi-stakeholder initiatives in development cooperation, to do this in such a way that more coherence can be

achieved in project portfolios and that a stronger central steering and particularly monitoring and learning from not only partnership results but also partnership processes is secured;

- When building new partnerships, some time is necessary for partners to explore complementary competencies, build synergy and develop ground-rules and a sound governance and operations structure, and if necessary, have an independent party facilitate this process. The introduction of an inception phase in recent MoFA PPP facilities, which allows for such a partnership building and formalisation phase, is recommended;
- To facilitate learning, MoFA is recommended to develop a fitting set of instruments to measure process-aspects in partnerships, without creating too much additional reporting burdens;
- MoFA is advised not to stimulate very large alliances if its primary intention is to implement projects. Instead, smaller partnerships or partnerships that are supported by specialised entities should be prioritised;
- The success factors for partnerships, known from the literature, need to be tested further. To gather data for further research, MoFA should consider developing a process-level monitoring instrument, fit to monitor partnership dynamics not only on success factors but also on innovation aspects;
- MoFA should see to it that a capacity assessment on partnership level is developed and implemented, to determine whether a proposed partnership is best approach to tackle a problem;
- MoFA is also advised to develop a policy on dealing with the additional risk of failure in innovative projects, and make explicit what (additional) risk is considered acceptable in these cases.

# CHAPTER 1: Introduction

## 1.3. Policy context

### 1.1.1 The Pact of Schokland

After taking office in 2007, the Minister for Development Cooperation, Bert Koenders, expressed concern with the speed of progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The Minister made an appeal for pooling resources and expertise of public, civil and private partners to optimize the contribution of the Netherlands and accelerate achievement of the MDGs.

To bring together as many national and international stakeholders as possible, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) organised a massive event on June 30, 2007 in the polder of Schokland. During this meeting 36 agreements were signed by private businesses, civil society organisations, knowledge institutes and public entities. Another 2,000 individuals subscribed to the Schokland Agreements. The event came to be known as the Pact of Schokland or simply 'Schokland'. Although public-private partnerships were already in use as an organisation form for development cooperation<sup>1</sup>, this event is seen as a boost for development-oriented partnerships in the Netherlands.

The signatories of Schokland pledged to develop joint initiatives which would contribute to the MDGs. Minister Koenders reported to Parliament<sup>2</sup> that during the Schokland event, private sector, civil society, and knowledge partners committed approximately 240 million Euro to projects aimed at the MDGs.

The ambition of Schokland was not only to bring together different stakeholders in multi-stakeholder initiatives but also to stimulate innovation in development cooperation, by developing new approaches and new technologies. The Minister announced that he would establish a small fund to enable these new forms of cooperation aimed the MDGs.

### 1.1.2 The Schokland Fund

In December 2007<sup>3</sup>, the Schokland Fund was formally established through a budget-provision of €50 million. In May 2009, this budget was increased to €60.5 million<sup>4</sup>. The subsidy framework for the Schokland Fund translated the ambitions of the Schokland Agreement into concrete policy regulations and eligibility criteria for project proposals. These regulations and criteria are summarised below:

- The Schokland Fund only provides funding to projects that contribute to one or more development goals;

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<sup>1</sup> See World Summit on Sustainable Development PPP projects, quoted in the Annex 6.

<sup>2</sup> June 30, 2007 (KST112108)

<sup>3</sup> *Vaststelling beleidsregels voor subsidiëring Subsidieregeling Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2006 (Schoklandfonds)*, Staatscourant 4 december 2007, nr. 235 / pag. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Besluit van de Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking van 19 mei 2009, nr. DJZ/BR-0424/09, tot wijziging van het besluit van de Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking van 27 november 2007 (wijziging subsidieplafond Schoklandfonds)*, Staatscourant 98, 2 juni 2009.

- The Schokland Fund provides a once only contribution to partnerships;
- The Schokland Fund does not fund initiatives that can comply with criteria of other existing financing opportunities such as MFS, TMF, PSOM, NCDO, KPA, and the Stability Fund;
- No subsidies will be awarded to activities that are already funded directly or indirectly by MoFA;
- The Schokland Fund is not a new structural subsidy framework but it is a start-up, and accelerator or match-making facility for new initiatives;
- Only legal bodies implementing the activities in a partnership of at least two Dutch partners with complementary contributions are eligible for funding;
- The partnership has to be formalised in a formal agreement between the participating partners. This agreement has to contain joint objectives, expected results and the specific contributions of the different partners in cash or otherwise, a time-frame and provisions for monitoring of progress;
- Partners in a Schokland Funded project need to raise a minimum of 60% of the total project costs;
- The minimum contribution of the Schokland fund to a project is €100,000 and the Maximum is € 6 Million.

The Schokland Fund provision was integrated in the Development Cooperation budget for 2007 until 2011. This funding was meant to cause a multiplier effect by pooling resources of different partners. In a debate with Parliament<sup>5</sup> the Minister indicated that the Schokland Fund should focus on innovation and should be as non-bureaucratic as possible to allow for such innovation and entry of new partners, particularly from the private sector, in the Schokland projects. Other ministries were also invited to participate. The intention of the Minister was also to bring public, private and civil partners closer together in development initiatives and he explicitly stated that public partners, including MoFA could be active partners in Schokland projects.

In the end, these partnerships were to accelerate the Dutch contribution towards the realisation of the MDGs. The subsidy-framework and policy regulations for the Schokland Fund state the following objective:

“The Schokland Fund is meant for innovative society-wide initiatives that make a noticeable and effective contribution towards accelerated achievements of one or more of the Millennium Development Goals. Individual or small subsidy requests that are not embedded in a broader context of cooperation are not eligible for subsidy. The initiatives have to have a demonstrable added value to existing initiatives and projects implemented in the area of MDGs for 2015, to be proven by cooperation between multiple partners and innovative nature of proposals”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> June 30, 2007 (KST112108).

<sup>6</sup> Translated by the author from *Vaststelling beleidsregels voor subsidiëring Subsidieregeling Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2006 (Schoklandfonds)*, Staatscourant 4 december 2007, nr. 235 / pag. 7.

### 1.1.3 Mid-term review of the Schokland agreements

In 2009, Aidenvironment conducted a mid-term review of the projects selected in the two Schokland Fund tenders. This review looked at the selection and approval process of projects and it considered management and administration arrangements within MoFA.


One of the goals of the mid-term review was to analyse critical success and failure factors in the Schokland projects. As this analysis was done quite soon after grants were awarded, projects were still in an early stage of implementation. The analysis should therefore be seen as preliminary and partially based on expectations (rather than evidence) of projects' success.

Notwithstanding, Aidenvironment identified five critical success factors for the partnerships' projects, coined the "big five":

- The activities in the partnership project should match the core business of participating partners;
- The partnership should have a clear theory of change and a shared vision between partners on how to achieve change;
- The partnership should have sound governance: agreements, arrangements and regulations should be formalised;
- The partners in the partnership should have complementary competencies and sufficient working capacity to provide these competencies to the partnership;
- The partnership should have the ambition to create spin-offs. There should be perspectives for up-scaling of proposals.

The report shows the following picture of these critical success factors in the Schokland partnerships (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Presence of critical success factors in Schokland projects at time of MTR (2009)



Source: MTR Schokland Agreements, Aid Environment, 2009. (Translated by evaluation team).

The success factors 'core-business' and 'perspective for spin-off' were most commonly found in the Schokland projects. 'Complementary competencies' and a 'shared theory of change' were less common, but still found in about half of the partnerships. At the time of the review the most critical issue was the governance structure. In only a minority of cases (7) the partnership had established a clear governance structure for their project. This critical finding in the MTR, rather early in the Schokland project implementation process, might be an indicator of the fact there was a weakness already at the time of preparation, selection and approval of the Schokland projects. During this preparation and inception phase there might not have been sufficient attention to governance aspects, which was often due to the short time available for presenting project proposals to the Schokland Fund.

The mid-term review resulted in five recommendations:

1. Working with Schokland pre-proposals as a first round before the official submission of project proposals results in proposals of better quality and a better match with the policy objectives of the Schokland Fund and MDGs;
2. Clear communication of criteria to partners by MoFA is required to create a better understanding of the objectives and selection criteria of the Schokland Fund. Clearer communication can also help to decrease the number of appeals on rejections of project proposals by MoFA;
3. Establishing more focus in sectors, partners and size of projects will help to increase the impact of the Schokland Agreement, because more uniformity in management and support is possible and it will be easier to exchange and learn from experiences, for example by:
  - limiting the number of countries, regions or themes;
  - paying more attention to sustainable value chain development, financial instruments and entrepreneurship as these themes seem to be appropriate for partnership approaches;
  - striving for higher MDG relevance and more innovation in the projects;
  - give a more active role for private sector and Southern partners;
  - selecting larger projects to decrease fragmentation.
4. MoFA should decide on the organisation, management and administration of the Schokland agreements to limit the extra workload related with these projects. Two options could be considered: a) centralised management in a special unit, involving third parties for specialised assistance or b) integrate the Schokland agreements within existing structures within the Ministry. Aspects that deserve special attention are to enable innovation in projects, to separate financial and content responsibilities and to involve relevant expertise where and when needed;
5. Manage the Schokland Fund portfolio as an incubator to ensure that talent or building and developing further relations and project initiatives can be more easily identified by MoFA f.

At the time of the MRT €13 million of the original Schokland Fund was still available. The above recommendations were formulated in the light of a possible third call for proposals, but this did not take place. However, MoFA reported that the lessons learned in the mid-term review, as well as experiences in the course of managing, monitoring and evaluating individual Schokland projects, have found their way into new policies and management structures. We provide an overview of these developments in the next paragraph.

#### **1.1.4 Recent developments**

The on-going experiences with Schokland and other partnerships have shown that the involvement of private business in partnerships generally correlates with better focus, higher effectiveness and more value added. This is why MoFA has decided to add the participation of the business sector as a selection criterion to a more recent PPP facility (FDOV). However, The ideal composition of a partnership depends on the specific aim. Thus the definition of what a public-private partnership entails can differ depending on context. For example, in another PPP facility, aimed at stimulating sustainable projects in the fields of water safety and water security, participation of a public body (other than MoFA) is desired, because provision and management of water is generally seen as a public good.

Other policy changes as a result of lessons learned are:

- The composition of partnerships, the roles of partners (including MoFA) and division of risks are formalized in cooperation agreements. Changes in the composition or division of tasks are only allowed under predefined conditions.
- The management and monitoring of projects co-financed from current PPP facilities is delegated to a government agency specialised in the administration of grants (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland), in order to increase procedural uniformity.
- In order to increase project relevance for the local context, the active participation of at least one partner from the targeted country is required in current PPP facilities. Also, the Dutch embassies are involved in assessment of project proposals.
- Some effort has been made to improve process-level learning during implementation of PPP projects: a PPP Expertise Centre has been established within MoFA, and for FDOV and FDW a 'learning platform' has been created, which will support PPP projects by addressing research questions that follow from implementation.

### **1.4. Overview of Schokland partnerships and projects**

The establishment of the Schokland Fund was followed by two calls for proposals, both in 2009. According to Aidenvironment 62 project proposals were submitted. 35 of these were rejected, most of them (25) on technical grounds. The other proposals were either rejected because they were not sufficiently innovative, did not contribute sufficiently to the MDGs or both. Overviews provided by MoFA show 27 projects that were approved in the first two rounds of Schokland.

In 2010 a number of partnerships initiated new activities aimed at the MDGs. Even though these projects were not supported by the Schokland Fund they were considered as part of the Schokland portfolio and referred to as Millennium Agreements. The thematic directorates of MoFA co-financed these projects from their own budgets. The set of eligibility criteria developed for the Schokland Fund did not officially apply. However, according to MoFA officers, it was used as a reference framework.

Eventually, both the Schokland Agreements dating from 2008/9 and the partnerships supported in 2010 were called Millennium Agreements. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to all projects resulting from these Schokland or Millennium Partnerships as Schokland projects.



Table 1 contains an overview of all Schokland projects and their respective awarded grants.

Table 1: Overview of the Schokland projects and Millennium agreements

Nr.	MoFA Reference	Title	Max. Grant Awarded (€)
<b>Proposals 1<sup>st</sup> tender Schokland Fund</b>			
1	18404	Internet for Water and Sanitation	1,225,000
2	18407	Access to Internet and ICT	2,250,000
3	19471	Best of Both Worlds	2,113,512
4	18512	Learn4Work	2,000,000
5	18430	InReturn's East Africa Fund	487,000
6	18428	Fragile States and Education	288,309
7	18429	Pilots Commodity Business Support Centres	4,800,000
8	18401	Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge	153,534
9	20778	Foundation 2015	600,000
<i>Sub-total 1<sup>st</sup> call for proposals Schokland Fund</i>			<i>13,917,355</i>
<b>Proposals 2<sup>nd</sup> tender Schokland Fund</b>			
10	19292	Increase food security and improve livelihoods of rice and sorghum producers	2,066,728
11	19474	MDG 5 - Meshwork for Improving Maternal Health	4,406,854
12	19299	Global Premix for Food Fortification	6,576,550
13	19296	Food Early Solutions for Africa (FESA) - Micro Insurance	645,000
14	19250	SMS Combats HIV/Aids	124,436
15	21496	Fighting Violence to Ensure Education for All	541,046
16	19278	Platform MDG Profs: Action Plan Knowledge and Research for Development	435,000
17	19297	Farming and Livelihood Improvement Programme (FLIP)	317,334
18	19298	Design and Local Production of Ergonomic Tools for Farmers	251,077
19	19305	Financing Sustainable Value Chains	3,070,000
20	19285	Oikocredit	435,000
21	20191	The World Mortgage: A House for a House	1,750,000
22	19293	Smarter Futures- Improving Quality Wheat & Maize flour in Africa	319,050
23	20729	Helping Farmers Produce Cassava for Profit	6,000,000
24	19248	Text to Change (TTC)	104,200
25	20192	Ananthagiri	680,000
26	20100	Fair Climate Fund (FCF)	4,370,000
27	18162A	IDH - The Borneo Initiative (TBI)	2,000,000
<i>Sub-total 2<sup>nd</sup> call for proposals Schokland Fund</i>			<i>34,092,275</i>
<i>Total First and Second Round Schokland Fund</i>			<i>48,009,630</i>
<b>Projects added to Schokland portfolio in 2010</b>			
28	18233	Foundation Rural Energy Services (FRES)	10,000,000
29	30700	Knowledge Network for Peace, Security and Development	2,633,569
30	17269	Universal Access to Female Condom (UAFC)	5,000,000

31	16717	Green Light for Africa (SESA)	3,300,000
32	16707	Knowledge for Health	300,000
33	19884	Aqua for All (A4A)	7,000,000
34	15369	Millennium Municipalities in Business	250,000
35	21598	Health Insurance Fund (HIF)	157,963
36	18329	Mesofinancing in Developing Countries	3,450,000
37	18503	More than the Sum of Parts: 3D Interaction Forum	740,500
38		Netherlands National Action plan 1325 (NAP1325)	75,000
39	19836	Heat-Stable Oxytocin	86,750
40	20639	Access to Medicine (ATM)	750,000
41		An Ombudsman for Development Cooperation	n.a.
42	20378	Resource Centre Development Partnerships	2,880,750
43	20790	Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition (AIM)	1,112,910
44	17288	MDG 3 Fund: Investing in Equality	70,000,000
45		Eradicate Violence against Women	20,000,000
46	19163	Health Insurance for the Poor (HIP)	157,963
47	20199	Moving Targets	2.500,000
48		Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)	550,000
49		Culture, Development and International Culture Policy (C&O)	2,000,000
50		Declaration of Intent Cooperation Tax and Development (B&O)	500,000
51		Sanoma Agreement	0
52	18162	Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH)	57,938,000
53	18162B	IDH - The Amazon Alternative (TAA)	6,585,000
54	PM	The Currency Exchange (TCX)	PM
<i>Sub-total additional projects</i>			<i>197,968,405</i>
<i>Total all Schokland Projects</i>			<i>245,978,035</i>

Source: financial overview Schokland Agreements, MoFA (12-12-2013) and AE-MTR analysis sheets (2009).

The allocated Schokland Fund grants in total amount to €48 million, which is less than the intended amount of € 60.5 million. A far larger amount (almost € 198 million) was provided by MoFA directorates from their regular budgets (Table 1).

Some of these projects are well embedded in long-term cooperation arrangements with the contract-partners of these partnerships. In hindsight it is not possible in every case to establish whether specific proposals were triggered by the Schokland Meeting in June 2007 or through other dialogue mechanisms. Interviews with MoFA officers and contract-partners indicate that the Schokland process was used an opportunity to renew, expand and innovate on-going activities in line with the Schokland agreements. In these cases Schokland was not so much a start-up subsidy for new initiatives, but it was much more an accelerator for these activities.

## 1.5. Objectives and scope of this evaluation

### 1.5.1. Objectives

This evaluation was commissioned by the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to improve PPP policy in the context of development cooperation and trade. The objectives of this Schokland and PPP evaluation, as explained in the ToR (see annex 7) are:

1. To deliver an appraisal of the individual Schokland agreements at output level, and where possible, also at outcome and impact level;
2. To synthesise the results of the Schokland agreements and other PPPs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of previously conducted evaluations;
3. To make policy recommendations concerning the factors determining the success and failure of PPPs.

### 1.5.2. Scope and time-frame

The scope of this evaluation is a basket of 53 'Schokland projects', i.e. activities supported by MoFa, which result from Schokland or Millennium Agreements. 27 of these projects received financial support from the Schokland Fund, and the other 26 projects were co-financed from regular budgets and managed by different directorates within the Ministry.

This evaluation covers the period 2008 (start of first Schokland project) until the end of 2013 (when the evaluation started). As project reporting usually lags behind several months, results of unfinished projects were included up to the first half of 2013. For projects that had already ended by the time this evaluation started, reporting was only available up to the formal end date. In some cases, we have been able to update this information in interviews. The reference date for financial information is November 4, 2011.

To incorporate earlier lessons learned in this evaluation, the ToR asked to subject other PPP's (i.e. not linked to Schokland or Millennium Agreements) to a meta-evaluation. Criteria for selection were that they were supported by the Dutch government and that they had been evaluated. An internal search by MoFA/DDE resulted in four evaluation reports<sup>7</sup>. Although the number of evaluations was not specified in the ToR, this yield was less than expected. The evaluations also provided less information than hoped for on success and failure factors for partnerships. Overall, the information provided was insufficient to draw conclusions on PPPs in general. In agreement with the reference group, the evaluation team therefore decided to leave the meta-evaluation out of the main report and provide an overview of findings in the Annexes instead.

### 1.5.3. Research questions

The research questions of this evaluation, as prescribed in the ToR, are listed below:

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<sup>7</sup> The search also yielded some evaluation reports that concerned Schokland projects. These were added to the project files and included in the basic assessments projects.

1. *Appraisal of the individual Schokland agreements at output, (and if possible) outcome and impact level:* How do the Schokland agreements rank in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability?

Sub-questions:

- To what extent have the objectives of the agreement been achieved? (*effectiveness*)
- Has the agreement contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the Schokland Fund?<sup>8</sup> (*relevance and impact*)
- Was the agreement implemented in a cost-effective manner? (*efficiency*)
- Are the results sustainable? (*sustainability*)

2. *Synthesis of results of Schokland agreements and other PPPs funded by MoFA:* Have the PPPs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to innovative results in development cooperation? If so, how? If not, why not?

Sub-questions:

- Is the agreement or the partnership innovative (for example because it introduces new parties, new resources, new technology and/or a new approach?)
- What has been done with the insights achieved through this innovation (local spin-off)?
- Has the PPP generated commercial activities?
- Which partner was significant in achieving the results, and in what situation?

3. *Policy recommendations concerning the factors determining success and failure of PPPs:* What are the specific success and failure factors of the partnership?

Sub-questions:

- Was there a balance between the input of profit-organisations and not-for-profit organisations?
- Do the project results indicate that the cooperation between partners in the partnership generated added value? Could the results also have been achieved without the partnership?
- Is it possible to determine in which situations or sectors PPPs are likely to provide added value?
- Did particular governance factors influence the partnership?
- What specific risk factors affect partnerships and how can these be mitigated?
- What agreements were made about the sharing of inputs, costs, results, profit and risk?
- In what way was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the Dutch embassy involved in the organisation, management or strategic advice, and did this contribute to the results?
- What best practices (including context-specific elements) can be identified?
- What are the recommendations for future PPP-type programmes, based on the evaluation of the Schokland agreements and previous evaluations?

The focus of this evaluation is on the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of Schokland projects. The research questions do not concern the selection and approval process and also not the

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<sup>8</sup> Achieving the MDGs through cooperation between partners, in an innovative fashion and with substantial individual contributions.

management and administration arrangements at MoFA. These process aspects have already been evaluated in the Schokland mid-term review<sup>9</sup>.

#### **1.5.4. Reference group**

The evaluation was supported by a reference group consisting of three representatives of DDE, of which one acted as an independent president, a representative of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) and a representative of the Partnerships Resource Centre. The reference group provided valuable feedback and guidance on aspects of methodology and on analytical issues such as success and failure factors for partnerships.

#### **1.5.5. Key users**

The key users of this evaluation are the Department for Sustainable Economic Development (DDE) and other departments within MoFA engaged with partnerships or interested in developing new partnerships. The recommendations are specifically intended for DDE, the principal for this evaluation and the host of the intradepartmental expertise centre for PPP's.

### **1.6. Structure of the report**

This report consists of 7 chapters. The following chapter describes the research approach and methodology. In chapter 3 a description of the main features of the Schokland projects are introduced. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the evaluation, structured for the different levels of analysis in this evaluation. Chapter 5 contains the analysis of findings according to the first two main evaluation questions and sub-questions. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions that are based on the analysis and in chapter 7 the recommendations are introduced.

A series of annexes can be found at the end of the report:

Annex 1: List of persons interviewed and field-visit programmes and interviews

Annex 2: Literature and documents reviewed

Annex 3: Case studies

Annex 4: Project summaries of non-case study projects

Annex 5: Survey results and analysis

Annex 6: Assessment table of Schokland projects evaluation sample

Annex 7: Evaluation of non-Schokland partnerships

Annex 8: Definition of Millennium Development Goals

Annex 9: Terms of Reference

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<sup>9</sup> Aidenvironment 2009.

# CHAPTER 2: Methodology

## 2.1 Research design

This evaluation consists of two pillars, 1) the evaluation of activities under the Schokland/Millennium Agreements and 2) the meta-evaluation of earlier evaluated partnerships.

The first pillar serves two goals: to establish the results of the Schokland Agreements, in terms of development outcome and impact, and to combine these results with information on the configuration of the partnerships underlying these agreements. This combination should provide insight into success or failure factors for partnerships in development. Research activities in this pillar were divided in three levels:

- A basic assessment of 39 agreements in the sample, consisting of desk research using only the available material in project files. The typical project file contains a project approval document ('BeMo'), project narrative and financial reports, mid-term or end evaluations (if carried out), and copies of formal and informal communication.
- An intermediate-level assessment of 22 selected agreements (including the 6 agreements that were preselected for level 3), consisting of telephone interviews and an online survey among the most important partners. The interviews were meant to supplement lacking or out-dated information in the project files.
- An intensive assessment of 6 agreements preselected by MoFA, consisting of more elaborate interviews with a broader set of partners and visits to project locations.

The aim of the assessments was twofold. In the first place it served to reconstruct the intervention logic of the agreements, in order to determine the development relevance (ex-ante). Secondly it aimed to collect available information on input, output, outcome and impact, as well as innovation and process factors (setup and operation of the partnerships). The levels were incremental, meaning that each Schokland Agreement went through the basic assessment, a subset was also evaluated at the intermediate level and an even smaller subset was studied rigorously on location.

A questionnaire was distributed among the participating partners in the intermediate assessment and case studies to obtain insight into the appreciation of partnerships and partnership development over time.

For the second pillar, MoFA provided the evaluation team with 5 reports of earlier, external or internal evaluations of PPPs supported by the Ministry, which were unrelated to any of the Schokland Agreements. Findings and conclusions of these evaluations on development outcome and impact were assembled, as well as conclusions on success factors for partnerships.

Members of the evaluation team have performed the above steps more or less independently. To guide and standardise these processes as much as possible, we used of protocols for each separate step in the evaluation and topic lists for each type of interview. All protocols and topic lists had first been discussed and agreed upon by the reference group.

The research results were processed and analysed during two full evaluation team workshops, one near the end of the data collection phase and one after data collection was finalised. The purpose of these workshops was to collectively crosscheck and analyse findings, and to combine these into a shared analysis on an aggregate level. Topics included in the discussion were; the classification of agreements, assessment of innovation processes realised by the partnerships, partnership lifecycle and sustainability perspectives, comparison of development results against original planning and a ranking of Schokland projects based on these criteria. Furthermore success and failure factors and partner configurations were discussed and analysed in the team.

As a final step, the team's judgements of all projects was translated into a quantitative score on four aspects:

- Development results (a composite score based on available information on outputs and outcomes);
- Innovation;
- Sustainability;
- Amount of (theoretical) success factors that we observed in the implementing partnerships.

These scores were used to analyse what types of partnerships produced positive development results, and to discover relations between types of partnerships, results and the presence (or absence) of success factors.

## 2.2. Definition of key concepts

In this evaluation, we make use of the concepts of 'critical success and failure factors' and 'innovation' that may need some clarification.

### *Innovation*

One of the assumptions underlying the Schokland Pact was that partnerships produce innovative forms of development cooperation and could accelerate the realisation of the MDGs. For this reason innovation is a central themes in this evaluation. Operationalising 'innovation', we discern four dimensions: process, technological, financial and output innovation.<sup>10</sup> In this evaluation, we have used the following questions to demarcate the four dimensions:

1. Process innovation: have partners developed new processes within and between their organisations/ new ways of cooperating that help to reach the goals of their partnership?
2. Technological innovation: has the partnership produced new technical solutions for the problems it focuses on?
3. Financial innovation: has the partnership found new sources or forms of income or financing, so that it can continue without subsidy?

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<sup>10</sup> See: Pierre Hupperts & Caroline van Leenders, *Bedrijven en maatschappelijke organisaties: samenwerken voor duurzaam ondernemen*, NIDO, 2003

4. Product or output innovation: has the partnership brought up new approaches, solutions products or services?

Of course the judgement of innovativeness of a project can change over time. It is important to note that we have not evaluated projects against current standards (e.g. is the technology innovative compared to other technologies today?) but against the situation when projects were conceived.

### *Success and failure factors*

Some of the evaluation questions refer to success and failure factors for partnerships in development. In the scientific literature, many success and failure factors have been put forward and there is an on-going discussion on which factors are the most critical<sup>11</sup>. Based on this literature and a preliminary analysis of project related documents and interviews, the evaluation team has decided upon a list of 12 most important critical success and failure factors that were identified in previous research and those which were used in the mid-term review of Schokland partnerships<sup>12</sup>:

- a) Clarity of roles, responsibilities and ground-rules (including legal/formal arrangements),<sup>13</sup>
- b) Clear understanding of mutual benefits / shared interests (win-win),
- c) Clear and shared vision of objectives / shared ambition,
- d) Clear communication, shared planning and decision making,
- e) Good / professional leadership,
- f) Complementarity of competencies,
- g) Balance of inputs/efforts to achieve results,
- h) Level of effort to maintain relations and build trust,
- i) Existence of theory of change and related key performance indicators (for monitoring and reporting),
- j) Achieving cultural / cross-sector synergy,
- k) Willingness to learn (and make mistakes),
- l) Longer-term vision on sustainability – independency from subsidy/funding.

These factors are defined as success factors, so a higher score contributes (supposedly) to successful cooperation within a partnership. Failure factors are the inverse of the success factors.

## **2.3. Sampling and representativeness**

For the purpose of this evaluation a total sample of 39 projects was chosen. In this section it is explained to which extent this selection can be regarded as representative for all Schokland projects, including the later added Millennium Agreements.

The scope of this evaluation, in terms of project selection, was delimited by MoFA and formalised in the Terms of Reference (ToR). MoFA chose to leave out agreements that were not effectively

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<sup>11</sup> IOB, *Public- Private Partnerships in developing countries, a systematic literature review*, no 378, April 2013; Partnership Resource Centre (2012, 2013), Hupperts (20013)

<sup>12</sup> Aidenvironment, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> The first 5 success-factors are derived from the Partnership Resource Centre (2012). The other 7 factors are derived from other sources, see note above.



started. Thus in this evaluation, Schokland and Millennium Agreements always led to activities. This means that the sample is not representative for the complete set of Schokland Agreements. Moreover, this evaluation concerns only those activities that have received a grant from MoFA (from the Schokland Fund and/or from departmental budgets). Thus partnerships that applied for funds but were turned down, and partnerships that did present projects to MoFA but never applied for funds, were not included in this evaluation.

The number projects included in this evaluation is slightly smaller than mentioned in the ToR. In consultation with the reference group, three projects were removed from the list after the start of the evaluation. One project was removed because it was a specific partnership to generate knowledge on partnerships in direct interaction with MoFA<sup>14</sup>. A second project was impossible to evaluate as a separate project because it had been integrated into a larger project<sup>15</sup> and an extensive evaluation was already planned for this integrated project. And a third project<sup>16</sup> was withdrawn from the evaluation sample because it appeared that no activities had been undertaken.

The final evaluation sample covers 39 projects in total, covering all 9 projects selected in the first tender for the Schokland Fund and 12 (of 14) from the second tender. Of the 31 projects that were later added to the Schokland Fund, 19 projects were selected for this evaluation. The 39 selected projects are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Presentation of evaluation sample

Nr.	MoFA Reference	Title	Max. Grant Awarded (€)
<b>Proposals 1<sup>st</sup> tender Schokland Fund</b>			
1	18404	Internet for Water and Sanitation	1,225,000
2	18407	Access to Internet and ICT	2,250,000
3	19471	Best of Both Worlds	2,113,512
4	18512	Learn4Work	2,000,000
5	18430	InReturn's East Africa Fund	487,000
6	18428	Fragile States and Education	288,309
7	18429	Pilots Commodity Business Support Centres	4,800,000
8	18401	Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge	153,534
9	20778	Foundation 2015	600,000
<b>Proposals 2<sup>nd</sup> tender Schokland Fund</b>			
10	19292	Increase Food Security and Improve Livelihoods of Rice and Sorghum Producers	2,066,728
11	19474	MDG 5 - Meshwork for Improving Maternal Health	4,406,854
12	19299	Partnering to Improve Availability of Premix for Food Fortification	6,576,550
13	19296	Food Early Solutions for Africa (FESA) - Micro Insurance	645,000
14	19250	SMS Combats HIV/Aids	124,436
15	21496	Fighting Violence to Ensure Education for All	541,046
16	19278	Platform MDG Profs: Action Plan Knowledge and Research for Development	435,000
17	19297	Farming and Livelihood Improvement Programme (FLIP)	317,334
18	19298	Design and Local Production of Ergonomic Tools for Farmers	251,077

<sup>14</sup> Partnerships Resource Centre

<sup>15</sup> The Borneo Initiative, integrated into IDH.

<sup>16</sup> Ombudsman for Development Cooperation.

19	19305	Financing Sustainable Value Chains	3,070,000
20	19285	Oikocredit	435,000
21	20191	The World Mortgage: A House for them a house for us	1,750,000
22	19293	Smarter Futures- Improving Quality Wheat & Maize flour in Africa	319,050
23	20729	Helping Farmers Produce Cassava for Profit	6,000,000
24	19248	Text to Change (TTC)	104,200
25	20192	Ananthagiri	680,000
26	20100	Fair Climate Fund (FCF)	4,370,000
<b>Projects added to Schokland portfolio in 2010</b>			
28	18233	Foundation Rural Energy Services (FRES)	10,000,000
29	30700	Knowledge Network for Peace, Security and Development	2,633,569
30	17269	Universal Access to Female Condom (UAFC)	5,000,000
31	16717	Green Light for Africa (SESA)	3,300,000
32	16707	Knowledge for Health	300,000
33	19884	Aqua for All (A4A)	7,000,000
34	15369	Millennium Municipalities in Business	250,000
35	21598	Health Insurance Fund (HIF)	157,963
36	18329	Mesofinancing in Developing Countries	3,450,000
37	18503	More than the Sum of Parts: 3D Interaction Forum	740,500
38		Netherlands National Action plan 1325 (NAP1325)	75,000
39	19836	Heat-Stable Oxytocin	86,750
40	20639	Access to Medicine (ATM)	750,000
<b>Total grant value of evaluation sample</b>			<b>48,369,843</b>

Note: projects indicated in blue are projects that were subjected to a detailed casestudy and projects indicated in yellow were subjected to an intermediate analysis

The ToR selected six projects for which case studies and country visits needed to be carried out. This pre-selection (see Table 3) was based upon a preparatory scan of available information in 42 Schokland/Millennium project files, carried out by Berenschot on behalf of MoFA/DDE<sup>17</sup>. However, the evaluators were free to choose which of the projects' activities to include in the case studies and which locations to visit. We selected activities that were situated in different regions of the world and that differed in complexity and budget, to get a broad impression of the variety of contexts that the projects operated in.

Table 3: Projects selected for case studies

Reference	Title	Site visit locations
19474	Meshwork for Mothercare	Sierra Leone
19471	Best of Both Worlds	Sierra Leone
18407	Access to Internet and ICT	Zambia
19292	Increase Food Security and Improve Livelihoods of Rice and Sorghum Producers	Burundi and DRC
19299	Partnering to Improve Availability of Premix for Food Fortification	Uganda and Bangladesh
18404	Internet for Water and Sanitation	Uganda, Kenya and Bangladesh

The evaluation team selected the subset of non-case study projects for the intermediate assessment. Because of large differences in terms of budget and partnership composition, we

<sup>17</sup> Berenschot 2013.

selected a relatively large sample of 16 out of 33 remaining projects, with at least one from each of the following categories:

- Geographical focus (East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Asia, Latin America, Worldwide) ,
- Complexity of partnership (up to two or multiple partners next to MoFA),
- Budget (< 250k €, 250-500k €, 500k-1mln €, 1-3 million €, 3-6 million €, >6 million €).

The projects selected for the intermediate assessment are marked in yellow in table 2. Considering that all projects were submitted to at least the basic assessment scheme, we trust we have a decent base for presenting findings and drawing conclusions on the 38 projects selected for this evaluation.

## 2.4. Bottlenecks and limitations

Desk research into the selected partnerships was hampered somewhat by the lack of availability of information in project files. Project files gave only partial and for the most part out-dated information on the composition and operation of partnerships.

In 7 of the 24 projects in the basic and intermediate-level assessments there had already been some form of external evaluation (either mid-term review and/ or end evaluation). The evaluation reports were generally informative on the criteria of input, output and outcome (and to a lesser extent on impact) and the information has been duly taken into account. Unfortunately, these evaluation reports were not as informative for the quality aspects of partnerships. It seems that evaluating partnerships in terms of process and relationship aspects was not standard. As a consequence, information was generally lacking on issues such as the composition of partnerships, the roles and responsibilities of partners, the extent of formalisation and the contents of any formalised agreements, nor was it often clear why these specific partners joined forces (intervention logic of the partnership). This lack of information limited the possibility of analysing success and failure factors for partnerships.

Additional research (in the form of interviews and an online survey) was used to collect information on qualitative partnership aspects, but this step was hampered by considerable difficulties in finding contact persons who were still involved in the partnerships. Many people who were first involved in the sampled projects had changed jobs, were not easy to trace and in many cases had no updated knowledge on the partnership development. In a few cases we did not find anyone to interview, because projects and partnerships had already ended and sometimes, contact persons were not fully cooperative.

A further challenge in this evaluation was that the evaluators have encountered confidentiality issues in several partnerships, related with conflicts between partners that were unresolved at the time of evaluation. The chosen solution is to report the details of our analyses to the Reference Group only, and to report only aggregate results in the body of the report. Where partners disagreed with the analysis of the evaluators they were given the opportunity to present a side letter as a complement to the confidential analyses.

The scope of this evaluation includes the selected projects (and the implementing partnerships) only, whereas in reality some of these projects have relations to other activities, either or not sponsored by MoFA. A few projects that started as small activities were later integrated into larger contracts or were followed up by very similar activities. This makes attribution of a partnership's results to the specific Schokland project (and period and subsidy amount) rather difficult.

# CHAPTER 3: Main findings

## 3.1. Introduction


In this chapter we present the combined and aggregated findings of the basic and intermediate assessments of the 39 selected Schokland projects. For findings and analyses on individual projects and partnerships, please refer to the annexes: Annex 3 contains the detailed description of the 6 projects that were selected for case studies and Annex 4 contains a summary of the 33 other projects. The results of the survey among the principal partners in the Schokland projects (part of the intermediate assessment) are presented separately in Annex 5. In the next paragraph we will first describe the Schokland projects on the basis of characteristics such as size and focus. Then, in paragraph 3.3, we will present some features of the partnerships that initiated these projects.

## 3.2. Project characteristics

### 3.2.1. Budgets and grants

The size of project subsidies in the evaluation sample shows considerable variety. The largest category contains 9 projects which received between €250,000 and €500,000. 8 projects received between €1 million and €3 million while another 7 projects received between €3 million and €6 million (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Subsidy-Amounts awarded to Schokland Projects



a. Note: for projects that were administratively closed at the time of this evaluation, the final subsidy amount is used, while for still on-going Schokland project the initial subsidy amount is used.

Source: financial overview Schokland Agreements, MoFA (12-12-2013).


The average budget of the partnerships is € 4,721,320. For projects co-financed from the Schokland Fund, the subsidy amounted to 37% of the budget on average. For the projects outside the Schokland Fund, the average subsidy share was 54%.

At the time of this evaluation, approximately 74% of the total budgeted subsidy was spent. Non-spent funds relate mostly to delays in implementation (see next paragraph) and in a few cases to lack of progress in reaching results.<sup>18</sup> According to the Ministry’s financial administration, the maximum subsidy amount awarded to the projects at the time of closure was not always reached. In most cases however, final expenditures surpass 95% of the budgeted subsidy, as would be expected at the end of a project.

### 3.2.2. Duration

All of the projects within our sample started (officially) between 2007 and 2010, with most starting in 2009 (figure 3).


Figure 3: Amount of projects per starting year



Source: Aidenvironment 201; adjustments APE.

The planned duration of projects varies between 1 and 5 years. Most of the projects had a planned duration of four years or more (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Planned duration of projects




<sup>18</sup> Reference date: 04 November, 2013.

Source: Berenschot, 2013; adjustments APE.

At the start of 2013, 12 of the Schokland files were not yet formally closed, which implies that activities were still on-going, or that the final reports of the project were not yet approved. In 26 cases the grant agreement was finalised at the time of this evaluation. In one case a grant agreement was ended prematurely, due to disagreements between MoFA and the contracting partner on the project's progress (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Current state of project files



Source: Evaluation team analysis, January 2014, based on financial overview of MoFA 2013

Ten out of 39 projects passed their original end date and were extended (with no-cost contract extensions).

### 3.2.3. Project goals

The project proposals show that all sampled projects focus explicitly on one or more MDGs (see Annex 9 for a definition of MDGs), as expected. The most common goal is MDG 1: 27 out of 39 projects (69%) aim to alleviate extreme poverty and hunger in one way or another. This is unsurprising as there are many interlinkages between MDG 1 and other goals. For example, if a project aims for MDG 6 (combating hiv/aids and other diseases) it is reasonable that – if successful – the project can also have an effect on poverty. In many project plans, the intervention logic resembles this example.

Figure 6: Millennium Development Goals



Source: United Nations.

The second most common MDG in our evaluation sample is MDG 8, developing a global partnership for development (19 projects; 49%). MDG 8 refers to the establishment of a global partnership for development. It is not surprising that this goal features in so many project proposals as the development of new and innovative partnerships was a criterion of the Schokland Fund. MDG 8 can be seen as an intermediate goal, or as a means to reach other MDGs.

12 projects (30%) address MDG 7, ensuring environmental sustainability, mostly in relation to poverty reduction. These projects typically combine development of agricultural production and value chains with environmental sustainability.

Health(care) improvement (MDGs 4, 5 and 6) is also a common target in the project portfolio. Three of six health projects include all three health MDGs in their proposals, bringing together a variety of actors to address child and mother perspectives and the provision of medicine and medical treatment.

Education (MDG 2) and gender equity (MDG 3) are less prominent in the sampled. Only 6 projects included gender equity as a goal. In three cases gender equity is linked to education (MDG 2) and in two cases with health (MDGs 4 and 5). In one case gender-equity is the single focus of the project.

Apart from interconnections between MDGs, the fact that the vast majority of projects (26) address multiple MDGs may also be related to a tendency, as some applicants testified, to mention multiple MDGs in order to increase the chance of winning a grant.


### 3.2.4. Geographic focus

All projects but one directly target problems in developing countries. The exception is a project that aims to raise awareness of the MDGs in the Netherlands. Other projects may also contain elements



of awareness, but combine this with activities directly targeted at problem-solving in developing countries. The geographical focus of the sampled projects is presented in Figure 7.

Figure 7: MDG and geographic coverage of the Schokland projects



Source: financial overview Schokland Agreements, MoFA (12-12-2013) and AE-MTR analysis sheets (2009)


Figure 7 shows that that most projects focus on Africa. 18 projects (46%) are solely situated in African countries. In 7 out of 8 projects addressing multiple countries in different regions African countries feature prominently. Only one project combines countries in Asia and Latin America only. The 8 global projects do not focus on any specific country or region but address all developing countries equally. This means that a total of 33 projects in the evaluation portfolio address countries in Africa. Three other projects were implemented in Asia only, one in Latin America only, one in both Asia and Latin America and finally one only in the Netherlands.

Most of the projects (28) target multiple countries. Of the 11 single-country projects, some even target specific communities or regions and in a few cases just one community (a case of integral local development). The single-country projects in Africa were implemented in: Ghana (2), Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. All projects in Asia were single country-projects: two in India and one in Nepal.

### 3.2.5. Thematic focus

Figure 8 shows the priority themes and sectors of the Schokland projects, as analysed by the evaluation team. These themes and sectors are more specific than the MDGs and therefore shed some more light on the variety of topics in the project portfolio.

Figure 8: priority themes and sectors in Schokland projects



Source: evaluation team assessment 2014

The largest category in the Schokland portfolio is financial service delivery. Nine projects focused on financial services. These services can be divided into two sub-categories (micro or meso-) financing and insurances.

The second largest category is composed of projects in the health sector (6). Five projects focused on safety and security issues. Next in line are four categories that contain five projects each: local development, food security, value chain development and Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). Around these themes, multiple-stakeholder initiatives were already common before Schokland and some of the projects in the Schokland portfolio were not entirely new, although new innovative aspects and new partners were incorporated.

Knowledge management and ICT were new areas for which multi-stakeholder cooperation was organised. These areas are relatively new in development cooperation and the projects in this category can be considered innovative.

While 29 of 39 Schokland projects had a clear focus on just one theme, in 10 projects two thematic focuses were combined. This was usually a combination between a sector and a methodological theme, e.g. combining health, safety and security or WASH activities with new communication technologies or knowledge management (3 projects), health or value chain development with financial service delivery or knowledge management (3 projects).


### 3.2.6. Innovation

In this evaluation special attention was given to innovation in the projects, as one of the central ideas behind the Schokland Pact and Fund was that innovation would accelerate progress towards the MDGs. We looked at four different types of innovation:

- Process innovation;
- Technological innovation;
- Financial innovation;
- Product/Output innovation.

Figure 9 shows the types and amounts of innovations found in the sample.

Figure 9: Amount and types of innovations observed in Schokland project sample



Source: Evaluator’s analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014


As shown in the table, innovations of all four types were found. We have found process innovation in 15 projects, in the form of new mechanisms to manage and coordinate projects or new ways of bringing together different partners. Technological innovation was found in 13 projects. In many cases these innovations were related to ICT. Innovation on product level was found in 12 projects. In these projects new products or services were developed for beneficiaries or intermediate agents. The most common product innovations concern financial and ICT- supported services. Financial innovation was found in 11 projects and these were found at two levels: new mechanisms for fundraising and pooling resources and new mechanisms to achieve sustainability of projects and project-related services.

Only 3 projects did not realise any innovation. These projects encountered problems in realising their innovation ambitions, at least before the end of the project. In eight other cases the evaluators

were not able to detect any innovation, but this may have been caused by information shortage. These projects were subjected to a basic (document) analysis only, and as there were no reporting requirements on innovation aspects, we cannot be sure that innovation was truly absent. Project administration

In line with the interdisciplinary character of the ‘Schokland’ event, the Schokland Fund was (originally) positioned as an inter-departmental facility. A coordinator was appointed to manage the projects supported by the Schokland Fund. After some time, these projects were handed over to different departments. The majority of projects in our evaluation sample fall under the responsibility of the Social Development Department (DSO) and the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE). The projects that were not funded from the Schokland Fund were managed by those departments of MoFA that were already maintaining relations with the partners involved.

Figure 10: Schokland project files distribution among MoFA directorates



Source: financial overview Schokland Agreements, MoFA (12-12-2013), adjusted by APE

### 3.3. Partnership characteristics

#### 3.3.1. Size of Schokland partnerships

The evaluated partnerships contained a total of 288 partners, an average of 7.4 partners per partnership. The total is an estimate because the files do not always contain full and accurate information on the partners involved and the number of partners often changes over time. The files contain information on the relationship between the Ministry and the lead party, which is always formalised in some form of grant agreement. Other partners in the partnerships have no contractual relations with the Ministry (at least not within this context). Partnerships are therefore relatively free to change partners along the way and these changes are not necessarily documented.

#### 3.3.2. Lead and contracting partner


In most (17) of the partnerships, an NGO is the lead party. In ten cases, a company took the lead role as contracting party. The remaining partnerships were administered by knowledge institutions (6),

governmental organisations (3) or an alliance’s secretariat (3). All of the lead parties are Western organisations and most are seated in the Netherlands. Western NGOs are also the largest category of partners within the partnerships (33%), followed by Western knowledge institutes (17%) and Western companies (17%). Least represented are Southern governmental organisations (0.3%), intergovernmental organisations (1%) and Southern knowledge institutes (1%).

### 3.3.3. Sectoral composition

In a large majority of cases (32) more than two sectors are represented. We distinguish four sectors: public, private (meaning businesses), civil society and knowledge. These partnerships consist usually of representatives of NGO’s and private sector or knowledge partners and MoFA participates as a funding partner, although in several cases its role went beyond funding only. In 7 partnerships, only two sectors are combined, MoFA as funding partner with either NGO’s or with knowledge sector partners only (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Types of partners per partnership (excluding MoFA)




Source: Evaluation team analysis, January 2014

### 3.3.4. New or existing partnerships

Because the Schokland Pact aimed to bring together new partnerships, we analysed the extent whether the partnerships under evaluation were mainly based on new or previously existing relations. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Mainly new or mainly existing relations



Source: Evaluation team analysis, January 2014

More than half (22) of the partnerships within the sample consist of organisations that had not worked together before. These partners came together for the purpose of developing and implementing a Schokland project. In 15 cases, the most important partners already knew each other and had already gained some experience in working together. Several partners consulted for this evaluation testified that enthusiasm and ambition in the formation of new partnerships was high, whereas the timeframe was short, at least for those partnerships that wanted to apply for a contribution from the Schokland Fund.

### 2.1.1 Formalisation

Apart from the grant agreements between MoFA and the lead partners, formalisation of ground-rules rules for cooperation, e.g. in MoU's or contracts defining the division of responsibilities and risks were rarely found in the sampled portfolio, let alone procedures for exit. From interviews it follows that partners in many cases did not (find the time to) establish clear and shared ground-rules at the start of partnerships but rather developed their partnerships organically, on the go.

## CHAPTER 4: Analysis

### 4.1. Performance on evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability)

#### 4.1.1. Relevance of projects

We assess the relevance of the evaluated projects in light of the MDGs and the Schokland aim to accelerate the Dutch contribution to realising the MDGs. On the basis of our analysis of project proposals and planning documents, in some cases supplemented by interviews, we conclude that objectives, theories of change and intervention strategies are usually present. We our assessment the relationships between goals and activities are plausible, which means that the vast majority of projects in the sample had potential for impact and can therefore be considered relevant for the MDGs. In only a few cases, the theory of change was not plausible. In one of these cases, earlier experiences with similar activities should have casted doubts on the plausibility of the theory of change and especially the feasibility of the ambitious targets. In two other cases, a plausible theory of change was presented in the project plan, but external developments during implementation undermined the project's intervention logic.

As explored in paragraph 3.2.3, some MDGs were more common than others in the Schokland portfolio. The evaluators observe that the Schokland portfolio is more relevant to MDGs 1, 7 and 8 than for the other MDGs.

Two related findings stand out. In the first place, only a few projects explicitly promote gender equality (MDG 3). This is surprising as equality may be considered a crosscutting issue that could have been addressed in all projects. Second, the amount of projects focusing on safety and security issues is remarkable as this theme is not explicitly addressed in any of the MDGs. Historically this is also not an area in which multi-stakeholder partnerships are common. A hypothesis is that the relative high proportion of safety and security related projects is related to the increased focus of Dutch development cooperation policy on safety and rule of law.

For the sample as a whole, the relevance of the projects in relation to accelerated achievement of MDGs and to more specific local or sector context can be considered realistic. With respect to specific MDGs we can see that relevance was particularly high for MDG 1; poverty reduction and MDG 8: creating a global partnership, followed by environmental sustainability (usually linked to agricultural and water-related projects).

Considering the high concentration of projects in (and for) African countries, the evaluators observe that the Schokland Portfolio is most relevant for the African continent. It is also in this continent where most countries that are lagging behind in reaching the MDG's are located. However, short timeframe for the design of project proposals has had adverse consequences on the link with (and thus relevance for) the local context. In several cases, not enough attention was given to the analysis of needs and relevant context at the local level. For some projects it is clear that the initial

partnership interactions took place mainly or even exclusively in the Netherlands. Local stakeholders were often not (fully) involved in the project design and development. Indeed, some of the proposals were written in Dutch only.

Related to the two aspects mentioned above, the evaluators have detected that in many cases partnership composition changed over time. This was generally a downsizing of the partnership, by partners dropping out over time, but in some cases new partners were added. With changes in partnerships, changes in project objectives, results and methods occurred, although (apart from requests for extension) these were not always documented. The evaluators have seen projects that reported different objectives than those that were presented at the start of the partnership. Governance of the partnership was not thought through and not well designed.

As a result of the developments in partnerships and projects, we can see that although a shared theory of change was present at the start of projects, in several cases the intervention logic was not systematically followed. If changes to the theory of change were necessary (e.g. because of changing circumstances), this was not always reported formally to MoFA, as there was no common framework for reporting requiring such information. Also, changes to the core of projects, such as the intervention logic or changes in membership of partnerships, even if they were communicated, were not always followed-up by MoFA. As a result, MoFA in only had partial information on the development of projects, which may have hindered control.

### **Complementary of competencies make partnership formation and implementation more challenging**

Relevance is also an evaluation criterion on the level of partnerships. Do the Schokland partnerships consist of the most relevant partners and do they possess the right competencies to realise their goals? Theoretically, we would expect partners to seek complementarity of competencies, instead of overlap. A large overlap in competencies would be undesirable from an efficiency perspective, as the same results might have been achieved with fewer partners and thus less transaction costs.

The analysis of the critical success factors (see section 0) shows an apparent contradictory finding: complementary competencies are more frequently found in projects with poor development results than in projects with medium and high results, which is surprising as complementarity was supposedly a success-factor. Cross-checking this contradictory finding with findings from desk-study and interviews, this finding has to be explained by the fact that in the partnership formation process a lot of effort was invested in finding interesting and complementary partners, but not enough time was invested in building relations, a good governance structure and thoroughly integrate complementarities into the projects. During the implementation of the more complex partnerships with different partners with complementary competencies, sharp differences in culture and work-approach appeared. These differences caused disruptions in the partnership and project. On the other side, more successful projects had a smaller number of partners with less variety in work-approaches. Some even developed special organisational structures to manage projects. This kind of shared organisational structure is less common in the partnerships with high complementarities because the time needed to set up that structure between parties that did not already know each other well, was not available. It seems to be easier for partners with less cultural differences to build



a shared project team, whereas partners that are less alike seem most in need of some common organisational framework for implementing their activities.

As there were many changes in the composition of partnerships it is difficult to analyse the dynamics of partnerships during the project because these developments are not usually documented in the project files and reports contain no analysis on how changes in the partnership influenced project implementation. However, the case studies conducted for this evaluation, show that frictions in a partnership between partners with complementary competencies, have had a negative effect on the development results of the project.

In larger partnerships in the Schokland Portfolio the evaluators observe a high variety of competencies at the project level and at the same time a considerable of competencies at partnership level. The evaluators observe that these larger partnerships are not tightly knit, meaning not all partners work together with equal intensity. Cooperation usually takes place at a lower, sub-central level.

#### **4.1.2. Effectiveness**

##### *Output*

In the majority of projects the level of ambition had to be downsized and project-implementation periods had to be extended. The enthusiasm and potentially also the time pressure in the beginning of the process may have been a root cause for the fact that intended results were often proven not feasible in practice, at least not within the set time frame. There seems to have been a lack of capacities and competencies in several partnerships.

The smaller partnerships in the sample and partnerships managed by special units appeared to be more effective in producing the planned results. In section 4.4, a comprehensive analysis is made of the partnership configurations encountered in the Schokland project portfolio.

##### *Outcome and impact*

As was observed in the pre-study for this Schokland and PPP evaluation<sup>19</sup>, many of the project files contain little information on longer-term outcomes and impact and as a result it is not possible to provide a complete analysis of outcome and impact.

For the projects selected for case studies it was possible to identify and analyse outcomes and impacts of project up to a certain extent. This is described in Annex 4. In the meta-evaluation of PPP-evaluations we have also looked at outcome and impact (see annex 8).

Summarising the analysis of outcomes and impact presented in those two sections, the following emerges:

- The review of the Schokland project sample and the additional 4 PPP meta-evaluations show that it is impossible within the evaluation framework to arrive at a full assessment of outcomes

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<sup>19</sup> Berenschot, 2013.

and impacts of the projects. The Schokland projects and the 4 additional PPP's did not include a review of the baseline situation, let alone a comparison of baseline data among target- and control groups. Therefore it is not possible to establish whether there is a causal relationship between outcomes and impacts;

- Furthermore many of the Schokland projects have undergone significant changes in partnership composition and in project objectives and planning, which have not been systematically documented and followed up. While in some cases outcomes were described these were not always part of the original plans. More often partnerships downsized projects, by cancelling project components and lowering the level of ambition of objectives. The results of this can be seen in the large number of projects that achieved less outputs and have achieved lower outreach among target-groups and locations than originally planned;
- Only in the case of the case studies conducted in this evaluation, we can provide a more qualitative and substantial analysis of outcomes and, up to certain extent, impact. The most important conclusions of that analysis are presented below for each of these case-studies (see further Annex 2):
  - a) The Global Premix Facility of GAIN has developed into a global facility that serves hundreds of buyers and sellers of nutrients for food-fortification worldwide. It also serves the largest global buyers of premix (a mixture of vitamins and minerals that can be added to food stuffs to increase its nutrition value), UNICEF and WPF. According to GAIN's 2012 annual report more than 451 Million beneficiaries in 39 countries were reached directly and a not specified number indirectly through other development partners (mainly UNICEF and WPF). GAIN's own reporting is regularly complemented with specific country-level impact-studies and in 2012 an independent performance review was conducted by an independent evaluation company. These independent reviews confirm the data provided in GAIN's own monitoring and reporting data. Through the quality assurance process and certification in the GPF, the quality of premixes has improved over the past years. It is not possible to assess the indirect impact of the GPF on the food-security situation of the beneficiaries reached by the programme. This lies outside the scope of the facility. At the outcome level the GPF has been successful in linking supply and demand of nutrients and premixes. The fact that the buyers of premixes have reached out to millions of people in many different countries, from the GPF project perspective is impact. The GPF project is continuing in 2013 and considering the fact that it reached 451 Million people directly and many more indirectly in the first four years of operations it is likely that this project will reach the original target of 750 Million people mentioned in the application form;
  - b) The open source for water and sanitation (Akvo) shows a quite similar picture to the GPF project of GAIN. Akvo is a service facility on water-related information, brokerage and reporting services available on the Internet, ensuring a global outreach. It has developed as planned in the original project plan and Akvo has produced impressive outputs and outcomes. At the outcome level, the Akvopedia was viewed by over 150.000 viewers in 2010 (end of Schokland project). The Akvo Platform was used by 220 partners and the number of projects that are active on Akvo marketplace is 214, representing a value of over € 10 million. Impact at the global level is difficult to establish, because users in different countries

and contexts use the Akvo services and information differently. In this evaluation we have observed impact (seen from the perspective of Akvo's intervention logic) in Uganda where Akvo's reporting system and new software 'Flow' is now replicated in the health sector and in this sector the direct (private) users of Akvo services and software have been successful in expanding the use of these instruments in the public health sector. However, to which extend these other partners in their own respective intervention strategies have obtained impact at the level of improved health situation of their patients, remains outside the scope of this evaluation. In Bangladesh, at the outcome level, the Akvo services are not only used by individual users but also shared between the different members of the Bangladesh WASH alliance and by the alliance collectively. Also in this project the indirect impact in the form of improved WASH conditions at the level of ultimate target groups of Akvo clients and users is not possible to establish and to attribute to Akvo. This indirect impact is not part of the theory of change and intervention logic of Akvo.

- c) The local sourcing project of Heineken and EUCORD in DRC and Burundi has realised its own (but independent) impact studies<sup>20</sup> of the projects in the two countries. These studies showed significant impact of the project in DRC, much higher than planned in the original project plan. 57.355 families in DRC and 10.852 families in Burundi benefited from the project in the form of increased income by the sales of rice and sorghum to Breweries, but also to local food-markets (increasing the local supply of rice in DRC). Volumes in Burundi still lag behind targets and the income increase for farmer-families is still marginal, and this will receive priority attention in the remaining project period in 2014. The project did not achieve impact in the area of education, because this original project-component received only marginal attention in Burundi and limited attention in DRC. The activities in this area remained limited to the output level by building schools and improving educational materials.
- d) The Best of Both Worlds project of the Lion Heart Foundation in Sierra Leone produced good outcomes at the local level in a rural community, in the form of increased availability and quality of maternal and general health services, improved and reliable water and electricity supply. The economic activities in the oil-palm plantation did not achieve planned results and the oil-palm plantation and palm oil factory are still not profitable after five years of project-implementation. There is noticeable impact of the project at the local level in the form of increased quality of life of families in the rural community. This impact is also picked up by the national government after a visit to Yele in 2012, where the president spent considerable time with Lion Heart to learn from the Best of Both Worlds project. The president has declared Yele as a model for other integrated rural development projects and small hydropower plants. This could greatly increase the impact of the project at the national level. But the project also faces a great risk of non-sustainability of the impact achieved, because the project is not yet realising its theory of change of financing social and health services with profit generated from business activities (palm oil factory and plantation). Currently the economic activities in Yele are subsidised by the Lion Heart Foundation. The consequence of this is that impact is not sustainable yet, because the local economic projects do not generate the income needed to sustain all activities in the village and even not their own operations. Lion Heart has recognised this challenge and in January 2014 it has

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<sup>20</sup> These impact studies were conducted by an independent researcher in 2013 and 2014. In this case (as with most other outcome and impact studies) no comprehensive baseline was available.

closed a new partnership with Natural Habitats, and organisations specialised in oil-palm cultivation and palm-oil production. Through this partnership Lion Heart hopes to overcome the current sustainability challenges in the project;

- e) The Meshwork for Mother Care project in Sierra Leone produced mainly outputs and some outcomes. The most important outcome is increased availability of trained midwives in rural areas in Sierra Leone. This outcome is still relatively recent (2012) and therefore it is not yet possible to establish impact in the form of decreasing child and maternal mortality. In a period of two to three years it might be possible to establish impact by investigating if mortality rates are decreasing in the target area. Other activities focused on strengthening the Sierra Leonean Midwives Association, campaigns on health and malaria and supporting research. These activities have resulted in a revived association and successful health campaign, professional twinning relations and available research materials. However, capacity of local institutions to make effective use of these outputs of the project is limited and relations between different partners in the projects are not optimal, limiting the perspectives for achieving impact. Furthermore, due to conflicts between two core partners in the partnership the project was ended prematurely and abruptly and there are no follow-up activities foreseen, which further limits the perspectives for impact;
- f) The ICT as an enabler for rural development project of Macha Works has produced many outputs at the local level in the community of Macha, mainly in the form of buildings and ICT infrastructure. The original ambition to install and support ICT facilities in 150 rural communities was not achieved: only in 8 communities such structures were established. Many of the initial local support withdrew from the project, reducing the level of operations mainly to Macha and mainly by Macha Works itself. Problems with acquisition of funding to maintain operations forced Macha Works to end contracts with all staff members of its local working organisation and to stop all activities. Immediately after the activities were stopped, conflicts emerged around the property of buildings and other assets that aggravated to the level of legal disputes. This situation creates a situation of total inertia in the community of Macha. Until the legal dispute is solved, the perspectives that buildings and ICT infrastructure will be used are dim. The legal dispute in Macha casts a shadow over the perspectives for impact of the Macha Works project and it is highly unlikely that the original project can be revived and restarted under new conditions and arrangements, as hoped for by Macha Works that wants to continue its operations in Macha as a volunteer organisation. In the current situation, the evaluators have to conclude that the impact of this project is nil, and the outcomes of the project are subject to a legal dispute. Some outcomes were obtained in the form of increased capacities of local people in Macha and the establishment of a still functional local radio-station staffed by local people. But the current situation in Macha makes it very difficult for people to apply the skills they have acquired in the project.

### **4.1.3. Efficiency**

#### **Project extensions were common, but for a variety of reasons**

At the time of this evaluation, 9 partnerships in the evaluation sample have requested (no-cost) extensions of their projects. Extensions have been requested for a variety of reasons:

- Unforeseen (external) events have hindered implementation,
- Implementation capacity was insufficient to operate according to plan,
- The promised co-financing (funds or in kind contributions) to match the MoFA grant) was not collected in time.

Our analyses suggest that at least in some cases partnerships were unable to meet the ambitious project objectives due to organisational problems.

### **It has not always been easy to raise the partner's own contribution to the Schokland project**

An important aspect that has caused a number of partners to request no-cost extensions, was the fact the Schokland Fund regulations prescribed that the subsidy amount of MoFA had to be matched by a 60% own contribution of partners in cash, time or kind. These commitments had to be made by the partnerships at the start of the partnerships, but during implementation some partnerships faced difficulties to meet this percentage and therefore had to extend the project-period to pool the resources needed for the own contribution.

We have encountered substantial differences in follow-up of projects by different directorates of MoFA with respect to monitoring the 40%-60% funding distribution. The projects that were funded from the Schokland Fund had to comply with these budget percentages, while projects that were later added (as Millennium agreements) did not have to comply with this requirement. Due to lack of coherent and central regulations, the treatment of the projects varied between different MoFA departments. The evaluators have found a variety of own contributions from 0% to 80% in the project sample in this evaluation, but this includes some Millennium agreements that did not have to comply with this strict criterion.

Interviews also indicate that there have been differences in style and strictness of follow-up in different projects. In some cases it appeared that MoFA accepted relatively easily that projects were not finalised fully according to plan and still made the final payments to the projects, but in other cases compliance to reaching original objectives and the 60% own contribution was enforced more strictly. This is caused by the fact that the Schokland Fund had no specific and central monitoring requirements, instructions and format and by the fact that project follow-up was delegated to various MoFA directorates.

### **There is no proof that private sector participation has resulted in a significant amount of new funding for multi-stakeholder projects.**

An often-heard and enticing argument for public-private partnerships is that they are more successful in generating additional funding for development projects, compared to public-NGO or public-knowledge sector partnerships. In 25 of the evaluated partnerships one or more Western businesses were involved at the start. The projects of these partnerships were awarded, on average, a 41% grant from MoFA, which is slightly less than average (44%). Five of these partnerships also involved one or more businesses in the target countries. These projects were granted a percentage

of 46%, which is larger than average. The grant percentage of 4 partnerships that included Southern, but not Northern businesses was even higher with a percentage of 51%.

Whether partnerships that involved private partners were better at attracting additional or follow-up investments cannot be determined on the basis of available data. Only in the intensive assessment scheme was it possible to get a comprehensive view on the project financials beyond the MoFA subsidy. This sample of six partnerships is too small for a comparative analysis of financial leverage. Considering these mixed findings, there is no reason to conclude that the Schokland portfolio would have been more efficient in generating funds if more private businesses had been involved.

### **Budget depletion of Schokland Fund is slower and less than planned**

The financial overviews of December 2013 show that only 74% of the subsidies the Ministry has pledged to the Schokland projects were spent. A quarter of the projects have surpassed their original end dates and partners had to request no-cost extensions, some projects are still ongoing on 2014.

However, these findings do not lead to any general conclusions on administrative efficiency, as we do not know to what extent delays were foreseen at the start of Schokland nor have we researched how the administrative costs of Schokland compare to the average costs of development grants.

#### **4.1.4. Sustainability**

Sustainability is an important evaluation criterion for development projects. The evaluated Schokland projects do not score well on sustainability. We have seen a significant number of projects that ceased to exist after the ending of the Schokland Funding or even during the funding period.

To better understand sustainability issues at the end of the Schokland project-period, it is useful to have an overview of the entire lifecycle of a Schokland project, as is provided in the section below.


### **Schokland projects show significant variety in phases and duration**

We have used the lifecycle model of cross-sectoral partnerships that was developed by the Partnership Resource Centre in 2012<sup>21</sup> and extended it to fit the variety observed in the Schokland portfolio. The lifecycle consists of four phases, as shown in Figure 13 below.

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<sup>21</sup> Cross-Sector Partnership Formation, What to consider before you start?, The Partnership Resource centre, 2012

Figure 13: Partnership lifecycle of Schokland agreements




Source: adapted from Partnership Resource Centre, 2012, p.7.

The first two phases refer to the formation process of partnerships. In the framework of the *Schokland call for proposals process*, most of the projects/partnerships were set-up in a relatively short period in 2007 and 2008. A significant number of partnerships already existed prior to the Schokland call for proposals. The implementation period of the Schokland projects shows significant variety, from projects that were implemented in a period of 2 or 3 years, to projects that took more than five years or are still not completed.

**Different possible routes at the end of Schokland projects, most of them moving towards institutionalisation**

When we look at the final phase and/or follow-up of the Schokland projects at the time of this evaluation, we observe that ten Schokland projects achieved replication and further rolling out of activities, such as the FESA project that developed a micro-insurance product for the African market, based on satellite data on climatic and crop-yields information. In several cases these projects were followed up at an international and even global level.

Figure 14: Routes and phases of partnership projects in Schokland project sample



Source: Evaluator’s analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

The largest group of projects (16) has taken the path towards institutionalisation. This route can be subdivided into different categories:

- Sustainability can be achieved at the institutional level. This means that the project’s activities are taken over and followed-up by different organisations and original project-partners, but there is no increased scale of operations. An example of such sustainability is the Best of Both Worlds project on integral local development in a rural community. After the Schokland project funding the project activities were continued by different local partners and the contract-partner in the Netherlands. Although the local experience is now recognised by the Sierra Leonean Government, it is not yet taken over as a model in the set-up and implementation of other projects in the countries;
- Organisational sustainability is reached, when an organisation has continued the project as a regular activity in its own organisation. Examples of such sustainability are Heineken who created a new position within its organisation to ensure that local sourcing is done according to the organisational strategy of 60% local sourcing or KNOV (the Dutch Association of Midwives) who integrated twinning and international cooperation in its organisational strategy;
- Project sustainability is achieved when the organisation or partnership has been successful in obtaining follow-up funding from other donors to continue the project as a specific activity in the organisation. An example of sustainability at this level is the project “Pilots Commodity Business Support Centres (18429)” which experienced a substantial increase of third-party contributions that enabled the project to continue and expand.

The different forms of institutionalisation can occur in combination. And those projects that have achieved replication and up-scaling have usually also achieved institutionalisation.

11 projects in the Schokland portfolio moved towards extinction. In theory, extinction can be a desired and functional step cases where the project’s theory of change has been achieved completely and no further follow-up actions are required, but in all except one projects that were




discontinued this was not the case and therefore all projects that became extinct after can be considered undesired extinctions.

Some of the Schokland projects, at the time of this evaluation, are still in implementation, but have already achieved expansion or institutionalisation while the Schokland Funding is still ongoing (e.g. Gain and Heineken).

### **Projects that have chosen the opportunity route are more successful in achieving expansion and replication than issue based partnerships**

When we look at the relationship between the route chosen at the start of the project and the final phase of the Schokland projects we can observe that the opportunity route has been more successful than the issue route:

Figure 15: Effects of issue and opportunity route on project sustainability



Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

32% of the opportunity-based projects achieved expansion or replication while only 18% of the issue-based projects reached that level. And 35% of the issue-based project became extinct while this was the case for only 26% of the opportunity based projects.

Some of the Schokland projects, at the time of this evaluation, are still in implementation, but have already achieved replication or institutionalisation while the Schokland funding is still on-going (e.g. Gain and Heineken).

### **Partnership formation processes have been effective, but those that have been formed somewhat opportunistically have not always been long-lasting**

The partnership formation for Schokland was generally done in a short timeframe. The Schokland meeting on June 30, 2007 was an important symbolic event that united many organisations around

the MDGs. The establishment of the Schokland Fund by MoFA provided a short-term perspective to develop and concretise multi-stakeholder project proposals aimed at the MDGs and it mobilised a lot of energy and enthusiasm in and around the signatories. In less than a year around 50 partnership proposals were submitted to MoFA, of which 28 were awarded a grant. While the partnership formation process can be considered quick and effective, during the implementation of the projects, some of the partnerships proved too unstable to be sustained during the whole period of implementation of the projects. In half of the case studies in this evaluation, the partnerships underwent significant changes over time and such changes were also observed in around half of the projects subjected to an intermediate analysis. Partners that were interviewed during this evaluation process indicate that the ruptures and changes in the partnership during the implementation were caused by too much opportunism and optimism at the start of the Schokland projects. But, in the other half of the projects, partners indicate that during the implementation of the projects, the relations between partners improved. The survey might also indicate that more time and effort is needed to properly prepare the proposals and set-up the partnership.

As was observed earlier, a better understanding of partnerships can only be realised if more process oriented monitoring information is made available in reporting.

Just like in a marriage between loved ones, at the time of expressing the marriage vows, the partners cannot believe that they will fight about the division of assets in case of separation. But once facing a situation of separation, they regret the fact that they have not put more agreements and rules on paper. While some partnerships have proven it is possible to reach the end of a multi-stakeholder project without major difficulties, in three out of the six case-studies in this evaluation and 4 other projects in the intermediate analysis, conflicts have caused disruptions in project implementation and/or partnership composition. The absence of mechanisms to avoid and solve these conflicts, such as a MoU containing an explicit division of tasks, rules of engagement and a procedure for exit, has sometimes aggravated the disruptive effects of conflicts in partnerships. However, it is not possible to say if ground-rules had been in place these conflicts would have been less serious or maybe not even have occurred.

#### **4.1.5. An overall development performance indicator**

The ToR for this evaluation asked for a ranking of evaluated partnerships/projects. To be able to define best practices, it is necessary to compare the effectiveness of projects and sustainability of outcomes. This is hindered by the different levels of information on the effectiveness and sustainability of projects. Even so, we have tried to construct an integrated indicator for effectiveness, covering all available information on output, outcome and sustainability of projects. In this context, sustainability only refers to the longer-term (financial) safeguarding of project outcome. We do not consider sustainability of partnerships to be relevant here, unless the continuation of a partnership is necessary to sustain outcome.

We have scored all projects on this constructed ‘development results’ indicator. Scoring was done on a three-point scale: poor, medium, high.<sup>22</sup> The summarised results of this assessment are presented in the table below.

Table 4: Assessment of development results, sustainability and innovation in Schokland projects

Development Results	# projects	Score <sup>23</sup>
Very good development results	5	96,0
Good development results	7	74,8
Medium development results	13	56,5
Insufficient development results	6	36,5
Poor development results	8	17,3

Notwithstanding the high levels of ambition in the project proposals and the sound theories of change, many partners encountered problems along the road and contextual developments made project-implementation more difficult. In the analysis of the overall performance (a composite score of development results, sustainability and innovation aspects) of the Schokland projects, 5 projects were assessed as the best cluster in the whole portfolio with an average score of 96.0 (on a scale of 0-100) and another 7 projects with an average score of 74.8. These projects achieved very good or good developmental results and to a large extent have realised the original ambitions expressed in the Schokland project proposals. For another 13 projects, the overall performance is assessed as “medium”, with an average score of 56.5, which means these projects have not realised their original ambition but still contributed visibly to achieving one or more MDGs. In 6 Schokland projects, the assessment of the evaluators is that the overall performance of these projects are not sufficient, while a final group of 8 projects have to be considered poor, both in the sense of results obtained against the original projects’ ambitions and their contribution to MDG’s is not clear. In these cases, the projects have only realised a small part of their planned outputs or results that were obtained proved not to be sustainable. In a few cases, the project as a whole, or the majority of its components were cancelled. But some other projects in the lowest scoring category did not have the intention to contribute directly to achievement of MDG’s, because these project were focussing on knowledge generation and exchange on MDG’s. As a result, these projects could only achieve a low score on development results and therefore these projects can be found in the lower ranking ranges. However, to end in the lowest range of scores, these projects also had to obtain a rather low score on sustainability and innovation. For a more detailed overview and ranking of the sampled Schokland projects, see section 4.2. and annex 6.

When considering the development results it must be taken into account that the criteria of the Schokland Fund requested new, innovative and if possible cross-sector multi-stakeholder partnerships. By default these criteria require experimentation and exploration, which in some case will put development success at risk. The evaluators’ opinion is that the innovation and partnership criteria of the Schokland Fund mean a degree of less successful development results is acceptable. However, in innovation programmes, it is important to guarantee that lessons learned during

<sup>22</sup> For the methodology of scoring, we refer to Annex 6.

<sup>23</sup> This score is weighted composite score of three different aspects: a) the development results; b) Implementation and final replication, institutionalization and extinction phase; and c) the presence of different innovation aspects in the project. The formula used was:  $(1*a+1*b+0.25*c)*100/225$ . Factor a) is between 33 and 100; factor b between 0 and 100; and factor c between -25 (no innovation) and 100.

experimentation are picked up and disseminated amongst those for whom those lessons are useful. We have found no monitoring protocol or other strategy for deriving and disseminating lessons. The Schokland projects have reported along traditional reporting lines, very much oriented towards outputs, outcomes and (sometimes) impact compared to planning. This has limited the opportunities to understand process dynamics in the partnerships during monitoring and also in this evaluation.

We have used this ranking to further analyse the characteristics of the partnerships that produced these results, which we will report upon in the next paragraphs.

## **4.2. Overall ranking of Schokland projects according to evaluation criteria**

In response to the ToR, we have come to a ranking of the projects in this evaluation sample. This ranking is based on a weighted composite score of three different aspects: a) the development results (integrated performance indicator developed by the evaluation team, as presented in section 4.1.5); b) the perspective for sustainability (upscaling/ institutionalization/ extinction, explained in section 4.1.4); and c) the amount of innovation in the project<sup>24</sup>. The detailed results of this analysis are presented in Annex 6 of this report.

Because the Schokland Fund aimed to support projects that provided a concrete contribution to the accelerated achievement of MDG's, in the scoring methodology the aspect of development outcomes was taken as the primary ranking principle and weighted more heavily than innovation aspects in a partnership. Also the perspective for sustainability and expansion and replication of experiences was weighted heavily because this aspect is closely related with achievement of wider impact in achievement of MDG's.

below presents the results of this ranking. Taking into account the uncertainties in this evaluation, among which the lack of information on various aspects, we will not present a ranking of individual projects. Instead, we have clustered the projects in five categories and presented the average score per cluster. The projects in each cluster are presented in alphabetical order. The projects in the first two categories can be seen as examples of good practice, the rest as average to worse practice.

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<sup>24</sup> The formula used was:  $(1*a+1*b+0.25*c)*100/225$ . Factor a) is between 33 and 100; factor b between 0 and 100; and factor c between -25(no innovation) and 100.

Table 5: Overall ranking of sampled projects

Project name	Score
<b>very good overall performance (range 90-100)</b>	<b>96,0</b>
Food Early Solutions for Africa - Micro Insurance	
Helping farmers produce cassava for profit	
Improved food security & livelihoods rice & sorghum producers	
Internet for Water and Sanitation	
Learn4Work /Technical and Vocational Training / TVET	
Partnering to improve availability premix for food fortification	
Smarter futures- Improving quality Wheat & Maize flour in Africa	
<b>good overall performance (range 65-80)</b>	<b>74,8</b>
Access to Medicine (ATM)	
Aqua for all	
SMS combats hiv/aids	
Text to change	
Universal access to Female Condom (UAFC)	
<b>medium overall performance (range 45-65)</b>	<b>56,5</b>
Best of Both Worlds	
Catalysing Finance for Sustainable Value Chains	
Clean and improved WASH in Nepal	
Design & local production tools for farmers in Ghana	
Dutch National Action Plan 1325 (NAP1325)	
Fair Climate Fund (FCF)	
Farming & Livelihood Improvement Programme	
InReturn's East Africa Fund	
Millennium Municipalities in Business	
Oikocredit	
Piloting Commodity Business Support Centres	
Platform for Health Insurance for the Poor	
World Mortgage: A house for us, a house for them	
<b>insufficient overall performance (30-45)</b>	<b>36,5</b>
Ananthagiri 2009-2014	
Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge	
Fighting violence to ensure education for all	
Fragile states and Education	
Intellectual property rights and innovation for MDGs	
MDG5 Meshwork for Mother Care	
<b>poor overall performance (10-25)</b>	<b>17,3</b>
Access to Internet and ICT	
Energy Services for Rural Areas	
Green light for Africa	
Heat stable Oxytocin	
Knowledge for Health	
Knowledge Network Peace, Security & Development	
Meso-financing in Developing Countries	
More than the sum of its parts: 3D interactive forum	

The scoring methodology as used in the table above values projects that are concrete MDG related interventions on the ground more highly than projects that have focused more on knowledge creation and exchange around the MDG's. This is because concrete MDG related interventions have the potential to make visible and measurable contributions to the achievement of MDG's, while knowledge related projects don't make such a visible and measurable contribution. Therefore some

of the knowledge creation and dissemination projects have ended up in the lower scoring range of the table above. This does not mean that these projects were not relevant and effective in creating and disseminating knowledge around MDG's. Therefore, although some projects scored at the lower end of the table above these projects can still be considered successful in the light of their own specific objectives but less in the light of the overall Schokland objectives.

In the following sections of this chapter, specific aspects related with performance aspects of partnerships, development results obtained and innovation aspects are presented in more detail. The analysis in these sections is based on the analysis in this table and the more detailed analytical table presented in Annex 6.

### 4.3. Analysis of observed success factors

The evaluators have assessed all Schokland projects on success factors (introduced in paragraph 0) during the implementation of the Schokland project. The assessment is based on original project documents and in the case of intermediate assessments and case studies supplemented by (and even mainly based on) interviews. The assessment is therefore retrospective and considers the whole project implementation period. In this assessment, information to compare critical success factors at the start and end of the partnership was not sufficient to come to an assessment of differences over time, but further below, an analysis of appreciation of success factors over time by partners (on-line survey) is made to complement this assessment by the evaluators.

The results of the analysis of critical success and failure factors are presented in Table 6 below:

Table 6: Presence of selected success factors in Schokland project sample

Success factor	yes	no	information missing
Clarity of roles, responsibilities & ground-rules	19	9	11
Clear understanding mutual benefits / Shared interests	25	3	11
Clear & shared vision Objectives / Shared ambition	22	5	12
Clear communication, shared planning & decision making	8	12	19
Good / Professional leadership	15	6	18
Complementarity of competencies	26	4	9
Balance of inputs/efforts to achieve results	6	10	23
Level of effort to maintain relations & build trust	15	6	18
Existence Theory of Change & related KPI's	25	6	8
Achieving cultural / cross-sector synergy	11	10	18
Willingness to learn (and make mistakes)	14	5	20
Vision on longer-term sustainability / subsidy independency	16	12	11

Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

If a success factor is marked as 'information missing', this means that there is insufficient information to judge whether this factor is present or absent. For example: for 11 Schokland projects we have not been able to collect sufficient information on the extent to which roles, responsibilities

and ground rules were clearly defined for all partners. The fact that we have not been able to judge many success factors in many projects is related to the limitations of this evaluation, as described in 2.4.

### **Complementary competencies, mutual benefits, and theory of change are the most common success factors in Schokland projects**

The table above shows a clear top 3 of success factors that were observed among the 39 Schokland partnership projects: complementarity of competencies (26 projects); a clear understanding of mutual benefits (25 projects) and the existence of a theory of change (25 projects) are the most commonly found success-factors. It is likely that these three success factors have received more attention in project proposals and reports, because they were related to formal requirements for funding from the Schokland Fund. When starting up partnership projects, different partners usually spent time on reflecting and discussing if and how they can combine specific competencies of each partner in order to become more effective and to investigate how the project can bring mutual benefits. The presence of a theory of change in most of the projects also is logical because project interventions require to have at least a basic theory of change and intervention logic.

A shared vision of objectives and a shared ambition was also found in many (22) of the Schokland partnership projects. This aspect is closely related to the theory of change and understanding of mutual benefits and therefore it is not surprising that this aspect also shows among the highest scoring success factors. Having a shared vision and ambition serves as the “glue” in a partnership; it keeps the partners together and when the sharing of vision and ambition falters, it makes the partnership weaker.

When looking at the effects of the most commonly found success-factors on the overall performance of the partnerships in the Schokland sample we can see that the following relations between these success factors and overall performance of the partnership:

- Sharing a vision of objectives and shared ambition and having a clear understanding of mutual benefits are correlated in all projects with very high and high overall performance scores and these success factors were found in all projects<sup>25</sup> in these two categories;
- The existence of a theory of change is also common among these categories and was missing in only one project;
- Having complementary competencies occurred in all except 2 projects in these categories;
- 6 out of 12 projects in the two highest performance categories have all four success factors, while only two out of the fifteen lowest scoring projects (and none out of the poor scoring projects) showed all four success factors.

These findings show a strong correlation between the existence of these four success factors and overall performance of these partnerships. When looking in more detail at the six case studies, these findings are confirmed. Two out of the three high scoring case studies had all four success-factors, while none of the four cases possessed all four success factors. In the survey among partnerships, in the two partnerships with the highest scores, the appreciation of the quality of the partnership has

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<sup>25</sup> On two projects no information was provided on these four success factors.

remained more constant, which is more positive than the average results in the survey that show a slightly declining appreciation among partners of the quality of their partnership over time (see also section 4.2).

### **Communication, joint planning and decision-making and long-term sustainability are factors that are less commonly found in Schokland projects**

When we look at the other end of the spectrum, we find that the success factors which are least common in the Schokland portfolio are communication, joint planning and decision-making and a vision on long-term sustainability, and exit or transfer strategies. This illustrates that assuring good communication and joint planning and decision-making are not so easy to achieve and maintain over time in a partnership and project. For communication, joint planning and decision-making at the start of partnerships sometimes regulations and procedures were identified, although this was not always done with a detailed eye for these aspects during implementation of the projects. In practice, during implementation of the projects, exercising good communication, planning and decision-making regularly proves to be more difficult than originally anticipated, particularly when no regulations and procedures were identified at the start. The evaluators have seen several projects, where communication and joint decision-making in practice deteriorated over the period of implementation of the Schokland agreements and this observation is also confirmed by partners themselves in the self-assessment of their partnerships (see below in section 4.2).

In several of the Schokland partnerships the attention to an exit- or transfer strategy was not included in the project design. Not all partners had a clear vision on continuation of their projects after closing the Schokland Funding period, and the project analysis shows clearly that not having included this attention to sustainability has a clear negative effect on sustainability:

- 5 out of the 6 highest scoring projects in Schokland fund had a clear vision on sustainability and all these projects achieved expansion and replication of their projects;
- Only 3 out of xx projects in the lowest scoring project category did have a vision on sustainability, but in spite of having such a vision, two of these projects were terminated at the end of the Schokland funding, while one project is still in the implementation stage..

### **Process aspects in partnerships are not easy to identify, particularly not on paper**

Other less commonly found success factors were balance of inputs of partners and achieving synergy. Reporting on projects often does not specify specific inputs of partners, so this aspect is also difficult to assess (in 23 projects we were not able to find information on this aspect). In those cases where we did find information, we observed that balance in inputs was not always achieved, which in some cases caused disruptions in partnerships.


Many success factors are not easy to identify in a desk-study analysis of project documents. This was particularly the case for process aspects in partnerships, such as learning mechanisms and practices; communication and decision-making; maintain relations and building trust and achieving synergy. In many projects these aspects remained unknown. Reporting formats on projects did not request such process-related information.



**Partner’s appreciation of Schokland partnership performance is high but shows small decline during implementation**

In the framework of this evaluation a survey among partners was realised to acquire more information on partnership dynamics. The figure below illustrates how partners in a partnership have experienced partnership performance (in terms of different success-factors) at the start of their partnership experience and at the end. The results are summarised in the figure below.

Figure 16: Partnership performance experienced at start and end of Schokland projects



Source: Partnership survey Schokland evaluation, Dec-Jan 2013/2014. N=40


The figure above shows that partner’s appreciation on a five-point scale (ranging from not at all to excellent) of cooperation in the partnership in a survey sample is overall quite high with a score of 3.53. This illustrates that partners upon entering the partnership experience have a positive appreciation of all partner’s intentions and efforts to invest in the partnership. This appreciation over the years of implementation decreases somewhat to an average of 3.29. This means that the partners in the survey generally have had the experience that working together in the partnership is not easy and cannot be taken for granted; during the partnership it becomes often more difficult, because problems are encountered and conflicts may arise over time.

In the survey, we have also analysed how partners appreciate their own role and inputs in relation to other partners. Here the survey results show that the own inputs are scored 3.71 on a 5 points scale while the inputs of others is scored with 3.25. NGO’s, private sector and not-for-profit / not-for-loss partners show the highest appreciation of their own input and among these partners also the difference with appreciation of other partner’s inputs is highest. For a detailed analysis of the survey results, see Annex 5..

## Relation between success factors and development results in Schokland projects

The figure below presents an analysis of the relation between development results obtained in Schokland projects and the observed success factors.

Figure 17: Relation between success factors and results in Schokland project sample



Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

### There is a strong correlation between the existence of success factors in a Schokland project and its development results

The figure above shows that there is a strong relation between the existences of success factors in projects and development results of these projects. In 7 out of 12 projects we can observe that the higher the evaluator's assessment of development results the higher the percentage of projects that show a specific success-factor in 8 cases. In two cases (factors 4 and 5) the same relation might exist, but there was not sufficient information available on this aspect for projects with poor development results.

On two success factors (6 and 7) the results of this analysis are somewhat confusing. Complementarity of competencies was observed in all of the projects that delivered poor development results. But complementarity was also observed in a high number (67%) of projects with good development result and therefore we cannot conclude that complementary competencies lead to failure of projects. It seems more likely that complementary competencies require significant attention and effort when the partnership is encountering more difficulties in implementation. The

same might be the case with 'balance of inputs', but here we have to observe that very few partnership projects have reported on this aspect and therefore it is not possible to make a reliable assessment of this aspect.

On average Schokland projects with very good development results show 80% of the success factors (9,6 out of 12) and good development results show 62% (7,4 out of 12). The projects with medium development results show 49% (5,9 out of 12), project with not sufficient results show 43% (5,2 out of 12) and the projects with poor development results show only 24 % of the success factors (2,9 out of 12).

When taking into account the results of the self-assessment of partnership aspects and success factors, the following specific success factors were identified by participants to have become stronger during the partnership: a) complementarity of competencies, effective leadership and management and management of cultural differences. On most other aspects the partnerships have suffered a decline in performance and according to the participating partners this decline was most strongly felt in the area of integrating partnerships in organisational strategies and operations and in learning and applying of lessons learned in the partnerships. These findings in the survey are interesting particularly when looking at complementarity of competencies and these findings underscore the observation above that maintaining complementarity of competencies in partnerships is a challenge, but when sufficient attention is given to this aspect, partners see an improvement of quality of the partnership.

**There is no single key success factor to a Schokland partnership; the key is to obtain a good mix of different success factors**

All projects with good development results (and sufficient information) showed proof of existence of 7 success factors during implementation. These are: roles, responsibilities and ground-rules; mutual benefits; shared vision of objectives ambition; Leadership; Theory of Change; Synergy and sustainability are the seven key-factors for success in the Schokland portfolio. It is not possible to indicate which one of these factors is most important. More likely, mix of success factors is needed to guarantee the blooming of a partnership.

It is remarkable that the more successful Schokland projects did not show a balance of inputs and level of effort in building trust. At first this seems strange, as one can imagine that imbalances lead to problems in the partnership. But perhaps imbalances are less of a problem when roles are clearly defined (as is the case in most of the successful Schokland partnerships). Just as people can agree to disagree, partnerships can agree to a certain amount of imbalance (for example in terms of finance provided), and still function well. Professional leadership might also take away some of need for building trust between the partners, as long as there is enough trust in the leadership. Another reason why more successful partnerships do not show clear evidence of balance might mean that these success factors have already been achieved during the partnership formation stage and therefore require less attention during implementation (and are thus less visible to the evaluators).

When we look at the appreciation of partners of different partnership aspects and presence of success-factors in the survey, we can conclude that partners generally identify a combination of

different success-factors that are highly appreciated. The evaluators have also crosschecked these findings with the appreciations of partners expressed in the survey. The highest appreciations encountered in the survey at the start of partnership experiences are on added value, balance of inputs of partners and mutual trust. Over time or at the end of partnerships, this appreciation of different success factors changes somewhat. The appreciation on added value of the partnership as a whole and mutual trust declines a bit. Partners at the same time indicate that achieving a good balance of inputs remained good. And the partnership experience has helped to develop clearer common objectives over time.

#### **4.4. Analysis of innovation aspects**


Similar as was observed under process-aspects of partnership, MoFA did not develop instructions and formats to systematically report on and learn from innovation aspects in projects and therefore partners reported more outputs and outcomes of their projects than the processes of innovation used to produce these outputs and outcomes. The information shortage on partnership process and innovation aspects is lamentable because it was an explicit objective of the Schokland Pact to promote innovation in multi-stakeholder cooperation in the development context.

##### **Projects that focus on a single innovation are most common among the Schokland projects**

15 Schokland projects focused on a single aspect of innovation and in single innovation projects, technological innovation is the most common innovation aspect, in 6 projects. The other innovation aspects are more often found in combination with other innovation processes. The figure above also shows that complexity of innovation processes correlates with the number of projects that show these processes. Only 3 projects in the Schokland sample showed proof of all four innovation aspects.

The figure below shows the relation between the existence of specific innovation aspects and the overall development score in the evaluator's assessment of the Schokland projects.

Figure 18: innovation aspects related to overall project and partnership performance



Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

**Process and Technological innovation seem to play a role in achieving development results in partnerships**

Process (A) and technological (B) innovation in projects clearly correlates with a higher overall development score. The difference is more than 20% with product/service innovation. Financial innovation seems to have the lowest effect on partnership performance and project effects.

The three partnerships that achieved no innovation also achieved the lowest overall development score and a low presence of success factors. A plausible explanation would be that for lack of success factors, these partnerships failed to work together fruitfully, causing underperformance in terms of innovation, development results and sustainability.

It is impossible to analyse the exact relations between the different factors, this would require specific follow-up research. However, the interviews with partners in partnerships do indicate a two-way and mutually reinforcing effect, such that a smooth running project stimulates innovation, and innovation supports the smooth running of partnerships. Successful innovation motivates partnerships to continue. On the other hand, failed innovations can create a bond between partners when all take responsibility for a failure, but can create conflicts when partners blame each other for failures.

**The combination of three or more innovation aspects corresponds with better development results in partnerships**


Finally, we can observe that a combination of multiple innovations (three or four) correlates with more positive overall development results. And here it is also relevant that presence of success factors enables a more diverse and richer process of innovation in the projects.

## 4.5. Analysis of typical partnership configurations

The Schokland policy regulations prescribe: “only those legal entities that will implement the planned activities in a partnership arrangement with at least two different Netherlands’ entities, each with a distinguishable contribution, are eligible for subsidy. The partnership arrangement should be documented in a formal agreement between the participating partners.” (Vaststelling beleidsregels voor subsidiëring Subsidierегeling Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2006 (Schoklandfonds), 27-11-2007, p. 2)

### Menu for possible partnership arrangements in Schokland is very diverse

Based on this regulation, the menu of partnership configurations that can be supported in the framework of the Schokland Fund’s regulations can be described with the figure below:



The partnership can consist of two or more civil society, private sector, research institutes and public sector partners. Of the partners in the partnership at least two partners should be registered as legal entities in the Netherlands. Analysing the partnerships that submitted proposals to the Schokland Fund, we can observe that the most common Schokland partnership arrangements were between civil society, private sector and research partners, with usually a Dutch civil society partner as the contracting organisation with MoFA. These are presented in the dark-coloured circles in the figure above. The participation of public partners in the North is far less common and therefore it is presented in light coloured circle with a dotted line. Also common is that existing partnerships or organisations establish a separately managed entity or department to implement the Schokland project. Although this model does not formally comply with the policy regulations of Schokland,

because the contracting partner is not part of a partnership, it was not seen as contradictory to a partnership (and de-facto usually was an instrument designed by partnerships) and therefore accepted by MoFA and several Schokland projects have been implemented by separate foundations or entities. These separate foundations were always directly related to partnerships, as the implementation and management arrangement for the partnership's activities.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs role in partnership varies, but in all cases is seen as innovative in the context of international development cooperation**

MoFA was always involved in the partnership, through the funding-arrangement that can be with the leading (usually Dutch) civil society partner, or with the leading (always Dutch) private sector company, or finally with a separate (not always Dutch Foundation). Additionally to its funding role, MoFA sometimes participated in sounding boards, advisory committees and acts as an advisor to project-partners in the bilateral relations between MoFA staff members and project partners. The intensity of this partnership relation ranges from very intensive to almost no contact at all.

An active participation of MoFA in the partnerships is highly appreciated by the different partners interviewed in this evaluation process. However, in many cases the role of MoFA has been quite modest and limited to the provision of funding and monitoring of reports; while the project-partners had expectations with respect to exchange of information and dialogue with MoFA, MoFA in some cases did not consider these partnerships and projects of strategic importance to the Ministry and decided to only conduct a minimal monitoring of such projects. In some cases partnerships indicate that they have sought more contact and exchange with MoFA, but that this was difficult due to frequent changes in responsible officers resulting in loss of institutional memory at MoFA. In interviews with MoFA officers some indicate that some of the projects submitted to the Schokland Fund were entirely new partnerships and these had to be assigned to directorates who did not have relations with the partners nor were closely linked to the Schokland Fund. Therefore some of the projects funded by Schokland became almost like orphans in the MoFA structure, without having clear ties and relations. On the other hand there are several Schokland projects, where the Ministry is actively involved as a partner in strategizing and brokering in contacts with these partners. Sometimes the partnerships were already in contact with MoFA and the Schokland process enabled them to develop new projects. Other partnerships were new to MoFA but rapidly developed into strategic partnerships that quickly went beyond the scope of the Schokland process. Some examples of this are GAIN, Akvo and Heineken (case-studies in this evaluation), and also the Borneo initiative of IDH<sup>26</sup> developed into a much larger funding and relation with IDH, that has become very important in the PSD strategy of the Ministry.

All partners interviewed indicate that the Schokland process in the Ministry was a new and innovating process that allowed people to think out of the box and develop new ways of engaging in development cooperation. The Ministry is seen at the forefront of a trend in international development cooperation that other governments followed only five years later. These intentions of the Government and the willingness to invest in risk-taking and new partnerships are highly appreciated, even while some of the partners indicate that over time the follow-up and dialogue by MoFA with partnership was downsized to a low level

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<sup>26</sup> This project was not analysed in this evaluation because it is subjected to a separate evaluation.

## **Southern partners in Schokland project are mainly civil and private sector partners**

All partnerships also have partners in the South or links with beneficiaries, users and/or clients in the South. However, in the South we generally see a somewhat more limited mix of different partners. In most partnerships we encounter civil society and private sector partners. Public sector partners regularly participate as partners, but are less common. Least common are research institutes in the South. The role of Netherland's embassies in the South is usually limited, although in some cases they have been important.

When looking at the overall figure of the Schokland partnership configurations we can observe that there is generally a focus on civil society and private sector partners in the North and South and research institutes in the North.

The files that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has kept concerning the sampled partnerships primarily concern the administration of the grant agreement. Grants are targeted at a specific, time bound projects or sets of projects that are initiated or executed by the partnerships concerned. They don't usually contain much information on the development of the partnership itself. The evaluators have therefore had to rely on interviews and an online survey for process and qualitative information.

## **There are four archetypical configurations of Schokland partnerships**

Although the partnerships that have been supported by the Schokland Fund are extremely diverse and in fact all different, one can identify some (arche)typical configurations, where the participation and role of specific partners or stakeholder groups can vary significantly.

The most common configurations that were found among the Schokland project partnerships are presented in the following table:

Table 7: Partnership Configurations

	Number of partnerships	Percentage
Umbrella partnership	14	36%
Decentralised Southern based partnership	8	21%
Focused business-case driven partnership	7	18%
Special management unit for partnership project	6	15%
Other	4	10%
<i>Total</i>	<i>39</i>	


*Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014*

As Table 7: shows, the partnerships supported by Schokland can be categorised into four different basic configurations that were introduced in the previous section of this. Although the partnership and project sample seemed very diverse at first sight, after a more thorough analysis configuration patterns emerge.



## 1. Umbrella Partnership

The first category is the umbrella configuration. In this type of partnership, many, sometimes over 30 partners are mentioned in the project documents. It is usually difficult to determine the specific contributions of all these partners to the partnership and project. In these large umbrella partnerships we can observe significant changes in the partnership composition over time. Usually, the number of participating partners decreases over time as partners have dropped out from the process. Others replaced some of them, but it is much less common that new partners enter the umbrella partnership. We can observe that under the large umbrella not all partners are active at all times. The umbrella partnerships typically consist of some active core partners and other more passive and sometimes even dormant partners. The partners come together under the umbrella to discuss and exchange experiences and to jointly learn and communicate about the project. The concrete project activities, take shape in smaller sub-projects in which cooperation agreements are more formally structured. These sub-projects have different compositions of partners, although always part of the larger umbrella group and are managed and implemented as stand-alone projects.



In this configuration we can observe a difference with other types of partnerships that usually have more local partners in the implementing countries, and a much smaller group in The Netherlands. While the umbrella partnerships typically consist of many Dutch and Northern partner organisations and a smaller number of local partners, which sometimes causes considerable strain on the receiving organisation to absorb the support-activities of participating partners in the umbrella partnerships.


The Schokland projects categorised under 'umbrella partnerships' are:

- Learn4Work
- Financing Sustainable Value Chains
- Netherlands National Action plan 1325
- Health Insurance for the Poor
- InReturn's East Africa Fund
- Piloting Commodity Business Support Centers
- Platform MDG Profs
- Fragile States and Education
- MDG5 Meshwork for Mother Care
- Fighting Violence to Ensure Education for All
- Knowledge Network for Peace, Security and Development
- Mesofinancing in Developing Countries
- More than the Sum of Parts: 3D Interaction Forum
- Knowledge for Health.

## 2. Decentralised / Southern based Partnership

Several project-proposals submitted to the Schokland Fund are not so much Northern based partnerships, but the partnerships mainly materialise on the ground in the South, usually in a specific project and location. The organisation submitting the proposal to the Schokland Fund in the Netherlands has a fundraising role and also provides and mobilises technical assistance.

In the formal submission of the Schokland proposal other partners in the North participated, but they did not always play a very active role in the project-management and implementation and in some cases even dropped out the partnership.



The projects, although they certainly show partnership cooperation and innovating aspects on the ground, did not fully comply with the original Schokland Funding criteria that the partnerships should contain at least two Netherland's partners.


The results and impact of these projects are mostly local although outreach can occur until the national level, by serving as centres of reference for other local organisations.

'Decentralised partnerships' are:

- Helping farmers produce cassava for profit
- Design and Local Production of Ergonomic Tools for Farmers
- Foundation 2015
- Farming and Livelihood Improvement Programme (FLIP)
- Best of Both Worlds
- Ananthagiri 2009-2014
- Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge
- Access to Internet and ICT.

### 3. Focused business-case driven partnership

The focused and business case oriented partnerships are much smaller on the Dutch/Northern side (2 or 3 main partners). In the implementing countries, the partnerships are sometimes more widely extended, but still very much focused on a specific business case or value chain.



The projects of this category are usually directed to value chain development areas and provision of financial services sector (insurances and finance). The projects are based on a clearly developed and well-focused business case. The partnerships involve a limited number of partners that work together based on complementary competencies and clear task-descriptions.


The projects are usually private sector demand driven and this presents a strong trigger and drive for the implementation of the projects

We consider the following partnerships to be 'business-case driven':

- Increase food security and improve livelihoods of rice and sorghum producers
- Food Early Solutions for Africa
- SMS Combats HIV/Aids
- Oikocredit
- Fair Climate Fund
- The World Mortgage: A House for a House
- Green Light for Africa (SESA).

### 4. Special management unit for partnership project

The partnerships in the fourth category establish a special project entity to manage and implement the project proposal of a broad alliance or partnership or sometimes an individual company. There is a direct bilateral project and partnership relation between this entity and MoFA. The entity represents a much larger group of partners, who remain at a distance from the direct project management and implementation. These partners are active in boards and advisory committees of these entities. In this configuration we can observe that the entities were established before or at



the start of the Schokland project. During the implementation of the project an independent organisation or project team is responsible for all aspects of the project. In this configuration the partners that are supporting these entities remain mostly out of the evaluators' sight.

The following partnerships had a dedicated management unit:


- Partnering to improve availability premix for food fortification
- Internet for Water and Sanitation
- Universal access to Female Condom
- Aqua for All
- Access to Medicine
- Foundation Rural Energy Services.

We will now take a closer look at the results of these configurations.

**Focused business-case driven partnerships and partnerships management by a special unit or entity are more effective in producing development results**

The relation between specific partnership configurations and the development results obtained by them, and perspectives for later expansion, replication and or institutionalisation (sustainability) and the presence of success factors is shown in the figure below.

Figure 19: relation between partnership configurations and effectiveness



Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

Focused business-case oriented partnerships, followed by the partnerships managed by special units or entities show clearly higher overall assessments and assessments of development results than the other two type of partnerships. This can be explained by the fact that in both these partnership

models there is a strong focus on specific challenges and on specific outputs (products and services). We have also found stronger business-cases and financial (sustainability) strategies in these partnership models. By involving only a limited number of partners in the project management and implementation or organise these tasks in a separate unit or entity, the partners have simplified the management structure of the projects and were able to more effectively implement the projects. When looking at the presence of success factors in projects, the partnerships managed by special units score better than the other configurations, followed by the focused business-case oriented partnerships.

### **Decentralised, southern based partnership resemble MFS II type of projects and alliances**

Decentralised, southern-based partnerships also show development results, but lower than under the previous two configurations. Particularly with respect to sustainability and presence of success factors these projects score significantly lower. Some of the Southern based decentralised partnerships do not fully comply with the Schokland spirit by bringing together only a small number of partners in the Netherlands, merely from a fundraising perspective and less so because of complementarity of competencies. In some occasions Dutch partners have dropped out these projects and the core Dutch partner continued to raise funds (to match Schokland Funding) on its own to continue the project. In those case the formal Dutch partnership, de facto ceased to exist during the project implementation. However, In the South, this is sometimes compensated by the development of local partnerships to implement activities on the ground. This type of projects resembles strongly the model chosen in the MFS-II system and for this type of projects the evaluators don't see a clear need of a Schokland-type innovation and multi-stakeholder partnership oriented funding mechanisms. These projects could also have been funded by the MFS II system.

### **Umbrella partnerships have difficulties to achieve sustainability and incorporate success-factors**

The umbrella partnerships, as loose networks of many partners and several different activities or sub-projects are the least successful among all configurations. While they still are reaching development results to a reasonable extent, these networks are quite complex to manage and it is difficult to satisfy needs and expectations of all parties in the partnership. As a result continuity of active participation of different partners over time in the partnership was a challenge. In some cases in specific sub-projects satisfactory results were obtained, but at the overall umbrella level, no specific additional value could be added to the projects of these partnerships. In the larger partnership it is particularly difficult to achieve sustainability and exit strategies, because the individual partners after the end of the Schokland partnership go their own way. Additionally, the multitude of partners makes it more difficult to incorporate different success factors in the partnership.

### **Active private sector participation seems to make partnerships slightly more effective**


Finally, the evaluators have looked at the effects of participation of private sector partners in the Schokland partnerships. Although such private sector partner participation was not prescribed in the Schokland Fund regulations, in many publications and also in interviews in this evaluation, stakeholders expressed that the inclusion of private sector partner could be a mechanism to pool

non-traditional sources of funding for development cooperation and also to introduce business-case orientation into partnerships and projects.

This thinking has further progressed in MoFA after the Schokland process and public-private or multi-stakeholder partnerships are increasingly supported over the past years.

Therefore a specific question in the ToR of this evaluation requested an analysis of the effects of private sector participation in Schokland projects. In section 4.1.3 we have analysed financial contributions of the private sector to partnership projects. In the figure below the relation between private sector participation and development results is illustrated.

Figure 20: relation between private sector participation in Schokland projects and results



Source: Evaluator's analysis Schokland portfolio project sample, January 2014

The figure above shows that private sector participation in the Schokland partnerships is most effective when private actors are either in the lead or are among the main partners in the partnership. In many cases civil society organisations are managing the partnership and report to MoFA and they do so in close cooperation with the private sector partner(s) in the partnership. In interviews we have heard that private sector partners often desire such a solution because they don't have much experience in project management, monitoring and reporting to MoFA. Often it is prefer to delegate the project management to a civil society partner that already has experience in receiving and managing funds from MoFA. This model is also applied in cases where private sector partners are in the lead: they sign of on reports that are prepared by their civil society partners in the partnership. Only with respect to presence of success-factors, the score is lower. This can be explained by the fact that civil society and private sector organisation both play an important role.

But also partnerships that are managed by a private sector organisation as a contract partner to the ministry are more effective than partnerships in which private sector organisation only play a minor role or no role at all. In the practical implementation of these projects we have often seen that the private company had delegated the reporting activities to civil society partners or outsourced the entire management and implementation to a specialised unit.

Partnerships with limited to no participation of private sector organisations achieve lower scores on most aspects with the exception of presence of success-factors, where partnerships with no private sector participation seem to do better than most other. This might be explained by the fact that these partnerships with no private sector participation are more between similar partners in civil society or research institutes and therefore can more easily manage different process related success-factors, such as building trust and achieve good communication.

# CHAPTER 5: Conclusions

## 5.1. Overall summary conclusions

**The start of the Schokland Agreements was rather hectic and took place in an ambiance of great optimism and opportunism. The resulting portfolio was very diverse in terms of types of partnerships and projects.** The portfolio was de-centrally managed and monitored by different directorates in MoFA, with some central coordination and support of a special Schokland coordinator in the first phase of the Schokland agreements. Internal mechanisms to systematise learned in the partnerships and Schokland projects during the implementation were not strong, but MoFA learned from the partnerships and projects through a Mid Term Review of the Schokland agreements realised in 2009 and through individual project evaluations. Lessons learned have been incorporated in new partnership modalities, such as FDW and FDOV. (1)

**The contribution of the Schokland Fund and individual Schokland projects to accelerated achievement of MDGs is not obvious and very difficult to measure.**

The ambition of the Schokland Agreement to contribute to the accelerated achievement of MDGs cannot be measured, because the scale and scope of the projects in the Schokland Fund is too small to be linked with these MDGs, even in national or sectoral contexts. Impact detected in the Schokland projects is usually limited to changes in the direct environment of the projects and the projects themselves mainly produce outcomes that can be considered small steps in a still long pathway to accelerated achievement of the MDGs, requiring a much larger coordinated effort. Attribution of changes in MDGs to interventions of Schokland projects and partnerships is impossible, but more specific impacts at the local level can be observed in some projects that had strong interventions on the ground. When looking at the theory of change and overall objectives (impact level) in specific projects, it is possible to detect impact at the level of specific target-groups and locations and at the level of client and users groups in several Schokland projects. In the case studies such impact could be observed in 5 out of 6 cases. (2)

**Individual Schokland projects and also the Schokland Fund as a whole have been effective in accelerating partnership approaches in the Dutch development cooperation.**

The Schokland Fund has been effective as an accelerator for expansion and replication of multi-stakeholder partnerships within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and among many Schokland project partners. The effort of the Dutch Government to strengthen partnership approaches and allow for innovation are recognised and appreciated nationally and internationally and the Dutch Government is considered to be at the forefront of this recent trend in international development cooperation. The Schokland and Millennium project portfolio has generated several new partnerships and initiatives that have become of strategic importance to MoFA in its current and future activities. But at the same time a considerable number of projects cannot be considered successful. (3)

On some specific but important aspects, such as process-dynamics, partnership lifecycle development and on success and failure factors, no reporting information was requested and therefore these **important process aspects in partnerships and projects agreements have not been translated in lessons learned and systematised insights.** (4)



## 5.2. Development results (outputs, outcomes and impact) of Schokland projects

**The achievement of outputs in the Schokland projects was not in line with the often very high ambitions of partnerships at the start of their projects.**

The Schokland projects generally report comprehensively on achieved outputs. Performance of different projects is highly variable ranging from overachievement of anticipated results in some cases to underachievement in a considerable number of projects. The underachievement of outputs can be explained by two main reasons; a) the fact that in many original Schokland project documents ambitions were not accompanied with sufficient degree of realism and awareness of capacities of the partnerships in the light of the challenges identified; and b) due to high speed in the project-formulation and short inception phases in many projects, a context and need analysis was rushed or not done at all. In many Schokland projects, during the implementation phase, components had to be cancelled and anticipated result-areas had to be downsized. (5)

**Outcomes that are reported in the projects cannot always be related to baseline assessments and therefore attribution to the partnerships interventions is sometimes problematic.**

Most Schokland projects also report on outcomes and outcomes obtained are in line with planned outcomes at the start of the projects (although regularly lower, as observed under the previous conclusion on outputs). However, the outcomes formulated at the start of projects were often not related to an analysis of the existing context and situation at the start of the project (baseline assessments). This makes the attribution of outcomes achieved in projects to the partnership's interventions somewhat difficult, because a comparison with a baseline cannot be made. (6)

**When looking at development results obtained in Schokland projects, analysed against original objectives, 7 Schokland projects produced very good results and 5 projects achieved good results. There is a large group of 13 projects that shows medium development results. 6 projects showed insufficient results, while 8 projects have delivered poor results.**

From the total Schokland Portfolio of 39 projects analysed in this evaluation, 7 projects can be considered very successful and another 5 projects successful in reaching their originally anticipated objectives and they have shown good development results. In 13 projects the objectives were not fully achieved and medium development results were obtained. In 6 projects the assessment of the development results is more critical and in 6 cases development results are poor. With respect to projects that have not scored well in this assessment of development results it must be observed that some of these projects were focusing more on generating knowledge around development issues and MDGs than contributing to their achievement. (7)

## 5.3. Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability<sup>27</sup> of Schokland projects

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<sup>27</sup> Impact has been covered in the previous section.

**Schokland projects mainly aimed at MDG 1 (poverty reduction) and MDG 7 (environmental sustainability), and often in combination with MDG 8 (developing a global partnership).**

All Schokland projects were well linked to the MDGs as was required in the Schokland regulations. The largest group of projects contributed to MDG 1 (poverty reduction), but this is not surprising, as MDG 1 serves as a container for a variety of interventions in different sectors that contribute to poverty alleviation and also interventions under other MDGs such as education and health are often also contributing to poverty alleviation. Many MDG 1 projects also included actions related to MDG 7, illustrating that productive and value-chain development initiatives often were designed with a sustainability perspective integrated in the project. MDG 8 (developing a global partnership) has been very important in many projects, but more as a methodological principle than a thematic focus. The considerable attention to this MDG can be attributed to the fact that the Schokland regulations were requesting partnership projects. (8)

**Schokland partnerships seem to have a focus on financial services, health, safety and security, local development, food security, value chain development and water and sanitation (WASH).**

The fact that many partnerships focused on these sectors is an indicator that in these sectors, the Schokland process had made a successful appeal to many partners. Particularly financial service delivery aroused the interest of many different partners in 9 partnership initiatives. (9)

**Partnership formation at the start of Schokland projects was opportunity driven and many partnerships changed over time.**

The Schokland project portfolio shows that many partnerships that were formed at the time of developing proposals and starting up projects changed over time. Some partnerships during implementation developed into single-partner managed projects, while other partnerships developed special management and implementation entities. These changes during project implementation show that partnership formation at the start of the Schokland project has been opportunity driven and quick and did not always lead to stable partnerships. (10)

**The experimental multi-stakeholder and innovative nature of Schokland projects comes with a significant failure rate, but benchmarking of this rate in the development sector is not possible.**

The 14 Schokland projects that achieved poor or insufficient development results represent a considerable percentage of the total budget of all 39 projects in the evaluation sample. Some of these projects were ended earlier or budgets were downsized, so in terms of expenditures these projects represent a smaller share of the total. It is impossible to say if this percentage of failure should be considered high, low or average, because there is no benchmark available in the development sector.<sup>28</sup> But in the light of the requirement in the Schokland regulations to stimulate innovation, it is not strange that a considerable number of projects have not achieved reasonable development results. This is a more common feature in innovation project (11)

**A considerable number of partnerships encountered difficulties to realise their own contribution to the project and finish their projects within the original time-frame.**

Several Schokland partnerships had to request no-cost extensions of their projects. These extensions were usually caused by two factors, sometimes in combination. Partners needed more time to achieve the originally ambitious objectives and results of their projects. Several partners faced

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<sup>28</sup> Most industrial and technological innovation failure rates are above 50% and often between 80 and 90%.

difficulties in raising their own contribution of 60% for the project. The project-periods had to be extended to be able to generate more funds to match the 40% maximum subsidy amount of MOFA. (12)

**During the quick, opportunity driven and ambitious start of Schokland, the exit phase and long-term sustainability were often overlooked, leading to financial sustainability challenges at the end of the project-periods.**

At the time of this evaluation, 10 projects in the Schokland portfolio sample achieved expansion and replication of the experience at the end or after finalising the Schokland Funding. 16 projects achieved a certain form institutionalisation in organisations, partnerships or at local level, but often remained dependent on continuation of funding from other sources. 11 projects and partnerships at the end of the Schokland Funding period were discontinued and 2 projects did not yet reach a final stage. The discontinued projects (with one exception) were not discontinued because all results were obtained, but because of a lack of strategy for continuation of the projects after the Schokland period or due to problems and conflict that have occurred during the partnership project. (13)

#### **5.4. Critical success and failure factors and innovation in Schokland partnerships**

**Success of partnerships is not defined by specific individual success-factors, but it seems better to have a mix of a good number of different success factors.**

The partnership projects with good development results on average had 8.5 success-factors, while this number was 6.3 for medium development results and only 3.1 for partnerships with poor development results. This illustrates that a strategy to build more successful partnerships requires an integral focus on different aspects (14)

**The success and failure factors that were most commonly found in the most successful Schokland partnerships are: clear responsibilities & ground-rules; clear mutual benefits and shared interests; shared vision of objectives; leadership; theory of change; synergy and; vision on long-term sustainability. (15)**

**Process-related success factors are not well documented in Schokland project reporting and therefore limited insights have been obtained in process-dynamics of partnership during the project implementation.**

The Schokland partnership did not receive instructions and formats to report on the process dynamics of their partnerships and of innovation processes. Reports tend to focus on output and outcomes of projects and not on process aspects. Also evaluations of partnerships and Schokland projects have paid little attention to process dynamics. (16)

**The enthusiasm and ambitions of leaders at the start and inception phase of partnerships has caused certain neglect for formalising governance aspects in the partnership. At the same time intentions to invest and share in the partnerships were clearly expressed, but formalisation of these intentions into formal and legal regulations and ground rules has not been systematic.**

Though the policy regulations requested formally signed partnership agreements in the projects, this requirement is not systematically applied. While most of the project proposals present MoU's and

statements of support prior to the start of the project, most of the times no formalisation of these agreements could be found in project files. This does not mean that such formal agreements on sharing of inputs, costs, results, profit and risks were not made. These documents might just not have been filed because there was no such reporting requirement. However, for some of the projects where partners have experienced conflicts during implementation, there is clear evidence that such formal agreements were not made and signed, which has aggravated conflicts and made conflict-resolution very difficult in some cases. (17)

**Schokland projects show a significant amount of innovation, particularly in process and technology.**

The criterion of the Schokland Fund that projects had to be innovative led to indeed a significant number of innovation processes in projects. Only three projects did not show any visible innovation. Innovation most often occurred on the level of processes, as partners found new ways to coordinate and cooperate together and new ways of sharing and exchanging information. Also technological innovation is regularly found and usually relates to the incorporation of new ICT's in projects. (18)

## **5.5. Partnership configurations and the role of MoFA in the Schokland partnerships**

**The Schokland project portfolio shows that partnerships can take many different forms and configurations. In the current definition of partnerships currently applied by MoFA that focuses on public and private partners the risk is that the added value of civil society, social movements and knowledge institutes in partnerships might not always be sufficiently recognised.**

The Schokland portfolio sample shows clearly that particularly civil society organisations and private sector partners have played an important role in setting up and implementing many projects in the portfolio. Although not all of them have been equally successful some of them have generated new and innovating forms of cooperation in which civil society partners have played a significant and sometimes leading role. (19)

**The most effective Schokland partnership configurations are focused and business-case driven partnerships and partnership projects managed by a separate unit or entity.**

In focused and business-case driven partnerships a small number of partners invest clear complementary inputs and together are able to create added value. The partnership projects managed by a separate entity, though formally they are not a partnership, serve as instruments for stakeholders (in boards and committees). The fact that management and implementation is "outsourced" to such an entity might diminish opportunities for interactive learning and innovation, but it has effectiveness and efficiency gains. (20)

**The participation of private sector partners in the Schokland Partnership projects has led to a small increase in scoring of these projects on overall performance criteria.** At the same time the participation of private sector partners has **not led to the generation of significant extra funds** for partnerships and projects. The companies provide support in terms of technical expertise, staff time and in-kind support and only in some case financial resources. The expectation often expressed towards private sector partners in partnerships to bring in significant extra cash-budget is not so

realistic. **The value of the private sector participations lies in knowledge, networks and most importantly the perspective of a realistic business case.** (21)

**The umbrella and southern-based Schokland partnerships are less effective and innovating partnership configurations.**

Umbrella partnerships unite a very large number of partners. While this structure can be useful and interesting for sharing lessons learned and coordination of activities, these larger partnerships are less useful for actual implementation of projects. In practice we see that implementation is delegated to individual partners or smaller sub-groups, but this does not allow for strong and close coordination with the rest of the partners. The southern-based partnerships in their own local contexts can achieve significant results and also can generate partnership dynamics and innovation. But such partnerships do not present any new forms of partnership in the Netherlands to pool resources for development cooperation (as was one of the intentions of Schokland). Many of these partnerships could have fitted into the MFS II system and did not need a special Schokland Fund. (22)

**The role of MoFA has varied enormously over the different Schokland projects, from intensive partnerships to a minimal funding relation.**

In some of the projects dialogue and exchange between the ministry and partners was minimal to non-existent. MoFA limited its role to the provision of funding and monitoring of reports. Some of these projects were transferred to other departments and new officers, limiting the building of institutional memory and knowledge of these projects. This has particularly been the case with partnerships that were entirely new to MoFA and that used the Schokland Fund as a way of gaining access to the Ministry.

Other projects were intensively monitored and MoFA staff participated in boards and committees of these partnerships. For legal reasons MoFA chose the observer status in these platforms, but this in practice did not preclude active participation. In most of these cases the Schokland projects developed into important partnerships for the Ministry in the period beyond the Schokland Funding. (23)

**The Schokland project and Millennium Partnerships portfolio did not have a real “home” in the Ministry and as a result central steering and control of Schokland projects was weak, contributing to the significant variety in quality of projects.**

The Schokland Fund was coordinated centrally only until 2010. After that there was no central monitoring of Schokland experiences and partnerships. And during the period of central coordination of Schokland, project monitoring was decentralised to different directorates and officers. When the additional projects were added to the portfolio this de-central management and follow-up limited systematic learning from the entire portfolio. (24)

## CHAPTER 6: Recommendations

1. The Schokland and Millennium Agreements have generated good visibility and broad recognition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs among national and international stakeholders. Now that also other international actors have picked-up this trend, **MoFA is recommended to remain visible and active in using multi-stakeholder partnerships for development.** The Schokland and Millennium Agreements and some concrete partnerships that have resulted from it can provide lessons to MoFA for future partnerships and have already resulted in application of practices in new stakeholder modalities. MoFA is recommended to exercise **more coherence in in project portfolios and a stronger central steering and particularly monitoring and learning from only partnership results and processes;**
2. **MoFA is recommended in its current Public-Private Partnership Approach to recognise the role that other than public and private partners can play in development projects.** Some successful experiences in the Schokland portfolio of multi-stakeholder cooperation in development projects have shown that civil society partners, knowledge institutes and not-for-profit/not-for-loss companies can make important contributions. **The lessons learned in multi-stakeholder cooperation in the Schokland portfolio can be further integrated in MoFA's PPP approach,** as is already done to certain extend in new partnership modalities such as FDW and FDOV.
3. The opportunistic start of the Schokland has contributed to the fact that partnerships did not always invest sufficient time to work on different success factors in building partnerships and ensure proper ground-rules and other arrangements. This has likely limited development results of some of the partnership projects in the Schokland portfolio. **MoFA, in other processes and modalities in which it wants to bring different actors together in partnerships should allow for more time for partners to explore complementary competencies, building synergy and develop ground-rules and a sound structure for implementation of partnership processes.** MoFA and partners are advised to **consider the possibility to recruit external support and facilitation of neutral actors (quartermasters or facilitators) to prepare the ground or partnership establishment and project implementation.**
4. The **Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to continue taking stock of its different partnership experiences and instruments in the past decade.** DDE has taken up this challenge and established a “partnership-home <the PPP expertise centre>” in the Ministry that enables more systematic monitoring, learning and sharing lessons within (and beyond) the Ministry. **“Stock-taking” of and learning from different partnership experiences, should be done across different directorates without taking over management and administration** of partnerships from these directorates. For embedding of the partnership approach it is beneficial that different directorates can work and build experience with this modality, but with clearer corporate guidance and instructions.
5. Learning from partnership approaches requires looking not only at results of partnership projects but also to better understand partnerships formation processes and partnership dynamics during implementation. The reporting, monitoring and evaluation approach that is

usually applied in MoFA for project monitoring focuses on the results-chain but this is not enough to capture the process and partnership-dynamics aspect that are key for the success or failure of the partnership. **MoFA is recommended to develop an innovative and flexible set of instruments to measure process-aspects in partnerships, without creating too much additional reporting burdens for the partnerships.**

6. The Schokland experience has demonstrated that de-central monitoring and follow-up of partnership projects has left space for different interpretation of criteria and regulations. Some of the projects funded by Schokland started as a partnership but did not continue as such during implementation. **MoFA is recommended to be stricter in ensuring that partnership funding is not diluted into other funding arrangements for which alternative modalities exist.**
7. MoFA is recommended to consider the **introduction of a two-step funding mechanism for partnerships, which allows for a first phase of partnership building and project inception.** This can provide the necessary time and space to start developing successful cooperation and innovation in partnership in such a way that partnerships can further grow and become more effective in a separate implementation phases. A two-step funding mechanism can help MoFA to discontinue support to partnerships that don't succeed in meeting basic partnership requirements and are not promising in reaching development results.
8. Some of the Schokland partnerships were much too big to become effective instruments for project implementation. **MoFA is advised not to stimulate the formation of very large alliances with the purpose to implement projects** (while they could serve well as mechanisms for exchange, learning and dissemination) **but instead go for smaller and well-focused partnerships or partnerships that are implemented by specialised entities with partners in a board.**
9. Innovation by default brings in additional risks for achieving results in projects. In those cases where MoFA actively wants to stimulate innovation processes in projects, **there should be a policy and approach in dealing with possible risk of failure in innovative projects** and related to this accept a certain failure rate that can be higher than in mainstream development interventions. MoFA has done this in the set-up of FDOV, but experience in how to deal with innovation is still limited. For the purpose of future evaluation exercises, **it is recommended to develop some guidelines and indications for acceptable failure rates in innovative partnership funding modalities.**
10. **Partnerships should pay much more attention to sustainability and exit strategies at the start and inception of partnership projects.** When such attention is not given, the risk of problems and discontinuity at the end of a funding period becomes too big.

# ANNEXES



## Annex 1: List of persons interviewed and programme of field-visits

Date	Name	Function	Organisation
<b>Interviews with partners and stakeholders in the Netherlands and at International Level</b>			
8-10-2013	Schokland Evaluation Reference group		
10-10-2013	Rob van Tulder	Academic Director	Partnership Resource Centre RSM/Erasmus
16-10-2013	Jurriaan Middelhof	Policy Officer DDE	MoFA
17-10-2013	Elly Leemhuisde Regt	Senior Advisor SRHR	MoFA
18-10-2013	Peter van der Linde	Director	Akvo
22-10-2013	Monique Kamphuis	Senior Health Advisor	MoFA
22-10-2013	Frits van der Wal	senior policy adviser DDE	MoFA
29-10-2013	Schokland Evaluation Reference group		
18-11-2013	Franka Cadée	International midwifery policy advisor	KNOV
18-11-2013	Korrie de Koning	senior advisor sexual and reproductive health and rights	KIT
19-11-2013	Schokland Evaluation Reference group		
19-11-2013	Fred Nederlof, Arjan Schothorst	Director and Finance Officer	Lion Heart Foundation
19-11-2013	Monique Lagroo, Julie Love	Programme officer Health Unit	Cordaid
20-11-2013	Dick van Ginhoven	Senior adviser Water and Sanitation DMW	MoFA
20-11-2013	Igor Keutschreuter, Patrick Villemin, Paul Stanger	Business Control Manager - Sub Saharan Africa , Corporate relations Director, Local Sourcing Director	Heineken
	Henk Knipscheer, Niels Hanssens	Managing Director, dep. Executive Director	Eucord
21-11-2013	Dick Uijttewaal	Director	Macha Works Foundation
22-11-2013	Greg Garret, Christophe Guyondet and team	Director, Large-Scale Food Fortification, Senior Associate GPF	GAIN
03-12-2013	Jan Komrska	Contracts Specialist	Unicef
04-12-2013	Eduard Walkers	Deputy Regional Director	Oikocredit Kredieten
09-12-2013	Anno Galema	Coordinator Public Private Partnerships	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
09-12-2013	Justin Adonadaga	Chief Executive Director	Kalabash Foundation
09-12-2013	Judith de Kroon	Senior Policy Officer, strategy development and foresights	NWO/WOTRO
09-12-2013	Koert Jansen	Fund Manager	Triodos

10-12-2013	Daira Gomez	Executive Director	Cegesti
11-12-2013	Anna Meijknecht	Senior Researcher	Tilburg University
11-12-2013	Gerard Versteegh	Director	Tradin Organic
11-12-2013	Erik Klaassens	Senior Consultant	Ecorys
11-12-2013	Andries Rosema	Director	EARS Earth Environment Monitoring
12-12-2013	Marie Christine Siemerink	Coordinator	Oxfam Novib
13-12-2013	Paul van Koppen	Director	NWP
13-12-2013	Winnie Retief	General Manager	JLR International Services
16-12-2013	Chris Gilbert	Procurement Manager	Crown Agents
16-12-2013	Greetje Lubbi	Chairman	UAFC
16-12-2013	Jan Willem Nibbering	First secretary Food Security	Dutch Embassy
17-12-2013	Annemarie Goedmakers	Director	FRES
18-12-2013	Sandra Meixner	Head of Analytical Customer Service	Intertek Food Services GmbH
18-12-2013	Sjef Ernes	Director	Aqua for All
18-12-2013	Koen Peters	Advisor Renewable Energy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19-12-2013	Marianne Lowik	Institutional Funding and Programme Manager	Humana
20-12-2013	Valerie Jans	Senior Programme Coordinator	SOS Kinderdorpen
30-12-2013	Sunita Nadhamuni	Member of the Board	Akvo
07-01-2014	Mayte de Vries	Consultant	ETC Energy
07-01-2014	Mark Bennett	Director, Strategy and Business Development	Philips
07-01-2014	Jaap Breugem	Senior project manager	VNG-International
09-01-2014	Willem van Genugten	Professor International Law	Tilburg University
09-01-2014	Margriet Kuster	Senior Policy Officer Education and Research	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10-01-2014	Karin Boven	Head of development cooperation	Dutch Embassy
10-01-2014	Lucian Peppelenbos	Program Director of Learning & Innovation	IDH Sustainable Trade
10-01-2014	Gerald Holtfluwer	Director	Wereldfoundation
13-01-2014	Dick van Ginhoven	Senior Water Advisor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15-01-2014	Martijn Brouwers	Specialist Treasury FX	Rabobank
17-01-2014	Sandra Eikhout	Research Manager Work, Health & Care	TNO
<b>24/11 – 5/12 2013: field work Sierra Leone: Meshwork for Mother Care and Best of Both Worlds</b>			
25-11-2013	Abdul K. Jalloh	Director	MRC
25-11-2013	Aiah a. Gbakima	Chairperson Steering Committee	METABIOTA

		Meshwork project in Sierra Leone	
25-11-2013	Meeting & group interview with Steering Committee Meshwork in Sierra Leone		
26-11-2013	Maria Singco	Manager palm-oil mill Yele	Nedoil/LHF
26-11-2013	Sheriff Elber	Finance Officer	Powered
26-11-2013	Lance Tarrawalli	Project Officer	Nedoil
26-11-2013	Maria Estrella T. Hernandez	Health Coordinator	LHMC Yele
26-11-2013	Edward Turay	Personal Assistant/Office Manager	Nedoil/LHF
26-11-2013	Alimamy R. Seasay Alfred J. Conteh	Field Supervisors	Nedoil/LHF
26-11-2013	Isatu Kanu Fatmata Z. Bangura	Newly LH trained Nursing Aids - Maternity	LHMC Yele
26-11-2013	Yankuba Seasay	CHO	LHMC Yele
26-11-2013	Sunthuba Osara 111	Paramount Chief	Chief Yele
26-11-2013	Arjan Schothorst	Finance Officer	LHF
26-11-2013	Gerry Konings	Midwife	LHMC/LHF
27-11-2013	Ruurd van Rooijen	Project Officer	LHF
27-11-2013	Harold F	Manager	SSLDF/Mabenteh Hospital
27-11-2013	Frances Fornah	Principal	SOMM
27-11-2013	Heidi Jalloh	Tropical Doctor/Adviser	MRC
28-11-2013	Sarah Palmer	Midwife Educator/SLMA Secretary	NSM
28-11-2013	Hossinatu Kanu	Chief Nursing Officer	MoHS
28-11-2013	Betty Sam	Seniro Technical Officer (support to SLMA by CHASL)	Making it Happen Programme SL – LSTM
29-11-2013	Yayah A. Conteh	Principal Donor/NGO Liaison Officer	MoHS
29-11-2013	Mabel Carew	Chief Nursing Officer	MoHS
29-11-2013	Dierctor	Dept. Hydro Energy	Ministry of Energy
02-12-2013	Walter Carew	Director	CHASL
05-12-2013	Joan Shephard	NSM Director/SLMA President	MoHS
<b>30/11 – 4/12 2013: field visit Zambia: Macha Works</b>			
2-12-2013	Fred Mweetwa	Representative and CEO Linknet (and secretary to the board)	Macha Works Foundations NL and Linknet
2-12-2013	Interviews with villagers in Macha		Business Centre, School, Radio Station
2-12-2013	Chief Macha	Paramount Chief	Macha
3-12-2013	Thuma Hamuukang'Andu	Bishop	BIC Church

4-12-2013	Nkuruma Chama Kalakula	Trade & Investment Officer	Netherlands Consulate Zambia
<b>5/12 – 8/12 2013: field work Burundi: Local Sourcing Rice and Sorghum</b>			
5-12-2013	Paul, Niels, Canisius, Astère, Claver, Fidèle	Kick-off meeting and group interview	Heineken/BRARUDI/ EUCORD
5-12-2013	Canisius Ntahe	Principal Avdisor	BRARUDI
5-12-2013	Astère Simbashizwheko, Claver Ntabangana, Fidèle Ndwimana	Director and team Burundi office	EUCORD
5-12-2013	Prof. Gérard Rusuka	Professor	CERDA/FECAGRO
6-12-2013	Site visit and group interviews with producers	Commune du Gihanga	Gihanga
6-12-2013	Governor	Governor	Province Cibitoke
6-12-2013	Group Interview with members of producer's associations	Producer's Associations	Cibitoka
6-12-2013	Paul Stanger	Local Sourcing Director	Heineken
6-12-2013	Alexis Ntamavukiro	National Coordinator	IFDC
6-12-2013	Jan Vlaar	Senior policy adviser Food Security & Economic Development	Netherlands Embassy
7-12-2013	Bastiaan Huesken	Contracted consultant	EUCORD
7-12-2013	Maarten Schuurman	General Director	BRARUDI
7-12-2013	Debriefing meeting BRARUDI EUCORD		BRARUDI/EUCORD
7-12-2013	Niels Hanssens	dep. Executive Director	EUCORD
8-12-2013	Elie Minani and Pierre Hakizimana	Independent traders	
8-12-2013	David Nyama Nyalala	Transporter	
<b>9/12 – 16/12 2013: field work DRC: Local Sourcing Rice and Sorghum</b>			
9-12-2013	Norbert Moerkens	1 <sup>st</sup> secretary	Dutch Embassy
9-12-2013	Frédéric Mbaki	Coordinator Projet Riz	Eucord
9-12-2013	Alexey Chernyaev	General Manager	Bralima DRC Kinshasa
10-12-2013	Bibiche	Finance Manager Projet Riz	Eucord
10-12-2013	Thomas Kembola Kejuni	Manager Food Security	Ministry of Agriculture
10-12-2013	Didier Ndaye	Secrétaire Exécutif	Batide
10-12-2013	Amigo Mikanda	Coach	Batide
10-12-2013	Jean-Pierre Sassa	BOD president	Batide
11-12-2013	12 representatives		Farmers association APERKING
11-12-2013	3 representatives		Farmers association ARED
11-12-2013	Gustave Cileu Ilunga	Chef de bureau vulgarisation	Rice National Programme
12-12-2013	Simon Mambu	Site Manager	Brarudi Kisangani
12-12-2013	Pierre Bolonge	Coordinator	PIDR
12-12-2013	5 representatives		Farmers association ABAMOD

12-12-2013	20 representatives		Farmers association UA
13-12-2013	Christophe Bokana	General Manager	Provincial Ministry of Agriculture
13-12-2013	Pelé Ngala	Logistic Manager	Brarudi Kisangani
13-12-2013	1 representative		Farmers association BOLINGO
13-12-2013	1 representative		Farmers association MIVAP
13-12-2013	1 representative		Farmers association MAPENDO
13-12-2013	1 representative		Farmers association AC DK
13-12-2013	1 representative		Farmers association ACDM
13-12-2013	2 representatives		Farmers association ACDA
13-12-2013	Michel Bolingola Likumu	Coach	PIDR
13-12-2013	Jean-Jacques Totiwe	Coach	PIDR
14-12-2014	Eric Terzi	Logistic Manager	BRALIMA
<b>9/12 – 17/12 2013: field work Uganda and Kenya: Internet for WASH and Global Premix Facility</b>			
9-12-2013	Dorcus Atieno (and team)	Project officer	Jinja Diocese
10-12-2013	Josephat Byaruhanga	Senior Policy Advisor, Agriculture & Agribusiness	Netherlands Embassy
10-12-2013	Louise Sserunjogi	Consultant – Nutritionist (and previous GAIN country officers)	Independent
10-12-2013	Dr Elizabeth Madraa	Fortification Advisor	Spring Nutrition Project (USAID)
10-12-2013	Miuro Nsubuha Ellis	Mill Manager	Ntake Bakery
11-12-2013	Elma den Toom, Francis, Andrew and Felice	Partnerships Assistant and members Akvo team	Akvo Hub Africa, Nairobi Kenya
11-12-2013	Johnson Ssubi	Officer in Charge of Quality & Food Fortification	Uganda Bureau of Standards (UNBS)
12-12-2013	Kishore Yadev	Factory Manager	Mukono_Oil Industries
12-12-2013	Tim	South Asia Team	Akvo
14-12-2013	Simon Oullo	Manager	Hope Alive Uganda
14-12-2013	Maurits Servaas	Planning Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	ICCO
17-12-2013	Francis Baganzi	Factory Manager	Nile Agro Industries
<b>14/12, 2013 - 7/1, 2013: field work Bangladesh: Internet for WASH and Global Premix Facility</b>			
15-12-2013	Mr. Basanta Kar	Country Manager	GAIN Bangladesh Country Office
15-12-2013	Mr. Wahiduzzaman	Sr. Consultant and Country USI Associate	GAIN Bangladesh Country Office

15-12-2013	Mr. SM Hasan Iqbal	Sr. Program Manager	GAIN Bangladesh Country Office
15-12-2013	Mr. Lutfor Rahman Tarafder	Joint Chief and Director of Fortification of Edible Oil in Bangladesh - Project	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	Md. Shahidul Haque	Assistant Director (Monitoring) of Fortification of Edible Oil in Bangladesh - Project	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	Gazi Mohammad Nurl Islam	Assistant Director, BSTI, MOI	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	Murntaherah Siddiquee	Assistant Director (Programme)	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	Md. Mizanur Rahman	Assistant Chief	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	Mr. Ansar Ali	Deputy Chief	Ministry of Industries
15-12-2013	MR. Mozammel Haque	Assistant Director (F&A)	Ministry of Industries
16-12-2013	Jan Willem Nibbering	senior policy advisor food security & governance	Netherlands Embassy
16-12-2013	Carel de Groot	First Secretary / Water Expert	Netherlands Embassy
17-12-2013	Alok Mujumber	National Coordinator	Bangladesh WASH alliance
17-12-2013	Mr. Zobair	Chief of Research	DORP
17-12-2013	Mr. Didar Uddin,	Program Associate	DORP
17-12-2013	Mr. Kawsar Ali	ICT Officer	DORP
17-12-2013	Mr. Firoz Ahmed	Program Focal Person	DORP
17-12-2013	Mr/ ATM Nazrul Islam	Executive Director	Hoop for the Poorest - ASA
17-12-2013	Ms. Fouzia Alam	Program Officer	Hoop for the Poorest - ASA
18-12-2013	Mr. Ashek Mafuz	National Program Coordinator	Microneutrient Initiatives (MI)
18-12-2013	Mr. Abu Taher Khan	Director Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorder (CIDD) Project,	BSCIC, Government of Bangladesh
29-12-2013	Mr. Kamal Saha	Owner	New Quality Salt Industries, Narayangonj
29-12-2013	Mr. Kamal Dewan	Owner	Khaza Gorebe Newaz Salt Industries, Narayangonj
7-1-2014	Mr. Touhidul Islam, Mr. Salauddin	Director	TK Group- Oil refinery
<b>Interviews with partners and stakeholders in the Netherlands and at International Level</b>			
2-1-2014	Gertjan van Stam	Coordinator Macha Works Macha	Macha Works Foundation
3-1-2013	Henk Molenaar	Former Ambassador Zambia	Netherlands Embassy
7-1-2014	Jaap Breugem	Project Manager	VNG International
7-1-2014	Annechien Deelman	consultant	MUNDO
9-1-2014	Thom Sprenger	Schokland Coordinator (2008-	MoFA (until 2010)

		2010)	
9-1-2014	Karin Boven	Dpt. Head Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction Division; Stabilisation & Humanitarian Aid Department (currently <i>HOS</i> )	MoFA (current NL Embassy Afghanistan)
16-1-2014	Meeting Evaluation Reference Group		
20-1-2014	Anne-Marie Voorhoeve	Consultant	CHE
22-1-2014	Frits van der Wal	senior policy adviser DDE	MoFA
6-2-2014	Meeting Evaluation Reference Group		

**Case Study Mission Schedule of evaluation Team Leader (fieldwork continued by national consultants):**

24/11 – 29/11, 2013: Sierra Leone: Meshwork for Mother Care and Best of Both Worlds

30/11 – 4/12, 2013: Zambia: Macha Works

5/12 – 8/12, 2013: Local Sourcing Rice and Sorghum

9/12 – 10/12, 2013: Uganda: Internet for WASH and Global Premix Facility

11/12 – 12/12, 2013: Kenya: Internet for WASH

14/12 – 18/12, 2013: Bangladesh: Internet for WASH and Global Premix Facility

## Annex 2: Literature and documents reviewed

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## Annex 3: Case study descriptions

### 1. MDG 5: Meshwork for Mother Care (project number 19474)<sup>29</sup>

#### Main features of the project and partnership

The Meshwork for Mother Care project consists of six sub-projects focusing on different aspects of maternal mortality. At the time of application 20 partners participated in this project. The contracting partner to MoFA was Cordaid. Activities were carried out in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and in the Netherlands. In the framework of this evaluation, the activities in Sierra Leone were subject to a field-visit and interviews with stakeholders on the ground as well as in the Netherlands. Therefore the focus of the analysis of this section is on the sub-project 'reduction of maternal mortality in Sierra Leone'.

However, before moving to that sub-project some background on the origin and start-up of the Meshwork for Mother Care project, as a whole, is needed.

The Meshwork for Mother Care alliance was a direct result of the Schokland meeting on June 30, 2007, around which a Dutch parliamentarian (Chantal Gill'ard) invited interested organisations to form a partnership around maternal mortality (under MDG 5). A specific challenge presented with this invitation was to organise public, private and civil and research organisations around a number of challenges related to this MDG. The subscribing organisations of the Schokland Agreement were invited to a series of two meetings to further identify specific challenges and based on this to move to project formulation. Another challenge was to bring together an entirely new mix of public, private and civil partners, who did not know each other well at the start of this partnership and initiative. The Centre for Human Emergence was asked to facilitate, so called "meshworking" meetings in the second Semester of 2007, to knit a more tightly connected network of these partners: 10 working-groups were formed that developed different proposals under the Meshwork for Mother Care group. This finally resulted in the submission of a Schokland proposal of the Meshwork for Mother Care partnership in September 2008 that consisted of six sub-projects all to be implemented by different sub-groups of the overall alliance. One of the original six projects aimed at the use of heat stable oxytocin<sup>30</sup> in developing countries during the entire project duration was not implemented, although it was approved at the start of the project. A special separate project, funded as a separate Schokland project, was developed to investigate conditions for production of heat stable oxytocin and that project was not successful and this has also influenced the Oxytocin project component in the Meshwork for Mother Care project. Towards the end of the Meshwork project, the component to test and introduce oxytocin could not be realised and in consultation with MoFA this project component was cancelled. A second project in original project-

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<sup>29</sup> The ToR of this evaluation requested to look at only the sub-project of the Meshwork project that was implemented in Sierra Leone and not the whole project. However, for a good understanding of this sub-project some information and analysis is needed of the overall project, as is done in this section.

<sup>30</sup> Oxytocin is a mammalian hormone that acts primarily as a neuromodulator in the brain. It is also used to as a medicine to prevent bleedings with and after childbirth. When used as a medicine, the quality of Oxytocin deteriorates quickly in (sub)tropical climates. In the meshwork for mother care project the challenge of producing and using a heat-stable oxytocin was one of the core issues to be tackled by the partnership.

plan focusing on production of television programmes on MDG-5 was not approved by MoFA and therefore was cancelled at the start of the project. In these two sub-projects, which did not materialise in Meshwork for Mother Care, five pharmaceutical industries were involved. Because in the other sub-projects of Meshwork for Mother Care the involvement of private sector partners was much more limited, the overall private sector participation in the Meshwork for Mother Care project, apart from initial explorations was not effectuated.

Among the 20 organisations that participated at the start of the partnership, Cordaid was requested to act as contracting partner to MoFA and to be the overall lead in the partnership, while the four specific projects were coordinated by Cordaid (two projects in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan), KIT (linking and learning) and WPF/MyBODY (mother's nights).

The analysis of the Meshwork for Mother Care in this section is only addressing the sub-project to reduce maternal mortality in Sierra Leone.

### **Theory of Change and result chain**

The theory of change in the project in Sierra Leone was focusing on the National Reproductive and Child Health Strategic Plan (2008-2010), aiming at a reduction of maternal, neonatal and child mortality in Sierra Leone.

An important assumption in the theory of change was that strengthened collaboration among stakeholders in the health sector through Public Private Partnerships in health services with special attention to reproductive and child health.

Five result areas and areas of cooperation were identified:

- Integrated planning and implementation of district health services
- Knowledge system for M&E and research by public and private partners
- Improved performance of professionals engaged in reproductive and child health
- Training institutions deliver human resources for reproductive and child health, reducing existing shortage with 25%
- Scaling-up of effective interventions.

During implementation of the project, the component of human resource development and management received most attention, addressing specially a Midwifery school in Makeni (serving rural areas). In the development of a knowledge system for health, research and research methodology were developed. Under strengthening of professional organisations, the project focused on strengthening the Sierra Leonean Midwives Association. A fourth related (and new result area) was to work on awareness raising in Netherlands and Sierra Leone, focusing again on SMLA and on exchange and twinning between midwives in the Netherlands and Sierra Leone.

In practice the project in Sierra Leone, developed differently than was originally planned. Particular changes are a stronger focus on specific (partner) organisations (MRC, Midwifery School in Makeni, and SLMA) and less focus on overall and nation-wide planning and implementation systems in reproductive health and maternal and child mortality.

## Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level

The projects in Sierra Leone have reached considerable results, although at a lower ambition level than originally anticipated. At the output level the evaluators could observe that a school for rural midwives was built in Makeni and that a curriculum for rural midwives was developed and implemented. At outcome level, at the time of the evaluation almost 250 midwives had graduated from this school. At impact level, it is still too early to establish if the increased availability of midwives has led to a decrease in maternal and child mortality in rural areas. Statistical data<sup>31</sup> show that Maternal Mortality has decreased from 970 (in 2008) to 890 (in 2010) per 100.000 live-births, but this was prior to the graduation of the new midwives. With respect to child mortality we can observe a drastic reduction from 2010 onwards from 154 per 1.000 children to 80 in 2010 and 76 in 2012. Also this reduction in child mortality rates cannot be attributed to the Meshwork project as the School in Makeni did not produce its first batch of rural midwives in 2012. But possibly awareness raising activities, such as a massive campaign on malaria, realised by Meshwork partners could have made a contribution to this reduction as that campaign was focusing on protecting babies with mosquito netting. No research was done on the effects of this campaign, so attribution is tricky.

At the outcome level, through exchange between Midwives in the Netherlands and in Sierra Leone (implemented by KNOV) and through a small project for support to SMLA and funding of the participation of the SL midwives in the international conference in Durban by Cordaid, the Sierra Leonean Midwives Association was successfully revived and reactivated. Exchange and twinning activities between midwives in the two countries still continue to exist, although not yet embedded anymore in a structural exchange relation but as a result of individual efforts. At impact level it is difficult to observe effects, as the SLMA is not a very strong and visible organisation, although it still exists, which is an indicator of some longer-lasting effects.

In knowledge management and research, outcomes were obtained in the form of implementation and publication of research and information and education packages on health issues. KIT has been active in this field and is still working together with MRC on research in the framework of another separate project. Also at the level of the Midwifery School in Makeni, the development of new and specialised curricula resulted in the continuous implementation of new knowledge elements produced in the project, mainly with technical support of AV-MUNDO, realised through an additional contract and funding by Cordaid.

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<sup>31</sup> <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=sl&v=2223>

## Timeline and milestones in the partnership and project


Time	Milestones
21-8-2013	Payment final tranche to the project by MoFA
28-1-2013	Formal cancelation of the Oxytocin sub-project from the Meshwork project by MoFA
31-12-2012	Closure of overall Meshwork project (KNOV and ICM stopped activities but maintained informal relations, KIT continued working with MRC in another project, AV-MUNDO ended the trajectory of curriculum development and Cordaid ended all activities and prepared for administrative winding up of the project)
2 <sup>nd</sup> Sem 2012	Gradual ending of dialogue between CORDAID, MRC and Steering Committee after the decision of Cordaid to end the end the relationship with MRC on 5-7-2012
5-7-2012	Formal decision by Cordaid to end the partnership with MRC and stop channelling funds through MRC (and therefore direct funding of activities in Sierra Leone, although activities of the Dutch partners could continue through direct funding of these Dutch partners by Cordaid)
11-6-2012	Request Cordaid to steering committee to consider alternative funding channel for the remaining project period
30-6-2012	End of Malaria no More component in project
2012	First two batches of 125 midwives graduated from SOMM, over 80% placed in rural areas
14-9-2011	The Sierra Leone Steering Committee expressed disagreement with a proposal by Cordaid for an alternative route of funding for the project, to be able to continue the activities with the School in Makeni (SOMM).
9/10-9-2011	Planning meeting for the 2012 Operational Plan (facilitated by the coalition factory). After this meeting the Meshwork project changed from two steering committees in the Netherlands and Sierra Leone to only one steering committee that included MRC, Cordaid and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation as core partners, but not the other implementing partners. They were supposed to coordinate directly with their respective partners in Sierra Leone
July 2011	MRC entered a situation of financial crisis and this has affected the situation of tutors and students in the Midwifery school in Makeni (SOMM).
Summer 2011	Suspension of transfers of funds from the project to MRC (and SOMM) by Cordaid. Reasons for the suspension are not subject to this case study and therefore are not further specified in this case-study report
19/23-6-2011	Participation of 50 Midwives from Sierra Leone an Netherlands in ICM conference in Durban
April 2011	Mid Term Review Meshwork Project by CIDIN and WUR
2011	Cordaid contracted AV-MUNDO to implement a process of curriculum development at SOMM in the Meshwork project
2 <sup>nd</sup> semester 2010	Emerging financial issues between Cordaid and MRC and concern expressed by Cordaid on disruptions in continuation of the project (the activities with SOMM through MRC)
June 2010	Emerging difficulties in communication between Northern and Southern Partners
2 <sup>nd</sup> Sem 2009 & 1 <sup>st</sup> Sem 2010	Period of project progress and increase of activities; the “blossoming” period of the Meshwork project in Sierra Leone: Anti-malaria and mosquito-netting campaign, exchanges KNOV-AMSL, building of school in Makeni, curriculum development and staff training and exchange In this period Cordaid and EU concluded a project with MRC as local partner for additional components to the School in Makeni (SOMM) and also to the health programme of MRC as an important supporting activity to the Schokland project.
19-3-2009	Approval MoFA Meshwork for Mother Care project (to contract partner Cordaid)

1-2-2009	De facto start of Meshwork for Mother Care Project
30-9-2008	Submission Meshwork for Mother Care partnership proposal to the ministry
Aug 2007 – Aug 2008	Meshworking meetings facilitated by CHE and working groups to develop concrete project proposals under the umbrella of Meshwork for mother care. Several meetings were organised for this meshworking work, funded by NCDO under a separate arrangement
30 June 2007	Schokland Meeting and signing of the partnership agreement
First Semester 2007	The Meshwork for Mother care Alliance was started as a response to an invitation of the Dutch parliamentarian Chantal Gill'ard to work together on MDG 5. Moving towards the Schokland Meeting the partners in this alliance started to exchange ideas on possibilities to work together and develop a joint Schokland Proposal.

### Partnership configuration and development over time

At the start of Meshwork for Mother Care 20 Dutch and international partners participated. In the first phase the role of CHE was very important to facilitate the process of partner-formation in the so-called meshworking phase. Concrete partnerships were developed at the sub-project level, led by Cordaid (2), KIT and WPF/MyBODY. Two partnership projects (led by CHE and WHO) did not take off.

The core partners in the Meshwork project are presented in the figure below:



Legend: blue = MoFA/Embassies; Orange = NGO's; Green = Private Sector; Yellow = Research institutes; Purple = Public Sector (local and international). Bottom part of the picture is implementation on the ground in developing countries. Light coloured circles with dotted line are not very active partners during the implementation of the project.

The project and partnership in Sierra Leone was by far the largest of Meshwork. The most active partners in this project were Cordaid, KIT, KNOV, ICM, Malaria no More! and the Midwives Academy of Maastricht. This academy later involved MUNDO to enter the project with concrete support for curriculum development in the Midwives School in Makeni. Some other partners participated in the project, but with a much lower profile than the others: TNO, Midwives academy Rotterdam, Development and Relief Corporation BV and NCDO. In Sierra Leone, the local partners did not refer to these partners at all.

In Sierra Leone there was a group of seven partners involved in the partnership: Medical Research Centre (MRC), Christian Health Association Sierra Leone (CHASL), Sierra Leonean Midwives Association (SLMA), School of Midwifery Makeni (SOMM), School of Midwifery Freetown (SOMF), University of Sierra Leone (UnSL) and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MHOS)

At the start of the project the partners in the Netherlands and the partners in Sierra Leone had separate steering committees, but this did not work out well. The coordination among Northern partners remained outside the scope of local partners. The project was perceived by local partners as an accumulation of many separate activities and missions that were not well coordinated and put a considerable strain on local partner. The partners in Sierra Leone requested a bigger role in the planning and coordination of the project and after an MTR in 2011 the project moved to one steering committee only in Sierra Leone, and this change and more significant role for the Sierra Leonean partners was much appreciated by the local partners. Cordaid was unhappy with the fact that the Steering Committee claimed decision-making over funds for which Cordaid was legally responsible to their back-donor and decision-making power over funds was not transferred to the SL steering committee. In the following period it became clear that the establishment of only one steering committee in Sierra Leone did not fully resolve financial issues in the project and also not the coordination and absorption of the many missions by Dutch partners in this project. Also in the period after 2011, local partners and the steering committee expressed concern with planning and implementation of some missions of Dutch partners.

At the Sierra Leonean side no changes in composition of the partnership occurred over time, but active participation of some partners did. SOMF (Freetown) was critical on the support given to SOMM (Makeni) and did not participate actively in curriculum development activities of the project, though they were always invited to participate.

Problems in the bilateral relationship and communication between Cordaid and MRC became more serious in 2010 and 11. The reasons for these problems were primarily related to financial and reporting issues, also in relation to a EU-project that Cordaid had implemented with MRC. As this project remains outside the scope of this case study report, we will not further elaborate about the nature and content of that conflict. It suffices to say that this conflict between Cordaid and MRC also casted a shadow over the relationship in this project and it caused the formal discontinuation of the funding of Cordaid to MRC in the Schokland project.



### **Critical success -factors**

The following success-factors could be identified:

- The Meshwork alliance was brought together with high speed, as a response to a political invitation to bring together many partners around MDG 5. This high political profile established high relevance and enabled motivation among partners in the Meshwork alliance to work on concrete proposals;
- The meshworking methodology to facilitate the exploration of partnership formation process has helped to build understanding and mutual trust, particularly between companies and NGO's that prior to this partnership did not have a history of cooperation. Unfortunately due to cancellation of the projects in which private partners participated, the results of this meshworking between private partners and NGO's on the longer term cannot be verified;
- The meshworking was done through external facilitators of CHE who did not take an active role in the meshwork project. This created a neutral process-facilitation between different partners in the partnership. This neutral facilitation was discontinued during the project implementation;
- The establishment of a single steering committee in Sierra Leone, and specific coordination groups for specific project interventions, has given a greater recognition of the role of local partners in the project that unfortunately due to emerging conflicts could not be explored in practice. The decision to establish this committee was important for the continuation of the project and if it would not have been done, the Sierra Leonean partners state that they probably would have withdrawn from the project if this hadn't happened.
- The bilateral conflict between Cordaid and MRC casted a shadow over the entire project and therefore the new set-up of a governance structure in the project did not get a real chance to prove itself.

### **Critical failure-factors**

- The Meshwork for Mother Care was a very large partnership and proved to be quite difficult to manage as a whole. Though joint meetings around implementation were organised at the sub-project level, overall meetings that occurred were mainly to exchange information around specific sub-projects but not to work on more synergy and joint planning. In 2011, Cordaid organised a week-long joint planning session by Dutch and Sierra Leonean partners in Sierra Leone. The overall meshwork partnership was however in practice mainly an administrative arrangement and also at the sub-project level there were different bilateral agreements ;
- From the Sierra Leonean perspective, the large number of partners in Meshwork which all had their own specific activities (project components) was difficult to manage and coordinate. The high frequency of missions and activities was difficult to absorb by the local partners and local capacity constraints to do so were not detected timely. The project was rather supply oriented and not sufficiently based on local needs and demands, although some components such as the Midwifery School in Makeni and the curriculum development for this school was based on a needs assessment and a clear demand of SOMM and MRC;
- The double steering committee was not helpful for a clear coordination of the project. Local partners wanted a stronger role of the local steering committee and wanted to avoid double and parallel lines of communication and to control the information flow. However, in practice the different project-components continued in a parallel fashion;

- Cultural tensions between Urban and Rural areas in Sierra Leone made it more difficult to create a collective path for improving quality of midwifery education in Sierra Leone, where Schools in Freetown, Makeni and elsewhere could constructively work together. Similar tensions could be found in the Midwives association. These tensions influence the possibilities for national level impact of the project and replication elsewhere;
- In spite of considerable efforts of Cordaid to invest in capacity development of MRC, it did not have its desired results. MRC claims that capacity challenges were not sufficiently addressed and that the pressure on MRC and other partners in this project was very big due to the large number of project activities and continuous flow of missions to Sierra Leone. Capacity constraints of different partners to absorb missions and possibly of MRC to manage the project activities in Makeni, caused disruptions in the project;
- Personal relations in the core of the project have had a great impact on deteriorating relations and communication. As these personal relations were crosscutting different organisations, personal frustrations and bitterness have contributed to the rupture of organisational relations;
- Partners mention poor communication between different partners and persons as an important reason for the aggravation of the conflicts in the projects. The styles of communication in Sierra Leone and the Netherlands are quite different and in times of the emergence of disagreements and problems accelerated the emergence of open conflicts;
- Although not a failure-factor during the project, it is important to mention that the lack of a formal ending and evaluation by the project partners collectively has caused that conflicts even more than a year after closure still exist. A formal ending could have created the possibility to start new relations and particularly to jointly learn from the process, successes and mistakes. Even now, more than a year later, such a formal joint closure and evaluation could be productive for restoring relations between different partners in this project although it is doubtful if this could lead to reconciliation between Cordaid and MRC.

### **Innovation aspects**

In the project the following innovation-processes could be detected

- A process innovation was realised at the level of the full Meshwork project, which was the meshworking methodology to create understanding and relations between partners in a partnership, even if they are from different sectors;
- A second process innovation was the twinning project between KNOV and SLMA, while twinning in general is not new, it was a new methodology in the Sierra Leonean context and it was greatly appreciated by the partners;
- An output innovation was achieved by the development of a midwifery curriculum tailored to rural situations, where the challenges of child and maternal mortality in Sierra Leone are highest.

### **Organisational (among partners) sustainability**

- The Meshwork for Mother Care was ended, but some individual members of the partnership have continued with activities together with local partners (KIT and KNOV);

### **Project sustainability**

- In the Meshwork project, no provisions were made for exiting, transfer or continuation of activities. After the end of the Meshwork in December 2012, the partnership was dissolved. No stock was taken of the experience, by organising a collective learning and closure event, although at the start such a collective learning and dissemination event was planned. However, the partners in the Netherlands did meet to arrive at a closure of the project.

### **Institutional sustainability**

- For KNOV, its participation in the Meshwork project has had a significant impact. It proved to be the introduction of an entirely new activity in the organisation. Since the project in Sierra Leone, KNOV has started new twinning projects in Morocco and Surinam and international activities to support midwives in other countries are now embedded in the organisational strategy of KNOV;
- ICM and SLMA have built structural relations and SLMA is member of ICM. However although SMLA has been revived its capacity is still very weak;
- The Midwifery School in Makeni has succeeded in establishing itself as an education institute and is applying the delivery of the curriculum for rural midwives. SOMM now yearly produces batches of rural midwives for the rural areas of Sierra Leone and is doing so with budget support from the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and direct support to students from UNFPA.

## 2. Best of Both Worlds (project number 19471)

### Main features of the project and partnership

The health situation in post war Sierra Leone is dramatic. The country has the highest maternal and child mortality rates in the world and has the lowest human development index worldwide.

Investments of the government and several international development partners to improve this situation are considerable. This is laid down in government health policies and strategies:

- Agenda for Prosperity 2012, pillar covering maternal and child health
- Sierra Leone Child Health Strategic Plan 2008 to 2010 and 2011 to 2015

In spite of these policies it will take much effort and time to improve the health and poverty situation in Sierra Leone and the government is welcoming investments of NGO's and international supporters.

The Lion Heart Foundation was founded in April 2006 as a result of a visit of three medical workers to Makeni in Sierra Leone. The initial motivation of the foundation was to improve medical services in rural areas of Sierra Leone. Since its start the Lion Heart Foundation has worked with the 'Best of Both Worlds' program since its foundation.

The first activities of Lion Heart in 2006 and 2007 were focusing on supporting clinics and health work in Lungi, Makeni and Yele, in different medical facilities in cooperation with the Swiss Sierra Leone Development Foundation (SSLDF).

At the end of 2007, Lion Heart started with the building of a sustainable palm-oil factory and a small plantation. In addition to the climatological conditions, palm-oil production provides a very good opportunity for income generation, because there are only a limited number of such facilities in the country.

The Best of Both Worlds program since 2010 is entirely implemented in Yele in the Chiefdom Gbonkolenken<sup>32</sup> and it is focusing on the following activities:

- Sustainable economic development, through the (re-)construction of a hydroelectric power station and a palm oil factory;
- Increased employment and income for the local population;
- Improving facilities for healthcare and education;
- Improved drinking water facilities through restoring a local water treatment plant and water-distribution network in the village of Yele;
- Development of a social and economic infrastructure.

Some of the main features of the project are based on local characteristics in the community that were taken up as opportunities for local development. The region has good conditions for oil-palm cultivation. The village of Yele is situated on the river Teije, where a hydroelectric power plant was located. However shortly after the civil war started both hydro power plant and water purification plant were destroyed. Since then, the inhabitants were reliant on expensive and environmentally unfriendly generators. Lion Heart has taken up the challenge to restore the power station and the electricity network in order to provide the village and the immediate area of electricity and in this way make maximum use of existing conditions.

### Theory of Change and result chain

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<sup>32</sup> After ending a relation of cooperation with another partner SSLDF in Makeni in 2010, Lionheart focused all its activities on Yele.

The theory of change of the Best of Both Worlds project is that a large part of the profits of economic activities can be used to finance social activities such as healthcare and education. The continuation of social services in a community can only be sustainable if there are mechanisms to become financially self-supporting. Due to the dire poverty situation healthcare and education in Sierra Leone can't be supported financially with income from patients or the government. Therefore most hospitals and schools in the country are structurally dependent on sponsors. The Best of Both Worlds project was designed to change this.

To achieve this link between economic activities and social service, Lion Heart has developed different components in the project focusing on the following goals:

- Sustainable economic development;
- Increase of local employment and improved income for the local population;
- Improve quality and quantity of palm-oil sales for thousands of oil-palm fruit bunches producing smallholders;
- Improved infrastructure and access to the region;
- Increase quality of facilities for health and education;
- Develop a social and economic infrastructure.

To reach these objectives, 7 sub-projects were developed:

1. Rehabilitation and expansion of oil-palm plantation for 1500 smallholders;
2. Rehabilitation of a hydro-power plant;
3. Bridging funding for operational costs of Magbenteh Hospital in Makeni;
4. Set-up and staffing of a community health post in Yele (later developing into a full clinic);
5. Building a house and workshop for 200 polio-patients;
6. Support to secondary schools;
7. Research on possibilities for infrastructural improvements, later resulting in the set-up of the drinking water project.

The theory of change applied in this project is very ambitious and resulted in a many-component integral local development project. In the next section, we will see that the project has achieved good results at the output and outcome level.

But the core aspect of the theory of change was not achieved. The social activities in Yele are not yet funded with profits from economic activities, and even on the contrary, the economic activities are not sustainable yet and until the moment of this evaluation dependent on subsidies of the Lion Heart Foundation. Lion Heart Foundation has closed a partnership with the Dutch organic palm-oil company Natural Habitats as per January 2014 and this company will develop the palm oil mill to a higher capacity and quality in the coming years and it will support the Lion Heart Medical Hospital with a yearly donation, depending on the volume of produced palm oil. Although with this new partnership the Best of Both Worlds model becomes a more concrete perspective it will still take time until the oil-palm cultivation and palm-oil production can reach such levels that it can provide a serious contribution to other Lion Heart activities in Yele, although the Lion Heart Foundation is optimistic that by buying palm-oil fruit bunches elsewhere in Sierra Leone the production capacity can already be more fully used as from February 2014.

### **Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level**

Outputs:

- Completion of the renovation and expansion of the MCH therapeutic feeding centre from 25 to 125 beds in 2009 at the Magbenteh Hospital;

- Increased capacity and quality of services in two hospitals in Lungi (Bai Bureh) and Makeni (Magbenteh) to serve 30.000 patients per year (has increased from 5.000 prior to the project). The support activities to these two hospitals have stopped in 2010 and take over by the original project partners SSLDF that continued this project independently from Lion Heart. Therefore results can only be described at the output level.
- Lay out of a small oil palm plantation in Yele and network for buying palm-oil fruit bunches from smallholders in the region and setting up an operational palm-oil factory (Nedoil) in Yele;
- Renovation of the SDA Junior Secondary School in Yele and boarding house and support to the school fund and school materials for primary schools in Yele;
- Continuous development and expansion of the Lion Heart Medical Centre in Yele: completion of the 'out-patients' department in 2011. In 2012 the LHMC was expanded with a ward that includes 32 beds, an operating theatre, a hospital kitchen and an X-ray department:
  - o In 2012 (the final year of the Schokland project): 6.997 patients were treated in the Out-patients department (more than double of 2011 and with a balance between men and women);
  - o Laboratory tests increased to over 500 month in 2012;
  - o Further services in 2012: 627 Malaria tests; 80 blood transfusions; 141 X-ray test; 720 Ultrasound test and 165 surgical procedures
  - o The LHMC started to do deliveries in 2012, and since second half 2012 increasing to over 10 each month
  - o In 2012 the LHMC in-house patients ward achieved over 120 admissions per month: occupation rate between 70-80%
- Delivery of training courses for medical workers at the LHMC in Yele
- Renovation of the destroyed hydroelectric power plant in Yele and reconstruction of the electricity network, street-lighting and connection of homes and businesses in Yele to the grid and set up of the company Powered to deliver electricity against pre-paid cards
- Repair of the water purification plant in Yele, an set up of the company Waterved to deliver water through a water-network (this project has continued with other sources of funding)

At the output level we can see an overachievement of results related to the LHMC, but an underachievement of outputs of the palm-oil factory. Other outputs were delivered as planned, though one of the turbines of the hydropower plant was damaged after a year and is not yet repaired. The electricity company is operating at 50% of its capacity, but this is more than the demand in Yele. However a potential for profit generation is not yet used.

At the outcome level the following results can be observed in Yele:

- Oil-palm plantation (50 hectares) and smallholders produce and sell palm-oil fruit bunches, but the capacity of the palm-oil factory is only partially used;
- The Palm-oil factory is still generating losses and it can only become profitable when a substantial increase of oil-palm plantation and/or outreach to smallholders is reached until approximately 600 hectares. Lion Heart has taken measures to minimize operational and staffing costs of the palm-oil factory and its capacity is now also used to run the Powered Company. Lion Heart, in January 2014, has signed a MoU with Natural Habitats for the expansion of the oil-palm plantation. But considering the time needed to clear land and plant oil palms and subsequently the five years before these palms become productive, it will take a minimum of 6 years of the palm-oil factory to become profitable. But at the short term a solution was found by Natural Habitats through closing several large contracts with other palm fruit suppliers in the country. This will mean that the full capacity of the mill might be used, starting in February 2014. Further expansion is foreseen in the end of 2014, which can improve perspectives for sustainability and give Nedoil also time to expand her own plantation.

- The hospital is fully operational and number of patients is still growing. Patient's satisfaction is generally high and the LHMC has become a reference medical facility in the region. LHMC is now also serving as a training centre and for rural areas the quality of its equipment is exceptional. Although planned, the management of the LHMC has not yet fully been transferred to local staff, although part of the management is Sierra Leonean;
- The rehabilitation of the hydropower plant and provision of pre-paid electricity has resulted in 187 connections to the grid in November 2013. The provision of electricity is 24 hours a day and Yele is among the very few (if not the only) rural community with this quality and outreach of electricity services;
- The drinking water project was not developed with funds from the Schokland fund, but it is directly related to this project and it can be considered an indirect outcome of the activities focusing on infrastructural improvements in the village. An outcome that could be clearly observed during the case-study visit was that clean drinking water on tap is available to the villagers and the hospital.

At the impact level we can observe the following:

- Impact of the medical services provided to the local population is not possible to measure, because no baseline of medical indicators is available. However considering the number of patients that are treated in the hospital, it is likely that impact on the health-situation in Yele is considerable;
- The provision of reliable electricity has made Yele a much livelier and economically prosperous rural community than the surrounding communities. The electricity has enabled small enterprises and trading facilities to come up. No research is available to compare the economic situation in Yele with surrounding communities, so this conclusion of impact is based on direct observation and interviews;
- The palm-oil factory is operational at a very basic level and is not profitable, therefore its impact is limited to a small number of smallholders selling to the factory and employed staff at the factory. Increase of operations of the Nedoil factory will still take many years and therefore the partnership with Natural Habitats was set-up. This new partnership can increase significantly the perspectives for sustainability and the application of the Best of Both Worlds concepts, but this cannot yet be confirmed in this case study research;
- The Lion Heart project in Yele and the MCH have become important regional and even national reference to health care, electricity and water provision in Sierra Leone. The president of Sierra Leone in a visit to Yele has declared that Yele should serve a national reference for integral rural development projects and particularly hydroelectric projects elsewhere in the country as water is a readily available resource in the country.

Although we can observe a considerable impact of the project on the local social and living conditions, the economic impact is much less. And more important, the theory of change of Lion Heart is not yet realised as Ned-oil factory is not generating profit and is even requiring continued subsidies for the longer-term. Other services in water and electricity are also not delivered on a full-cost recovery or profit-base. This means that the impact obtained in Yele at this time can only be sustained by continued subsidies of external donors. Lion Heart has been doing so after the ending of the Schokland project but after the Schokland subsidy it has focused its support to the Medical centre in Yele.

#### **Timeline and milestones in the partnership and project**

Time	Milestones
Second Sem. 2013	Exploration of cooperation with Natural Habitat for expansion of the Oil-palm plantations to ensure more production capacity of the factory


2013	Training for medical workers in Yele
2013	New maternity opened for in-house patients
Jun 2012	New ward finished and opened for in-house patients
31-3-2012	End date of Schokland project (earlier than planned, original end date was 31-12-2012)
9-3- 2012	Visit President Sierra Leone to Yele, where he made a reference to the project of Lion Heart as a model for development of other rural communities, particularly with respect to energy from small hydro-power stations
Oct 2011	Start of expansion of maternity ward in clinic with support of the Heineken Africa Foundation
Sep 2011	Opening clinic in Yele
2011	Rehabilitation of the water-treatment plant and restoration of the water-supply network in Yele
2010	Start of construction of Clinic in Yele
2010	Cooperation with SSLDF and support to hospitals in Makeni and Lungi was ended
2009/2010	Rehabilitation hydro-power station in Yele with a new Dutch partner Zebra Special Products
2009/2010	Establishment and expansion of the Ned-oil plantation and factory (including DBM subsidy)
1-1-2009	Start of the Schokland project (Yacht BV was formal partner, but did not participate actively in the project)
2007/2008	Preparation of the Schokland project proposal and appeal procedure until final approval of the project
30 June 2007	Schokland meeting
April 2006	Start of Lion Heart Foundation and activities in Makeni, Lungi and Yele

### Partnership configuration and development over time

The Lion Heart project started as a partnership of two Netherlands organisations, the Lion Heart Foundation and Yacht B.V. The participation of Yacht B.V has never materialised in practice, although it might be that Yacht B.V. has contributed with funds to Lion Heart to support generating the own contribution of Lion Heart to project. As the fundraising of Lion Heart is broad-based and funds come from many different sources it cannot be established what has been the financial support of Yacht to the project. Its originally envisaged role to support the project with human resources related services has not materialised. This change in partnership configuration is not according to the Schokland regulations that require an active partnership between at least two Dutch partners. But MoFA has not expressed disagreement with these changes in the partnership.

The full partnership at the start of the project can be depicted as follows:





*Legend: Orange = NGO's; Green = Private Sector; Purple = Public Sector (local and international). Bottom part of the picture is implementation on the ground in developing countries. Light coloured circles with dotted line are not very active partners during the implementation of the project.*

In Sierra Leone the project started in a partnership with the Swiss Sierra Leone Development Foundation (SSLDF), but soon after the start of the Schokland project in 2009, problems in cooperation and communication emerged leading to a formal conflict between the two parties in 2010. It was decided to end the partnership and Lion Heart and SSLDF separated, SSLDF continuing with activities in Makeni (MagBenthah) and Lion Heart from then onwards focusing on Yele only.

In Yele, Lion Heart started to create companies (Nedoil, Waterned and Powered) to engage in economic activities, but these companies did not operate independently but under a holding structure of Lion Heart. This design was chosen to ensure that the profit generated by economic activities could flow into the social activities. While in the figure above these companies are presented as partners, in formal legal terms they are not.

An informal partnership and active involvement of the Paramount Chief of Yele is secured in the project and the Chief is fully supporting the activities of Lion Heart in Yele. The PC as leader of his people and custodian of the land mobilised his people for lease of the land for the plantation, factory and hospital, and by involving local smallholders in the sale of oil-palm fruit bunches to the factory. Lion Heart also has ensured that all relevant public authorities (MoHS and Ministry of Energy & Power) have approved and endorsed the activities and projects in Yele.

A new partnership was established in practice, but not formalised in the Schokland project. The Dutch organisation Zebra Special Products provided expertise to the renovation of the power plant and it also provided advice on the palm-oil activities, as ZSP brings in specific expertise in this area from Indonesia and Malaysia.

Currently Lion Heart is trying to establish a new and direct partnership with Natural Habitat, which is an organisation that is active in oil-palm sector and production of sustainable palm oil. This new cooperation is crucial for the long-term success and sustainability of the Best of Both Worlds projects, to ensure that the economic scale of the oil palm plantation and smallholder's schema and the production volume increase to profitable levels.

Lion Heart also works together with a project developed by students of the Delft University of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University and MIT. That project focuses on boosting the local economy and trade. Because of shared interests this project is supported by Lion Heart by providing

advice, linkages and logistic support. This project will build on increased electricity supply in Yele for the establishment and growth of new local businesses.

### **Critical success-factors**

- Important for the success of this project has been the continuous relations and securing of support by the local chief and to coordinate with government initiatives to secure legal and official support to the project and sub-project;
- The capacity and willingness to adapt to changing situations and contexts in this project has been high. Opportunities were picked up in the local context to develop new projects. Creative linkages and cooperation were established to make maximum use of available capacity and decrease costs;
- The project focus on one specific community after the separation with SSLDF has helped the project to invest in the community in a more focused way;
- The project has introduced some payment for service mechanisms that can help building further sustainability to the project, but these mechanisms need to be improved to secure better cost-recovery;
- Although formally not in line with the Schokland requirements, the fact that Lion Heart become the sole manager and implementer of the project has increased effectiveness and efficiency in the project implementation;
- The willingness to look for other new partners to bring in competencies that are needed in the project can help Lion Heart to solve some basic challenges it currently is facing in its project.

### **Critical failure-factors**

- The Lion Heart management structure is housed in the Netherlands and Dutch representatives of Lion Heart are in the top management of all operations. This decreases the involvement and capacity of local people to take ownership of the project and continue the project in the further future;
- The business activities are organised in companies, but these companies do not operate independently and with a pure business rationale. They operate under a holding and business decisions are not made purely on business arguments but are influenced by the overall set-up of the Lion Heart project in Yele;
- The lack of ownership and involvement of local people and organisations presents a great risk for continuity of the project, if and when Lion Heart decides to leave Yele;
- Deteriorating personal relations with a local key partner (SSLDF) representative caused a total rupture of relations between SSLDF and Lion Heart. On the back-ground of this conflict also different religious believes played an important role;
- The Best of Both Worlds concept is not yet achieved because the World of business and profit generation is not sufficiently integrated in the project. The fact that Lion Heart subsidises the business operations is another mechanism that makes it difficult for the company to run its operations as a business.

### **Innovation aspects**

- The main innovation aspect of this project lies in developing new services in the community, with accompanying new mechanisms for payment. This can be called a product (output) innovation. Electricity services are now provided on a pre-paid card basis;
- Also in medical services, Lion Heart has made available new services in the villages such as Ultrasound, X-ray, Operating Table, Blood bank. These are not so much technological innovations, because these technologies are new. What is new is that fact that these technological services are now made available in a rural community in Sierra Leone, which is absolutely unique.

### **Organisational (among partners) sustainability**

The organisational sustainability at the level of Lion Heart foundation is strong. Lion Heart is continuing with its fundraising and focussed support to the community of Yele. It has a strong and continuous fundraising capacity that has continued after the Schokland funding. The Schokland subsidy has accelerated some of the developments, and now the developments are further continued at lower speed matching the financial and other capacities of Lion Heart and the local actors.

This organisational sustainability is not yet sufficiently established at the local level. The project components need to be managed by stronger local entities and by local people to decrease dependence on foreign capacity inputs.

### **Project sustainability**

The project's sustainability is very weak, because the theory of change is not realised. The economic activities in Yele implemented by Lion Heart are not sustainable and the largest activity, the palm-oil factory will still take time to become sustainable. This makes the continuation of activities and new projects in Yele largely dependent on the capacity and willingness of Lion Heart Foundation to continue to fund activities in Yele.

The project of Lion Heart in Yele needs at least another period (and serious and quick actions) of five years to create a prospect of financial sustainability.

### **Institutional sustainability**

Also a concern is the institutional sustainability at the local level. There is no clear and strong local management of the project in the hands of local people. Lion Heart was preparing transfer of management tasks to local people, but this has not yet occurred. Therefore the project is still too much 'in the hands of the Dutch people'.

Furthermore the fact that management of business activities is not organised in separate autonomous companies that can work with a clear business strategy is a risk to sustainability. The companies cannot make decisions based on the specific company situation and interest. A further process of separation and transfer of local companies to separate management is a condition to further work on sustainability of the companies.

The links of the project with the Chief and local and national authorities is a positive feature of sustainability. This support helps to start up and implement activities. The Government's interest in the development model of Yele is a possibility for further support to Yele and it also generates a perspective for replication of this model in other rural communities of Sierra Leone.

### 3. Increase food security and improve livelihoods of rice and sorghum producers (project number 19292)

#### Context and main features of the project and partnership

The cooperation between Heineken and EUCORD dates from 2001, when both organisations met on November 15, during a conference "MVO: het belang voor Ontwikkelingslanden" organised by MOFA, where private sector partners and NGO's were invited to discuss possibilities for increased cooperation between different stakeholders and corporate social responsibility in the development sector.

In the first half of that decade, Heineken was preparing the development of a local sourcing strategy for its breweries across the AME Region. First pilots on local sourcing were done in Ghana and Sierra Leone in 2005 -2011, with co-funding from the Common Fund for Commodities. Heineken and EUCORD worked together in these projects and started to build up joint experiences in developing supply chains for local sourcing.

During the implementation of this five year project, the features of the local sourcing policy became clearer, and led to a formal policy of Heineken, called "Brewing a Better Future" in 2010. In this policy, one of Heineken's objectives is to achieve 60% local sourcing for its breweries in Africa by 2020.

At the time of crystallising this policy, the Schokland fund presented an opportunity for Heineken and EUCORD to develop follow-up projects on the pilots done in Ghana and Sierra Leone. DRC and Burundi were chosen as countries for the proposal to be presented to Schokland.

The submission of the project of Heineken and EUCORD therefore was a continuation of an ongoing cooperation between the two partners and therefore Schokland in this case should be considered more an accelerator, replicator, and a significant up-scaling factor than an initiator of these activities.

In DRC, the project focuses on development of value chains for rice for local sourcing. This crop was chosen due to its relevance as local input for beer production but also because rice is major food-crop in DRC and it is extremely important for rural development and food-security for the people. In spite of huge agricultural production potential only 60% of the needs of Congolese population are served by national production. Rice is a major crop in basic food consumption and is preferred above other crops like manioc.

The project in DRC links to some other projects realised in the agricultural sector by FAO (to stabilise rice prices), by USAID to increase rice production near Kinshasa (introduced two years after the start of the Schokland project) and by BTC to open up rural roads to support (rice) farmers to bring produce to markets.

Before the project started, BRALIMA did attempt buying local rice but was not able to recruit reliable and knowledgeable partners. The start of the Schokland project was also the start of activities in this area in DRC. The project started with the identification of local partners near different breweries. While in the project-proposal only a few sites were chosen, the project quickly expanded to 6 BRALIMA breweries in Boma, Kinshasa, Mbandaka, Kisangani, Bukavu and Lubumbashi all of which had rice production in the neighbourhood. Through cooperation with EUCORD and local

partners (PIDR, BATIDE, FAD, IDR-BM, COOPEKI, ADIP, SOPAM, CEDASOC) the project was able to support farmers associations and develop local supply chains to BRALIMA.

In Burundi the same approach was chosen, but overall on a much smaller scale, due to size of the country and also the size of the market. However, in Burundi the focus was on sorghum, because sorghum in Burundi is among the main food-crops.

### **Theory of Change and result chain**

The theory of change of this project is simple and straightforward. The overall objective is to achieve increased food security and improved livelihoods of rice and sorghum producers. In order to realise the best prospects for reaching this overall objective, relevant food-crops were chosen for this project both from the perspective of the local breweries of Heineken and from the perspective of agricultural producers. In addition to increasing food security and improving livelihoods, Heineken's objective is to develop high quality and sustainable local supply chains that shorten transport lead-times and increase flexibility.

Through technical support in production of Rice and Sorghum and through assistance in developing value chains, producers are linked to local breweries of Heineken and by doing so sustainable sources of income are created, as the demand for inputs of the breweries is stable (if not growing). At the same time production improvements are contributing to higher productivity and increased income through sales and to increased access to surplus food – crop production.

The original project-plan also had a component to build schools and provide educational materials to communities of producers. In DRC, this project component was planned to be realised with support of the BRALIMA foundation and local partners. Although some activities in this area were realised, during the course of the project implementation it became clear that this component is not logically linked to the core theory of change of the project and that it included the risk to deviate funds and time from the core-business in the project. As a consequence, this project component was implemented on a relatively modest scale.

The education component might have increased the relevance and attractiveness of the project at the time of submission of the project to the Schokland fund, because more MDG's were addressed. However, in the practical implementation of the project, it was not a useful and logical component.

### **Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level**

The results obtained by the project thus far are quite different for both countries. On the one hand this is related to extremely diverse realities and sizes of both countries. Secondly the differences in results are also related to the choice of crops.

The sorghum was chosen in Burundi at the start of the project because it was attractive for BRARUDI as a minor ingredient (20-30%) in their existing beer portfolio. Later it became more important as the major ingredient in BRARUDI's 100% sorghum beer (Nyongera) that will enter the market in 2014, because the economic downturn in Burundi has now created space for positioning a 100% sorghum beer in the economy segment of the market. In the first years this has decreased the attractiveness of the sorghum somewhat both for producers as well as for BRARUDI, because for its normal beer it could use other alternative (traditional) inputs.

Another reason for difference in results between DRC and Burundi are related with limitations in the technical support provision to local farmers, which caused that the development of sufficient

quantities of sorghum could not yet be realised. Heineken and EUCORD have requested an extension of the project in Burundi to address this issue and to strengthen the development of farmer's organisations in the country. This is not needed in DRC, because there the project is over-achieving.

#### **DRC:**

The most important outputs achieved in this project are:

- Significant increase of productivity in rice production (from 700 kg/ha to 2.000 kg/ha) and 46.000 tons produced (20.000 planned);
- 12.000 tons of rice was delivered to BRALIMA in 2012 (14.000 planned) and 8825 tons of rice delivered to the local food markets.
- The 12.000 tons of rice sold to the brewery generated gross revenue of USD 9.6 million (at \$800 per ton).

The main outcomes are:

- Production crops are doubled and the farmers have the intention to double furthermore their production crops;
- Good adoption of new techniques in rice production (60%);
- Organisations of producers are strengthened but still dependent on NGO support;
- Reduction of hardship of women's work thanks to multiplication of processing units ("shellers") and/or irrigation of the fields;
- New fields with improved water management and success of rice farming and production in production areas led to increased possibilities for new farmer families to grow rice.

Impact:

- 57.335 families have benefited from the project (against 25.000 planned) with increased income and now that potential of the project is proven much more could be reached;
- Increased availability of rice on local food markets;
- Significant increase of family revenues (in interviews people referred to amounts increasing from 120 USD to 400 USD/600 USD. Heineken's and EUCORD own impact study has registered increases of 323% in Kinshasa and 184% in Bumba, which are lower but still very significant);
- Improved living conditions of the population (children go to school, improved housing conditions, improve (in quantities) of nutrition (1 to 2 meals/day), etc.
- New income-generated activities developed (small livestock, private school, bar, restaurant, motorcycles instead of bikes, etc.) in farmer communities;

In spite of the results of the project, the evaluators have observed in interviews with external stakeholders that the external visibility of the project and BRALIMA's efforts in DRC is still limited. This limits Heineken's and EUCORD's further impacts on other sectors and other agricultural products (manioc, corn and sugar)

#### **Burundi:**

The most important outputs achieved were:

- 4.000 hectares of sorghum under improved management at the end of 2012;
- The amount of sorghum sold to BRARUDI was 238 ton, which was much less than planned (5.000 ton), but closer to BRARUDI's actual requirements (500 – 1.000 ton);
- Farmers are increasing sorghum production and new varieties are introduced, but the process is slow;

- Sensitization of farmers in Sorghum production was achieved through open-days and training on demonstrations plots.

The main outcomes were:

- Farmer families were empowered in organisations and had access to technical support;
- Demonstration plots are used as reference by villages and farmers associations;
- Value chains were established through set up of Sorghum collection points and trader's involvement, but the production volumes are not yet sufficient and stable to ensure a constant flow of produce in the value chain;
- Larger producers are showing Interest in growing Sorghum, after an initial period of declining interests;
- The price of Sorghum has increased steadily over the past years.

Impact:

- 10,852 families (63,058 persons) have benefited from the project in terms of increased income through sales of Sorghum. But the income effects are still very limited due to small volumes
- It is estimated that a significant proportion of the sorghum produced has been sold at the open market rather than to BRARUDI.
- Extension of the production area shows that an increasing number of farmers are interested to produce Sorghum;
- The Government of Burundi is increasingly recognising Sorghum as an important food and cash crop for agricultural development and it is developing support programmes in this area.

In both countries (particularly Burundi) the originally planned activities in the area of education (building and improving schools and provision of education materials) have been realised only to a small extent. In DRC 19 Schools were improved (against 84 planned) and in Burundi 6 schools were improved (against 20 planned). Also individual students were supported. As the interventions in the area of education were not strategic to the overall interventions, the results in this area mainly remained at the output level only and no further follow-up was provided.

### Timeline and milestones in the partnership and project

Time	Milestones
Jan 2014	Decisions by Heineken and EUCORD to change strategy in Burundi for final year of project: diversifying local sources and varieties of Sorghum and intensifying efforts in strengthening supply chains to BRARUDI
Jan 2014	Impact Study In Burundi finalised
Sep 2013	Local sourcing manager employed at Heineken HQ to ensure that best practices are identified and shared and that the 60% local sourcing targets for Africa is reached by 2020.
July 2013	Impact Study in DRC finalised
2013	Start-up of CREATE project as follow-up and replication of the project in Burundi and DRC, now in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone
2013	Introduction of new sorghum varieties to expand local sourcing opportunities in Burundi
2013	Relations with new partners (SPARK and IFDC) in Burundi were established to strengthen entrepreneurial approaches in the project and also try to achieve re-entry of larger producers of sorghum in the value chain
2011	Decision of BRARUDI to produce Sorghum beer and position it on the market in Burundi
2011	Start of Kingabwa project in Kinshasa in collaboration with USAID
2010-2013	Project in DRC developed as planned
2011	Heineken introduced a financial governance process to integrate project funding in its annual budgeting cycle
2011	80% of the BRALIMA rice (after 2 years) comes from the local market

2010	First harvests of Gambela sorghum in Burundi with focus on small producers
2010	Project in Burundi did not develop as planned
2010	Local sourcing policy formally approved and integrated in “Brewing a Better Future”
Feb 2009	Start of project in DRC and the “project sorghum” (or “Amasaka”) in Burundi
30 Sep 2008	Submission local sourcing project to MoFA
2008	Preparation of project for Burundi and DRC by Heineken and EUCORD
30 June 2007	Schokland meeting
2005-2006	Development of strategy Heineken on local sourcing
2004	Pilots of Heineken and EUCORD in Ghana and Sierra Leone for local sourcing of sorghum and corn
2001	MoFA conference brought Heineken and EUCORD together for the first time

### Partnership configuration and development over time

The project and partnership between Heineken and EUCORD is based on previous cooperation between the two organisations in Sierra Leone and Ghana.


This Schokland project is implemented by a partnership of Heineken and EUCORD, with Heineken as the contracting partner of MoFA. Heineken is responsible for mobilising the own contribution to the Schokland project in cash and kind and it contracts EUCORD to implement the technical support activities and cooperation with local partners in Burundi and DRC. EUCORD also prepares the reports on the project.

The Heineken breweries in DRC and Burundi primarily act as economic agents and ensure the market for rice and sorghum producers that participate in the project. EUCORD together with local partners in different project locations provides the necessary technical assistance to test new varieties of sorghum and rice, introduce new production and post-harvest techniques and strengthen the value-chains.

Heineken and the local BRALIMA (DRC) and BRARUDI (Burundi) breweries maintain relations with MoFA and with local embassies, not specifically on this project, but more generally in relation with economic policies and relations within the countries and internationally. While MOFA and local embassies are not formal partners in the partnership, they are interested and involved in the activities of the project.

The partnership configuration is shown in the figure below:





The specific project partners in DRC are:

- BRALIMA: Responsible for the project management in DRC and for the generation of own contribution to the project (mainly in the form of cash contributions and transport by BRALIMA boats on the Congo River) and for purchase of rice from project partners (local associations, NGOs or wholesalers). Only marginal interventions were done by BRALIMA Foundation in education (responsible for this component) because it is not specialized in education (but more in health, through its medical centre);
- EUCORD: Responsible of the implementation of the project and especially for structuring farmers associations, 2 staff people based in Kinshasa (delegates from BRALIMA) : coordinator and finance manager; regular visits (3 or 4 times a years) to several production sites, very good knowledge of beer production (coordinator was BRALIMA production manager) and very near the farmers (regular visits and good capacity to get the message to the target groups);
- BATIDE (Bureau d'appui et d'Assistance Techniques aux Initiatives de Développement): Local partner for Kingabwa (Kinshasa) production site; supporting farmers associations, training of farmers and technical support in land development, support on rice processing marketing;
- PIDR (Programme Intégré de Développement Rural): Local partner for Kisangani production site; supporting farmers associations, training of farmers, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA and domestic market);
- BDD-Boma (Bureau Diocésain de développement –Caritas) and further SOPAM (Solidarité Paysanne de Mayumbe): Local partner for Boma production site; supporting farmers associations, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA and domestic market);
- COOPEKI (Coopérative de l'Eglise Kimbanguiste): Local partner for Gemena in the Equator province production site; supporting farmers associations, rice processing and marketing (domestic market);
- IDR-BM (Initiatives de Développement Rural de Bomboma-Moanda): Local partner for Mbandaka production sites; supporting farmers associations, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA in Kinshasa/Mbandaka and domestic market);
- CEDASOC (Centre de Développement Agricole et Social du Congo): Local partner for Bumba production site; supporting farmers associations, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA Kinshasa and domestic market);
- FAD (Femmes et Actions Agro pastorales pour le Développement) based at Uvira in South Kivu. Supporting farmers associations, training of farmers, mechanisation, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA and domestic market).

- ADIP (Association pour le Développement Intégré des paysans). Based at Kasomeno in Katanga. Supporting farmers associations, training of farmers, mechanization, rice processing and marketing (BRALIMA).
- National and Provincial Ministry of Agriculture: seeds expertise, availability of local monitors, availability of database on agriculture and food security, availability of seeds – but no financial resources (every service must be paid).

Changes in partnership over time:

- Change of local partners: BDD-Boma (because of bad management) by SOPAM, Eglise Kimbanguiste in Kisangani (not enough expertise in agriculture) by PIDR (very good expertise in rice production);
- Diversification of rice suppliers (to avoid dependence on only one source of supply per site);
- USAID has come in as new partner by supporting irrigation-works at the Pool Malebo site to increase rice production.

The specific partners in Burundi are:

- BRARUDI: Responsible for the project management and for the purchase of sorghum from participants in the project. BRARUDI provides the cash contribution to finance the technical assistance activities;
- EUCORD: Responsible for the implementation of the project and especially for organising producers and providing technical assistance;
- FACAGRO/CERDA: Testing different varieties of sorghum;

Some important changes in the partnership over time were:

- Earlier in the project EUCORD tried to partner with the Irish NGO Concern Worldwide in Kirundo; a local EU funded NGO called ADIC in Cankuzo; and Christian Aid in Muyinga.
- EUCORD has contacted IFDC and SPARK, two organisations that can provide increased business and entrepreneurship development support in the project. This was done to complement the agronomic and technical activities of EUCORD with a more commercially oriented approach to strengthen the value chain development component in the project;
- Due to insufficient supply of Gambella sorghum by the project itself, BRARUDI has decided to buy sorghum from other private wholesalers as from 2013;
- The projects now seeks relations with medium and large producers of sorghum who at the start of the project abandoned the project but now show renewed interest because of increased price of Sorghum on the markets.

The project in Burundi is not yet sustainable, because the producers still depend on technical support in production and value chain development. Production levels are too low and organisations are too small to maintain a reliable and sufficient supply-chain to BRARUDI. EUCORD and Heineken have agreed to intensify efforts to consolidate these value chains, but at the same diversify sourcing of sorghum in terms of new varieties and other providers. It is not yet sure if the project in Burundi will achieve a level of sustainable operations before the end of 2014, the final year of the Schokland-project.

### **Critical success-factors**

Overall success-factors and lessons learned from the experiences in Burundi and DRC are:

- Providing a guaranteed market for sorghum and rice (or other agricultural products) creates a strong incentive to farmers to improve their agricultural productivity and increase production levels;

- Cooperation between the private sector and local NGOs that have related objectives to the partnership project (e.g. increasing livelihood of rural families) is effective because these organisations already have local structures and relations;
- It is important to take sufficient time to build trust and confidence of producers before they will invest (time and money) in new products. Reactions to new business opportunities can be slow, but if efforts are continued speed of adoption will increase over time. This has happened in DRC but still needs to happen in Burundi;
- Risks need to spread in value chain development and this requires diversifying varieties of products and also producers, by creating a mix of larger and smaller producers. Particularly smaller producers present more risks in terms of quality and reliability of supply;
- In the value chain development partnerships, the role of intermediate service providers and traders is crucial to reach advantages of scale and to ensure more cost-effectiveness of operations. In both countries, this intermediate level in the value chain still needs to be strengthened;
- The reliability and close relations and transparency between the main partners in the project is crucial for the success of the project. The experiences in Burundi show that the partners need to overcome difficulties in the project-implementation together. In spite of problems, the transparency and willingness to look for new and alternative solutions together, has enabled Heineken and EUCORD to maintain the relations of cooperation until the end of the project to achieve the original objectives.
- The close and well-focused cooperation between Heineken and EUCORD as core partners in the project has been important for the success of the project. The role and task division in the project was based on complementary competencies of both organisations.
- The cooperation with local associations and local NGO's and EUCORD technical advisors "on the ground" has contributed to create relations of trust and to build bridges (supply chains) from these producers to the BRALIMA and BRARUDI breweries.

### **Critical failure-factors**

Some failure factors were also encountered:

- Capacity constraints of local NGO's and producer's organisations lead to unreliability in the supply chain and in the provision of technical support;
- The EUCORD team in Burundi did not have sufficient commercial understanding of the value chain development to create a good match with BRARUDI. The focus on agronomic aspects of sorghum production did not create sufficient results fast enough to establish a reliable sorghum supply chain for BRARUDI. The project partners have recognised this weakness and EUCORD is working on overcoming it by working together with new partners;
- There has been some tension between Heineken's immediate business need for a reliable local source of quality sorghum and the more gradual development orientation of EUCORD. This tension has created difficulties in the relations in Burundi, but is tackled by the both project-partners in the remaining period of the project;
- External market and/or political influences can have capacity to observe and interpret external influences;
- The project component of education in the Schokland project was not core to the theory of change in this project and diverted attention from the core-business. In hindsight it would have been better if this project component was not included in the Schokland project proposal or would have been delegated to another specialised a great impact on the business case development and need to be assessed timely to introduce changes in the project. This requires including in the partnership the organisation.

### **Innovation aspects**

Process innovation was achieved in this project by developing a private-civil cooperation between partners to develop supply chains in rice and sorghum, with a clear division of tasks between the partners.

Technological innovation was achieved in the project by testing and introducing new more productive sorghum and rice varieties and by introducing new production and post-harvest techniques in these sub-sectors. This innovation was successful in DRC where a significant increase in rice production was achieved. In Burundi research in Sorghum shows some promising perspectives for production increase, but in the production on the ground results have not yet been obtained.

The strategy of seeking partnerships with local NGOs who already have a presence in target areas proved to be cost-effective. EUCORD is able to limit its in-country staff while through the implementation of the project local NGOs gain valuable project implementation experience. The agreements between EUCORD and local NGOs are renewed on a year-by-year basis to allow EUCORD to maintain a group of performing partners.

Output innovation has occurred in different ways:

- In DRC, rice is not only produced for breweries but it is also produced for local food markets, this was a result that exceeded the initial expectations in the project, although these food related targets and components were already incorporated in the project proposal. The use of sorghum for beer-production in Burundi by BRARUDI is a product innovation that could occur after changes in the economic situation in the country. This product innovation creates a significant and reliable demand for sorghum in the coming years.

### **Organisational (among partners) sustainability**

An important result that was obtained in this project in terms of sustainability provides a best practice at the level of the full Schokland project portfolio. In September 2013, Heineken created as structural position at HQ for a local sourcing manager to translate Heineken's corporate strategy, Brewing a Better Future, into concrete actions to meet the target of 60% local sourcing of brewery inputs in Africa.

BRALIMA in DRC has developed structural relations with producers and traders, supported by EUCORD and local NGO's to ensure a constant supply of rice to its breweries. In Burundi this is still underway.

### **Project sustainability**

The project in DRC has almost achieved a level of sustainable operations, because the volumes of rice permit a constant supply-chain that can be supported by the actors in this chain. This will be consolidated in 2014 and, while there are always risks related to safety and security and climate conditions, the organisation of producers, traders and technical support organisation has reached a level that it can continue to operate with minimal external financial support. In Burundi this is still a long-term perspective.

Heineken and EUCORD have already started replicating the project in a broader regional project, CREATE, in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. This project currently receives support from MoFA.

### **Institutional sustainability**

Institutional sustainability is underway, now that Heineken and EUCORD have interested local and national governments in this value-chain development approach. Sensitizers and agronomists identified in local NGOs and Ministry of Agriculture have been trained by EUCORD and can take over and replicate similar approaches elsewhere.

Heineken have identified and recruited local sourcing managers in DRC to continue the local sourcing activities at the local level to continue operations.

Traders, larger producers and other organisations such as DFID and USAID have been interested in the Heineken/EUCORD project approach and their increased involvement can create good conditions for expansion and replication of the project in other locations. This is currently already happening in DRC, but still a bit further off in Burundi.

## 4. Access to Internet and ICT in Macha (project number 18407)

### Main features of the project and partnership

Macha is located in the Southern Province of Zambia, 70. The area is primarily open savannah woodland averaging 1,100 meters above sea level. The climate is tropical. Macha has an estimated population of 135,000 within an approximate 35 km radius around centre of the village. The families in Macha are living in small and scattered homesteads, which usually consist of one extended family. There are no commercial farmers or industries in the area. The primary livelihood is subsistence farming with maize being the main crop. 50% of the population is under 12 years old. The average income for a person in the village in the areas surrounding Macha is around \$1 per day.

On the terrain of Macha Mission (Brethren in Christ Mission) there is a large hospital that serves the wide region. Linked to the hospital there are a medical research institute (MRC) and schools and some housing facilities. Outside the mission terrain, the infrastructure in Macha is limited.

Rural areas in Zambia are generally not well connected with ICT facilities, in spite of efforts of different organisations in the past decade. Macha was not different and this community was isolated like most rural communities.

The Macha Works organisation and later project started as an offspring of the venue of Dutch couple that started living in Macha. The woman worked at MRC and the husband gradually integrated more and more in the local community and started to set up small projects with community members. These small projects were closely related with dreams and ambitions of young villagers in Macha, such as setting up a small business, starting a radio-station or setting up a local Internet connection facility.

Around the middle of the past decade, after a visit from a Dutch friend of the couple in Macha, the idea was taken up to organise and professionalise the fundraising around the small projects and activities in Macha that until were largely done with own resources. A Dutch Foundation was formed (Privaserve) to do this fundraising and when the Schokland fund was opened, this was seen as the possibility to accelerate the small projects in Macha and to lift the activities at a higher level, making Macha a centre of reference for integral development projects, targeting youth and with ICT resources as a specific focus.

After a successful application to the Schokland fund, the project gathered full steam ahead in 2009 and the original ideas were expanded and replicated into a large integral local development project with several different components and the construction of a significant amount of infrastructure (housing, schools, business centre, radio-station, community centre and hangar and small air-strip). The contribution of the Schokland fund and soon thereafter another support for a jatrophia plantation from Agency NL (DBM fund) together with a continuous flow of smaller funds and (ICT) equipment caused an increase of activities and scale that was unprecedented in rural areas of Zambia and the project drastically changed the outlook of the village.

### Theory of Change and result chain

The project's theory of change was focusing on accelerating rural development and creating better living conditions and future prospects of particularly young people in Macha by a variety of specific projects. In the centre of this development was ICT as the engine for local development and attractive resource for younger people in Macha to realise their own dreams and ambitions in the community. In the theory of change, an important element was that local development should come

from own initiatives and not external projects implemented by organisations that are external to the community.

A final component of the theory of change was that a success project at the local level in Macha could serve as a reference for other rural communities and therefore Macha work was to become a centre of a much broader project in which ICT infrastructure and services were to be developed and rolled out to 150 rural communities in Zambia.

These overall objectives were operationalised in several sub-projects:

- The establishment of a facility and competency development centre for rural areas, together with housing and other support facilities. This centre was to become the centre for ICT and rural development at the national level;
- Documenting the experiences obtained in Macha in research papers and publications
- Leadership development programme for young people and provision of training to external students;
- Expansion and replication of Rural ICT centres in 150 rural communities of Zambia.

In practice, the project of Macha Works has not followed exactly this theory of change and result areas. The expansion and replication of ICT centres at the national level towards the end of the project gradually received less attention and only 8 other Internet centres were established instead of 150 that were planned originally. At the same time the intensity of local activities in Macha increased, such as the establishment of a radio-station; housing facilities for local workers and staff of Macha Works visitors and students; a community centre; a business centre; a jatropha plantation; a local branch of a bank and a small airstrip and hangar. Some of these activities were linked to the overall work of Macha Works in Macha, but were not funded from the Schokland fund. The Schokland project was mainly used for the Innovative School/Competency Development Centre and setting up of ICT centres and replication of these centres throughout the country.

### **Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level**

The Macha Works achieved many outputs and the infrastructural works in Macha are impressive:

- Business Centre
- ICT centre
- Radio station
- Housing for visitors
- Housing for local population
- Housing for staff and teachers;
- School
- 2 Community centres
- Jatropha plantation and factory
- The originally planned replication of ICT centres in other rural communities was not realised. In only 8 communities such facilities were installed.

At the outcome level, the results of the project that can be reported are much less, which is mainly due to the fact that the Macha Works project came to an abrupt end in the first Semester of 2012, when the local Macha Works organisation had to finalise all contracts with staff and workers because of lack of funding. Since then the organisation of Macha Works has not yet been reactivated<sup>33</sup> and since October 2012, all infrastructural assets of the project are now claimed by the

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<sup>33</sup> Macha Works states that after dissolving labour contracts with its Staff, this staff remained available to Macha Works on a voluntary basis. However, this could not be confirmed during the evaluation visit and according to the evaluators it seems unlikely that previous paid staff that was fired and under a legal procedure had to be compensated is now willing to work on a voluntary basis. We

local mission church on which (leased) land all infrastructural works were built. Macha Works Netherlands and the Mission Church (BIC) are currently still involved in a legal dispute around all assets. At the time of the evaluation visit all project activities were closed with the exception of the local radio station that was not built on the mission lands and that can still continue to operate. Although the MICS (School) was also closed during the evaluation visit, the local Macha Works Netherlands representative confirmed that MICS is still operational and was only closed because of holidays. Macha at the time of the evaluation visit has no access to Internet or any other project-facility at the local level.

Some outcomes can be reported at the level of local persons that have worked as staff-members or workers of Macha Works and that have benefited from training and schooling. The people we have met during the evaluation visit showed increased self-confidence and knowledge and some of these persons were now autonomously continuing the activities in the local radio-station. But during the evaluation visit very few former Macha Works staff-members were present in Macha and it is not clear if they have moved temporary or for a longer period of time or forever.

The 7 communities (and facility at UNZA) are reported by Macha Works to be still functional and these communities still have access to Internet and facilities are used. But because the communities are situated in very different regions of the country and could not be reached in the time given for this case-study visit, the sustainable results of this replication could not be analysed by the evaluators.

### Timeline and milestones in the partnership and project

Time	Milestones
<b>2013/2014</b>	Continuation of legal procedures around the assets of the Macha Works project on the Macha Mission land
<b>2013</b>	Closure (under lock) of all facilities in Macha, except MICS and Radio Macha. Some housing facilities are still used. ICT Centres in other 7 communities operating independently.
<b>11-2-2013</b>	Formal closing document project by MoFA
<b>Dec 2012</b>	Departure Dutch couple Macha Works from Macha
<b>Nov 2012</b>	Meeting called by BIC on ownership of Macha Works assets in Macha and start of conflict about the project assets of Macha Works
<b>Sep/Oct 2012</b>	Severance payments to all Linknet-staff (de facto Macha Works employees). This was de de-facto end of Linknet as the acting society on behalf of Macha Works Zambia. Since this moment there are no signs of a re-emergence of Linknet or Macha Works Zambia as a new (voluntary) organisation
<b>13-7-2013</b>	Final approval of financial reports and audit statements by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Jun 2012</b>	Resignation of Chairperson board Linknet co-operative society
<b>29-5-2012</b>	Submission additional audit report to Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>27-4-2012</b>	Submission Final Annual Report and self-evaluation to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and closure of project
<b>1-3-2012</b>	Formal dissolution of labour contracts all employees Macha Works Zambia
<b>Nov-Dec 2011</b>	Emerging and growing awareness of sustainability challenges in the Macha Works project by Macha Works Management
<b>Apr-Dec 2011</b>	Set up of computer lab in Nurse training School in Mukinge and expansion of Internet centres in Kalene and Chilonga (NTS)

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
have encountered a voluntary worker in only one case and this is the current representative of Macha Works, but he does not represent Macha Works Zambia/Linknet but Macha Works Netherlands.



<b>May-Oct 2011</b>	Expansion of MICS
<b>May-Oct 2011</b>	Establishment of Vision Community Centre in Macha (entrepreneurship, restaurant etc.)
<b>Jan-2011</b>	Radio Macha receives 7 year license
<b>Dec 2010</b>	Care house constructed (adjoining the BIC hospital)
<b>August 2010</b>	Macha Innovative Community School (MICS) constructed and started operating
<b>Jun 2010</b>	Planned ZICTA (previously CAZ) financial contribution did not occur and since then was constantly delay and has never more materialized
<b>Feb 2010</b>	Radio Macha on air
<b>2010</b>	Set up of ICT centres in Minga, Chitokoloki, Chilonga, Chikanta and Kalene
<b>Nov 2009</b>	KAP project for hangar for airstrip of Macha
<b>Oct 2009</b>	Campus construction of Ubuntu finalization
<b>Sep 2009</b>	Ubunta campus connected to grid
<b>Sep 2009</b>	Start Jatropha Plantation (also DBM subsidy from NL Agency acquired (approved August 2009))
<b>2009/2011</b>	Building of housing and facilities for students, staff and visitors in Macha
<b>2009</b>	Set up of ICT centre and Ubuntu Campus in Macha and ICT Centre in Mukinge
<b>2009 (onwards)</b>	Gradual de facto phasing out of the partnership of CHAZ, ZICTA and CDC/MTR. Promised contributions of ZICTA and CDC after 2009 were not realised anymore. New contributions obtained from Computer Aid, University of Santa Barbara (UCSB), Zambia Tomorrow and other smaller donors (in cash and kind)
<b>Jan 2009</b>	Transfer/Name Change of Privaserve Foundation into Macha Works and start of the massive implementation activities in the Schokland project
<b>Dec 2008</b>	Delayed first transfers of MoFA and CDC to Macha Works and de-facto start of the Schokland funded activities
<b>15-8-2008</b>	Approval letter Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) for Macha Works project
<b>1-8-2008</b>	Formal start of Macha Works project (then Privaserve Foundation)
<b>2008</b>	Preparation of the Schokland project proposal
<b>2007/ 8</b>	Formation of partnership: CAZ (later ZICTA), CDC (through Macha Research Trust/MTR) with letters of recommendation and CHAZ, Linknet Zambia, PrivaServe Foundation.
<b>30 June 2007</b>	Schokland Agreements
<b>2006</b>	Foundation of Privaserve Foundation and start of systematic fundraising work for Macha Works in Zambia
<b>2003 (march)</b>	Dutch Couple arrives in Macha and start of first small projects with local villagers in the subsequent years

### Partnership configuration and development over time

The partnership configuration at the start of the partnership is presented in the figure below:



*Legend: blue = MoFA/Embassies; Orange = NGO's; Yellow = Research institutes; Purple = Public Sector (local and international). Bottom part of the picture is implementation on the ground in developing countries. Light coloured circles with dotted line are not very active partners during the implementation of the project.*

The project started as a partnership of a core group of one Dutch partner and a group of partners in Zambia and around this group a number of supporting partners. Formally the Macha Works partnership never seemed to have had two Dutch partners, as is required in the Schokland regulations. But the Erasmus University was also involved in activities in Macha, directly with a local partner the MRT. Activities were coordinated with Macha Works, but Erasmus was not formal part of the partnership.

The submitting organisation in the Netherlands after the start of the project changed its name from Privaserve Foundation into Macha Works Foundation. The Macha Works foundation was very active in fundraising in the Netherlands, Europa and the United States and it worked together with many partners supporting activities in the Macha Works project and thus raising its own contribution to match funding from the Schokland fund.

An existing local Cooperative Society Linknet was established in Macha to act as local partner. Linknet had a board of independent members, but in practice most of the board members were functionaries in BIC and MRT and together they had the majority of seats and the president and treasurer functions in the board. Macha Works decided to arrange that Linknet as a society was acting on behalf of Macha Works Zambia, and no separate NGO structure was established for Macha Works. Other partners from the first hour were the Zambian Communication Authority (ZCA, later ZICTA) and the Centre for Disease Control (US-related) which was working with a local Medical Research Trust (MRT). Supporting partners were the Zambian House of Chiefs (but not the paramount chief of Macha) , Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) and the University of Zambia.

During the first years of implementation of the project in Macha, most local partners gradually dropped out the project. CDC and ZICTA, after initial commitments and disbursement of financial resources for the project, from 2010 onwards did not provide any funding anymore. The role of CHAZ in the project has been limited, which was related that this contact was mainly established to CDC and MRT. The House of Chiefs has remained interested in the project and has regularly participated in activities and in talks in Lusaka about expansion and replication in other rural communities. The University of Zambia has also remained active in the project and has sent students

and interns for research activities until 2012. The Erasmus University maintained direct relations with MRT but coordinated activities with Macha Works.

Although not formally established as partners in the project, two organisations are important in the project implementation and can be considered de-facto partners. BIC (Brethren in Christ) is the owner of Macha Mission and the hospital in Macha and has a land-lease (until 2017) with the Paramount Chief of Macha. Macha Works has obtained permission of BIC to build infrastructure on the Mission land and to implement project activities and two sub-leases were drawn up for this purpose, however BIC is currently disputing the existence of at least one these sub-leases<sup>34</sup>. BIC and MRT are closely cooperating on medical activities and the relations with Linknet/Machaworks are close and intensive. This can for example be illustrated by the fact that BIC has cooperated with Macha Works by importing and buying materials and equipment, because as an NGO it was exempted from VAT. The role of BIC and MRT was not so much as active partners in the project, but they enabled Linknet and Macha Works to realise the project.

The partnership relations in the project have seriously deteriorated since 2011 and have ended in legal conflict in 2012 that is still ongoing at the time of evaluation. Because of the conflicts and also because of the fact that project is already formally finalised in March 2012 and many of the people involved in the project are not involved anymore, the research that could be done around the partnership and project unfortunately is incomplete and it was impossible to hear all different sides to this complex story.

For this reason, the description and analysis of the success and failure factors in this project do not provide a full overview. Also the documents and reports on the project don't give a lot of information on the problems that have been faced by the partnership and the project.

In formal terms, the project has ended and the local implementing project organisation has de-facto been dissolved because all contracts of Linknet were terminated and no new implementing structure was established. The legal existence of Linknet is very unclear, because the board has not been meeting anymore after the resignation of the chairperson and at the time of dissolving the labour contracts. All the more unclear is then what is the legal status of Macha Works Zambia because its existence depends on the existence of Linknet. And furthermore de-facto, Macha Works Zambia is not operational since the summer of 2012. This leaves Macha Works the Netherlands as the only organisation that is formally related to the project, and this organisation is now trying to remain with the ownership of the local infrastructure and equipment, because this ownership is disputed by BIC. If the legal conflict would be resolved in favour of Macha Works, the intention is to restart activities in the project, but on a much more modest scale and not as professional organisation with paid staff anymore but as an association of volunteers, mainly consisting of local villagers that have participated in the previous period of the project.

The outcomes of the legal procedures are not certain and it is impossible to speculate who will win and then there might be a next challenge after this legal case. The local paramount chief who has given the land-lease to BIC for Macha Mission is highly disappointed and dissatisfied with the situation and the behaviour of both Macha Works and BIC. As it is in the power of the Paramount Chief of Macha to extend or stop the land-lease to BIC in 2017, the situation of ownership of the local assets of Macha Works will again be highly insecure.

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<sup>34</sup> According to Macha Work' s information two sub-leases were signed with BIC. One lease was for Ubuntu Campus and this lease was signed in May 2008 and it became effective from My 1, 2008. A second lease was the Plantation and other works in Macha. The existence of the leases cannot be confirmed by documents and furthermore BIC claims it has made arrangements with Privaserve and not with Macha Works and it doesn't recognize Macha Works Netherlands as the signer of the lease. Because documents are not available to the evaluators the exact situation cannot be presented.

### **Critical success -factors**

- The fact that the combination of projects in Macha Works were all based on ambitions of local people (although with risk of not being fully realistic), the project activities have had a high degree of local ownership and participation;
- Because of the active involvement of local people in setting up and implementing the project, these local people have been empowered and have gained new skills that prepare them to take ownership of this project or other projects in the future. Although it is highly unsure how the future of this project will look like, it might be (as expressed by representatives of Macha Works) that if Macha Works would win the legal conflict, this would further empower the local people involved and this victory would create a strong new base for future activities. The evaluator questions if this perspective is real.

### **Critical failure -factors**

- The partnership was not well established at the start of the project. Although commitments were made (even on paper), agreements were not honoured by original partners. The start of the partnership was too informal and too much based on personal relations between key persons and not between institutions, but it has to be recognised that at the start of the projects these relations were good and embedded in the local reality;
- The implementation structure of Macha Works for the project (Linknet acting on behalf, the land-lease and the arrangements made to receive tax exemptions) was not well researched and the legal arrangements at the start of the project were not sound enough to prevent and survive conflicts. The partnership started built on trust, but when trust between different core partners was decreasing, there were not sufficient clear agreements and legal arrangements to fall back upon and in the case of the land-leases given by BIC to Privaserve, the documents have gone missing. Furthermore the transformation of Privaserve into Macha Works the Netherlands has not been registered and integrated in the local agreements and BIC does not recognise Macha Works Netherlands as an entity;
- The ambition level in the Schokland project at the start was too high and the project was a multiplication of levels of inputs, activities and efforts that was not matched by increased capacities of local partners to manage and implement the project. Particularly the replication of the project beyond the boundaries of Macha has suffered from this. The enormous increase of funding was not matched with management arrangements and the enormous amount of available funding has probably influenced the deterioration of relations between different stakeholders in and around the project, in spite of efforts to hire external expertise to strengthen management and financial arrangements in the project;
- Different partners express that since the start of the project there has been lack of trust between different partners, related with different cultural (US, Zambian and Dutch) styles of working and communication and with different visions on (the role of) religion in local development;
- The project was implemented without a clear phasing of activities in the project and several project-activities were added to existing activities as new (finding) opportunities emerged. This has contributed to a lack of focus in the overall project that at the period of main activities ranged from jatropha plantation, to ICT, to banking, education and health services. The project went beyond its original focus on ICT innovations;
- The business-development components have not been successful, which is partially related to the conflicts that have closed down businesses, but also due to the fact that businesses were not set up as entrepreneurial enterprises but as projects under a higher management, where entrepreneurs had bosses;

- The partnership and project did not have a vision towards sustainability and did not work towards an exit phase. This lack of attention for sustainability, combined with the fact that other donors were withdrawing funding, the project had to be stopped abruptly and the organisation had to end all its labour contracts, although possibly at a later stage it might return operational as a volunteer organisation, as is expressed by Macha Works;
- The local leader (paramount chief) was not sufficiently involved in this project to ensure that problems could be solved and conflicts mediated. Although the house of chiefs and chiefs in neighbouring chiefdoms were involved, the not sufficient involvement of the local chief of Macha in the Macha Works project can create a new possibility for conflicts at a later stage, even when Macha Works wins the legal conflict with BIC. The Chief can still decide to not extend the land-lease to BIC and a new conflict on the assets of the project and the mission hospital could emerge;
- Funders of the project (including MoFA and the Dutch Embassy), although they have shown much interest and involvement in the activities of Macha Works in Macha, have not provided sufficient and close follow-up to the project set-up, arrangements and implementation and therefore also bear responsibility that a significant amount of funding in infrastructure is now threatened to be lost in less than two years after finalising the project. And also the fact that MoFA did not critically review the very large increase of funding to this originally rather modest project has contributed to the fact that project did not deliver the expected development results.

### **Innovation aspects**

The Macha Works project has focused on and achieved technological innovation in ICT services. It has developed and provided ICT facilities for rural communities and it has also provided accompanying training support to develop management capacities of rural ICT facilities.

The project's ambition to achieve other innovations in terms of process or financial arrangements was not achieved due to the problems encountered towards the end of the project period.

### **Organisational (among partners) sustainability**

The organisation implementing the project had to end all contracts with staff-members and de-facto is not operational. The legal existence of Macha Works Zambia is very uncertain, as it fully depends on the legal status of Linknet, which is also highly uncertain and can only be established when the board of this society reconvenes, for the first time since summer 2012. There is currently no local active organisational capacity to restart the activities of the project in case of a positive resolution of the conflict for Macha Works.

Macha Works in the Netherlands still exists but it is only active in solving the legal conflict with BIC and is currently not actively engaged in fundraising for activities in Macha. The website is not updated anymore, according to Macha Works because the Internet company hosting the site went bankrupt. Apart from the legal activities Macha Works in the Netherlands should be considered a dormant organisation.

### **Project sustainability**

The project was not sustainable. The project had to be ended abruptly and Macha Works Zambia had to dissolve all labour contracts, when the end of the Schokland funding period became close and at the same time some other donors also decided to stop funding to Macha Works.

### **Institutional sustainability**

The current legal conflict is an indicator that the partnership and project has not reached institutional sustainability, but it also shows persistence of Macha Works Netherlands and its local representative to continue to fight for a future of the Macha Works projects. However, even after a legal resolution in favour of Macha Works, the local chief could again change the local institutional perspective of the project in 2017, if he would decide not to continue the land-lease to BIC, from whom Macha Works is subleasing.

## 5. Partnering to improve availability of premix for food fortification, GAIN (project number 19299)

### Context and main features of the project and partnership

The Schokland project of GAIN aims at improving the availability, use and affordability of quality-assured micronutrient premixes for food fortification through a global procurement platform, the GAIN Premix Facility (GPF). The GPF is a global level service facility and is managed and implemented from the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition's (GAIN) headquarters based in Geneva. At HQ there is a team in place to manage and implement the GPF project. GAIN, a Swiss Foundation, brokers partnerships among many private, civil and public partners working on food security (for example through the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition or AIM). However, the GPF project is not managed as a partnership of an alliance. It is managed and implemented by a central unit at the executive office of GAIN. As such the project is not a formal partnership, because there is only one contracting partner with MoFA and no co-signing partners. GAIN subcontracts Crown Agents as procurement agent of the GPF and Intertek for quality assurance and quality control. As cooperation with these entities is intensive these can be seen as partners.

In the framework of this case study, the evaluators have spoken with Netherlands' and international partners and stakeholders in the project and we have interviewed beneficiaries, users and clients on specific locations in Bangladesh and Uganda. At the country level one might speak more of users or clients of the GPF rather than partners.

In the context of the GPF and other activities of the Foundation, GAIN is engaged in establishing partnerships and relations of cooperation with international organisations and with national governments and ministries of health and/or food security. These relations and support activities of GAIN at the level of national government and ministries on policies and regulations related to nutrition and food security are not part of the GPF project presented to Schokland, but are important actions to create a supportive and enabling environment for the provision and expansion of adequately fortified foods through the GPF.

Furthermore, GAIN is involved and acts as one of the leading partners in the Amsterdam Alliance against Malnutrition (AIM), which has also received support from MoFA as an additional Millennium Agreement. The evaluators have not looked at that project and initiative, but in fact AIM and GAIN's activities to partner with governments and international development actors to increase food fortification targets, to develop food security and safety policies around fortified foods have much more characteristics of a partnership initiatives than the GPF, which is a primarily facility that links suppliers and buyers of nutrients and premixes and with a quality control process with certification. However, the GPF can be seen as an instrument in the hand of partnerships as GAIN and AIM.

The fact that the GPF is closely related to GAIN requires us to not only look at the functioning of the GPF to understand how partnerships and cooperation around food-fortification take place. We also have to look how GAIN is providing additional services to stakeholders to ensure that food fortification can be done in the right policy and legal frameworks and that GPF subsequently can ensure that supply and demand are linked and that quality and food-safety are secured.

GAIN and MoFA, since the start of the GPF project and in AIM have developed a strong and intensive partnership that goes beyond the only the GPF project. The Dutch Schokland Grant that financed 40% of the GPF operations was concluded in December 2013. The GPF is now absorbed in a much broader project of cooperation between MoFA and GAIN to further roll out QA/QC activities in

relation to food fortification and nutrition projects in other priority country in the Netherlands development policy and in other regions such as West Africa.

At the level of the countries visited in the case study of the GPF, we can observe the following relevant contextual factors:

#### *Uganda:*

- The 2040 Vision for Uganda focuses on strengthening the national capacity to harness its national resources including oil, gas, tourism, minerals, ICT, business, abundant labour force, geographical location and trade, water resources, industrialization, and agriculture. Food security is not a specific point of attention but is addressed in this vision under agriculture.
- The National Development Plan (NDP) 2011-2015 is titled 'Growth, Employment and socio-economic Transformation'. It provides a frame of reference for all national and international development partners. Food security again isn't a specific point of attention but it features in this plan, but within other areas. Food fortification isn't mentioned as a specific subject;
- The Ministry of Health began developing a national food fortification programme from 2008 onwards with funding from GAIN as well as policy and technical assistance provided by GAIN in which also the GPF project experiences are integrated.
- Food fortification became mandatory in Uganda in 2011 and enforcement started in July 2013.

#### *Bangladesh:*

- The first initiative in food fortification legislation was the SALT Law, enacted in 1989, that made production of edible salt with iodine (Potassium Iodate) obligatory. A programme for control of iodine deficiency disorders (CIDD) was started in 1990 with support of development partners, government of Bangladesh and salt millers in Bangladesh;
- GAIN initiated, catalysed and provided the required external start-up financing for the national vitamin A oil fortification program in Bangladesh. This program currently reaches approximately 49 million people with fortified oil as of 2013
- Vitamin A enrichment of edible oil became compulsory for oil refineries in Bangladesh. The Government has recently (28<sup>th</sup> November 2013) passed a Law in the parliament.
- These policies and programmes are supported with funding and technical advice by different development partners (GAIN, UNICEF and MI). For example in the CIDD project on developing an operational strategy to make the purchase and management of potassium iodate financially sustainable;
- GAIN is a partner of CIDD project (started in July 2012) supporting in quality control, advocacy, and ensuring availability of iodate towards achieving goal in 2016 "Universal Salt Iodization".
- The Bangladeshi Government is planning to develop a micro-nutrient strategy for the country and GAIN is expected provide technical assistance;
- The Government has exempted VAT and other related duties for the import of premix for salt and edible oil to enable cost-effective production and distribution of fortified foods in the country;
- The Netherlands embassy in Bangladesh funds a project of DSM, a partner in the GAIN alliance, for rice fortification and transfer of knowledge on rice fortification to Bangladesh.

This background in Uganda and Bangladesh shows that GAIN is very much engaged in policy dialogue and technical assistance in food fortification. Although these actions are not included in the GPF project, they are crucial for the development, implementation and results of the GPF in the past years.

#### **Theory of Change and result chain**



In developing country calorie and nutrients intake of poor people, particularly children, is a major challenge that needs to be tackled in many ways. One way is adding nutrients to basic food-products that are consumed by poor people and children so that the calorie, vitamins and nutrients intake can improve.

The theory of change in the GPF project is focusing on contributing to increased availability of good quality, affordable premixes for fortified foods for poor and vulnerable people in development country. The idea of the GPF is specifically based on the observation that premix elements represent a significant recurrent single-cost in food fortification programmes and this is threat to long-term sustainability of these projects.

If a more efficient and effective mechanism can be set up to decrease the costs of premixes, this risk of longer-term weak sustainability can be greatly decreased. And when such a facility is set up one can also integrate an important aspect of quality control and certification to ensure good and constant quality of premixes.

To address the challenges four services/facilities should be combined into one project: the GPF. Therefore the project was developed on four pillars:

- a) Procurement facility;
- b) Certification facility;
- c) Credit facility to enable customers to finance their premix purchases;
- d) Grant mechanism to interest and involve food producers and enable further expansion and replication of the process.

The GPF needs sufficient scale to be effective and therefore the four pillars were operationalized in such a way that this scale can be reached in a short term. For this purpose in addition the Schokland Funding additional funding was requested from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

The GPF project design has no extended results chain, as it basically is a facility that links supply and demand. The effects of food-fortification programme and distributions of fortified foods on the health and food-security situation of ultimate target groups lies beyond the scope of this facility, because that is the responsibility of the users and costumers of the GPF. In this sense the project's result chain has outputs and outcomes but no impact-indicators at the level of ultimate beneficiaries.

It is important to work on the enabling and policy environment for food fortification projects to become successful, although those activities were not part of the specific GPF project and as said in the previous section. Most of that work on enabling environment is done by GAIN, in other projects and interventions outside the scope of this specific Schokland funded project.

### **Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level**

In the light of the intervention theory described above, when we look at the GPF, we can merely distinguish between outputs and outcomes and not impact. At the end of this section, we will briefly discuss aspects of impact, but that requires also looking at the broader actions and interventions of GAIN that were not subject to detailed analysis in this case-study.

The overall outputs can be summarised as follows

- Yearly sales of premix have grown from 5.4 Million USD in 2009/2010 to 13.7 Million USD in 2012/2013

- GAIN has developed a certification process which is in line with quality standards set by internationally recognized institutions and which ensures food safety and consumer protection as well as premix quality;
- UNICEF & WPF have become structural global buyers of premix from the GPF;
- Specific systems for sustainable premix procurement for large-scale food fortification were set up in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Tanzania by the GPF (and we have looked in more detail at this support in Bangladesh).

#### Specific outputs in Uganda:

- Gain offered technical expertise, training and supported companies in starting using premix in flour and edible oil fortification;
- At the start beneficiaries were provided grants for free premix and fortification products, equipment which included mixers and dozers ( Mukono oil processors and Nile Agro wheat milling industries);
- The GPF has continued to offer oversight and technical assistance and remained one of the main facilities where premix can be sourced and purchased;
- The Uganda Bureau of Standards and National Drug Authority are quality controllers at both national and industry level and provide support the private sector to outsource quality products from manufacturers and to inspect and control that required standards for fortified foods are adhered to;
- The Uganda Bureau of Standards ensures certification and ensuring the proper use of the food fortification logo. GAIN has supported the Uganda Bureau of standards to review its standardization processes and procedures to include other foods;
- Manuals, guides and tools to support producers to go through the various steps of food fortification are developed but not much is known about outreach.

#### Specific Outputs in Bangladesh:

- Supply of Potassium Iodate (Iodine) for salt iodization to support the CIDD project and Vitamin A oil premix for edible oils is provided. 42 tons of Potassium Iodate and 29 tons of Vitamin A were provided in between 2011 and 2013.
- The CIDD project is still not fully sustainable as handling and import costs are still subsidised by BSCIC. GAIN is supporting and advising BSCIC to decrease subsidies over time;
- GAIN provides technical assistance to national partners in policy and programme strategy development in fortified foods;
- The GPF has provided grants and credits to companies to install SIP at the salt factories (dosing machine for mixing iodine with salt) and dosing machine for mixing of Vitamin A premix with edible oils.

#### Outcomes of the GPF facility:

- Since the start of GPF in 2009, according to GAIN's report on 2012/2013, the GPF has assured the quality and procured over US\$ 36 million worth of premix supplied in total directly reaching 451 million beneficiaries with fortified foods in 39 countries, with additional indirect beneficiaries are reached in another 22 countries through collaboration with WPF;
- With these figures the GPF project is contributing significantly to GAIN's overall reach target of 1 billion by 2015;
- The GPF has established a solid supplier base composed of 15 blenders, 36 micronutrient suppliers and 5 micronutrient powder (MNP) producers;
- 39 countries in Africa, Central and Southern Asia, reaching an estimated 451 million consumers in developing countries since July 2009;
- From 2012/2013 onwards the annual number of beneficiaries is expected at 150 Million;

- Less dependence of buying premix from GAIN funded purchases in GPF, through large increase of role of UNICEF, WFP and private customers (GAIN funded purchases decreased from 26% to 10% in 2012/13);
- GAIN has successfully negotiated with MoFA for funds until 2016 to institutionalize and improve sustainability of the national oil fortification project in Bangladesh.

*In Uganda:*

- The main producers of cooking oil and wheat flour are all compliant with food-fortification legislation and account for close to 90% of all the fortified oil and wheat products consumed in the country;
- The law for mandatory fortification aims to ensure that all the large oil and wheat producers are compliant and as such the wider community is assured of having the required micro nutrients in the oil and wheat flour;
- The achievements of the project have been carried forward by the Spring Project funded by USAID which is carrying forward most of the activities related to scaling up the initiative; in 2014, GAIN is planning additional regulatory monitoring assistance to the government of Uganda as part of the USAID ENABLE project;
- The fact that the cost of adding the pre-mix in the oil and wheat products adds very minimal additional costs to the producers is a guarantee that the wider community will continue to benefit from the fortified foods;
- The compliant companies continue to fortify their products as a form of corporate social responsibility and are comfortable by spreading the costs to the consumer by ensuring that the costs of bread, wheat flour and cooking oil are within the acceptable pricing for the consumer;
- The producers of the fortified foods have devised marketing strategies that deliver the products to the consumer in easily affordable packages that reach close to the wider communities at affordable prices;
- Fortification has been integrated in the national policies of the Ministry of Health that relate to the food and micro-nutrient programmes
- Fortification of maize-flour still presents serious challenges of sustainability, management, quality control and supervision as maize flour is produced primarily by small millers outside control of authorities.

*In Bangladesh:*

- The Salt amended Law and Oil fortification (Vitamin A) Law have now passed in the Bangladesh Parliament and salt companies are complying with the law;
- A MoU is developed to ensure supply of quality and affordable premix at a competitive price that foresees setting up a National Steering Committee on Premix headed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Industries and to develop a National Micronutrient Strategy involving key development partners like GAIN, UNICEF and MI are still prospects that are underway;
- Supply systems for potassium iodate and vitamin A have been set up and these will decrease the need for subsidies over time. GAIN, with UNICEF and the Bangladesh Government have achieved a series of results: Fortified oil standards were developed and established; industry buy-in from the majority of oil companies was achieved resulting in 16 out of 22 oil refineries that were equipped and trained to fortify production; a quality assurance and control system was established and training was provided to regulatory officials; a Government-approved fortification logo was rolled-out that is associated with vitamin A fortification messages disseminated to the oil industry, distributors, and retailers, as well as consumers through mass communications campaigns.

- Since the launch of fortified oil, monthly production has increased from approximately 15,000MT to 40,000MT/month and continues to gain market share. As of June 2013, about 393,320 MT of fortified oil was being produced annually, reaching 49.1 million individuals.

Impacts or prospects for impact in the wider environment and on ultimate target groups:

- The GPF has developed into a global facility that serves hundreds of buyers and sellers of nutrients for food-fortification worldwide. It also serves the largest global buyers of premix UNICEF and WFP. According to GAIN's annual report on 2013 more than 700 Million beneficiaries were reached with fortified food. This number is higher than the beneficiaries reached by GPF, because sometimes target-groups are served with Premixes from other sources, particularly directly from suppliers. Through the quality assurance process and certification in the GPF, the quality of premixes has improved over the past years. It is not possible to assess the indirect impact of the GPF on the food-security situation of the roughly 451 million beneficiaries reached by the programme. This lies outside the scope of the facility. At the outcome level the GPF has been successful in linking supply and demand of nutrients and premixes. The fact that the buyers of premixes have reached out to 451 million people, from the GPF project perspective this can be considered impact. The GPF project is continuing in 2013 and considering the fact that it has reached out directly to 451 Million people and more indirectly in the first four years of operations it is likely to reach the original target of 750 Million people mentioned in the original application form of the GPF;
- The GPF has achieved massive scale of premix use in food-fortification programmes, but the production of premix is still largely in the hands of large suppliers based in Europe, China, India and South Africa. In order to achieve more impact at the local level, more efforts are still needed to build national level capacities to produce quality premix and to decrease dependence on international supply chains. Now that the market-mechanism is developed, cost-effectiveness has increased and prices have went down, one next step for GAIN and the GPF in the future could be to work on establishing more local production-capacity for premixes and Micro-Nutrient Producers.

### Timeline and milestones in the project and partnership

Time	Milestones
31-12-2013	End of the GPF project and start of new contract MoFA-GAIN for implementation of a food-fortification programme in Bangladesh as well as for continued funding for the operations of the GPF
2 <sup>nd</sup> Sem 2012	Performance review of the GPF and start development of new five year strategic plan of GAIN/GFP and establishment of GAIN's Food Safety, Quality and Procurement unit. Continued support to this project is negotiated with the Dutch Government after ending the Schokland project at the end of 2013
15 Oct 2012	Approval no-cost extension of GPF project
2012/2013	Expansion to 39 countries and continuation of working with WFP
2012	Rice-fortification studies by GAIN
2011/2012	Support to development and implementation of national premix supply systems (Tanzania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia)
2011/2012	Expansion from 25 countries to 34 countries and additional 21 countries through WFP.
2011	Development of business programmes in Africa and Latin to generate new request for quotations for premixes, although not all were successful
2011	Expansion base of premix suppliers (to 17 in July 2011)
2 <sup>nd</sup> Sem 2011	Self-assessment of certification process and introduction of new certification approach in the GPF.
April 2011	Renew and extension of contract with Crown Agents as GPF procurement agent

2010/2011	25 countries reached directly and another 20 through a partnership with WFP
May 2010	Signing of long-term agreement with UNICEF
2010	Establishment Kenya Premix Hub
2010	Launch of call for expression of interest to certify providers of premix. 14 companies responded to this request and joint procurement processes with WFP
2009/2010	13 countries reached with the GPF
July 2009	Start of the GPF project
2009	Establishment partnership with WFP: GPF is added on the preferred supplier list of WFP
May 2009	Launch of the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition at the Gain Business Alliance Global Forum (AIM became a separate additional Millennium Agreement in the Schokland portfolio)
6 May 2009	Approval of the GPF project
29-9-2008	Submission of the GPF proposal to the Schokland Fund
2008	Visits to the Ministry and preparation of GPF project for the Schokland Fund
30 June 2007	Schokland Meeting
2005/2006	Rapid expansion of the GAIN alliance and support of international donors (a.o. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation that later also provided funding to the GPF)
2002	Establishment of the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)

### Partnership configuration and development over time


GAIN is a global alliance of many partners with a board and a partnership council. The members of GAIN's partnership council are: UNICEF, WFP, BRAC Health programme, KBZF, Stiftung Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, South African permanent mission Geneva, Naandi Foundation, Institute of Development Studies, NEPAD, Special representative of the UN SG for Food Security and Nutrition, Indofood, DSM, Rabobank Foundation, Hellen Keller International, Institute of Nutrition Mahidol University.

GAIN partners with business, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, academia and other key players in the nutrition sector to deliver programs to vulnerable populations as efficiently and effectively as possible. Strategic partnerships leverage the best capabilities of each partner and are essential to achieve harmonization and help deliver performance targets, such as reaching 1.5 billion individuals with fortified foods. National Fortification Alliances (NFAs) are an example of the type of multi-sector partnerships GAIN supports at the country level. GAIN is also part of international multi-sector initiatives that support countries in implementing policies for better nutrition such as the Flour Fortification Initiative and the Iodine Network.

GAIN has also developed business partnerships in order to increase private sector investments in nutrition. In 2005, GAIN established the GAIN Business Alliance (BA) to mobilise business to play a greater role in combating malnutrition and facilitate business partnerships. The Amsterdam Initiative on Malnutrition (AIM) of 2009, which was also funded by the Netherlands Government as a Millennium Agreement is an example of a new partnership with businesses in this approach towards business alliances.

These partnerships in GAIN are contextual to the GPF project, which is run as a facility from the GAIN secretariat. GPF directly deals with several of the partners in GAIN, most importantly with UNICEF and WFP as buyers of projects and also with DSM (and other companies) as suppliers of premix. The relations of GPF are mostly with three stakeholder groups, suppliers, buyers and certifiers. Although there are clear partnership relations among these organisations and with GAIN, the logic of GPF is not so much a partnership in itself: it is more a tool in the hand of partnership.

When we try to depict the most important relations in and around the GPF project and within GAIN, we arrive at the following picture:



*Legend: blue = MoFA/Embassies; Orange = NGO's; Green = Private Sector; Purple = Public Sector (local and international). Bottom part of the picture is implementation on the ground in developing countries. Light coloured circles with dotted line are not very active partners during the implementation of the project.*

The GPF is not a partnership in itself but it is an instrument that is managed from the international GAIN secretariat in Geneva. Through GAIN, and the GAIN board and partnership councils many partners are involved in steering and strategic advice across GAIN and facilities such as the GPF but not in management and implementation.

The relationship between GAIN (including the GPF project) and MoFA has started with the Schokland funding and it has developed into a strong and strategic partnership between MoFA and GAIN. As an offspring to the Schokland project new projects were developed and in 2013 MoFA has signed a new agreement with GAIN that is providing follow-up to the GPF to continue to provide its services and to further rollout QA/QC and food fortification in core countries in the Dutch international development cooperation.

GAIN and GPF have developed many concrete relations of cooperation and partnerships at the country level. But at the same time, at the country level there are many users and clients of the GPF, using the facility as an instrument or service against payment in the first place and not so much seeing it as a partnership. In the countries that were visited in the case study, the following relations were established and clients were served.

#### *Uganda:*

- Uganda Bureau of standards (UNBS); a government parastatal company, mandated for developing quality standards and enforcement of laws that govern foods quality and safety in the country throughout the value chain.

Together with and through UNBS also other partners are reached:

- Industries in the food sector by providing technical services, training and ensuring that the food stuffs products produced in country and those imported are regularly checked at ports of entry to ensure compliance with the national required standard;
- National Drug Authority (NDA) whose mandate is to control the manufacturing, importation, distribution and use of drugs and other related products which include nutrients and fortification mixes;
- Ministry of Health which coordinates the food fortification program and issues regulations to provide guidance on food fortification;
- Five largest oil millers, ten wheat millers and maize milling companies in Uganda. During the case study the researchers have visited: Mukono Oil Processors, Nile Agro Industries and Ntake Bakery.

#### *Bangladesh:*

- The Ministry of Industries is an important partners, because it is the implementing agency (Public) for Salt Iodization and Edible Oil fortification projects;
- Micronutrient Initiatives (MI) – a Canadian development organisation
- UNICEF
- Large number of Salt Mill Owners (there are 267 functional salt mills)

#### **Critical success and failure factors**

The critical success and failure factors in the GPF project do not relate so much with partnership dynamics, because the GPF project is not run as a partnership. Therefore the success-factors mentioned below refer more to elements on how the GPF and GAIN has managed to achieve results at the country level.

But a few important success factors with respect to the partnership aspects of the GPF deserve to be mentioned:

- The set-up, management and implementation of the GPF as a project/facility at the GAIN secretariat, with partners and stakeholders involvement through the board and partnership council in GAIN, have been very effective. Implementation and development of the project is not delayed or complicated by the need for joint planning and decision-making meetings of different partners. Different partners, through GAIN, secure the strategic direction of the GPF.
- The development of a global facility creates a good basis for a global outreach. Through GAIN's widely extended networks the GPF could quickly reach a massive scale of implementation;
- GAIN has invested in marketing and communication of the GPF but also its other activities and this has contributed to acceleration of outreach of the facility;
- Good relationship management with donors (including MoFA) has resulted in strategic cooperation and partnerships with important donor organisations, important for further replication and expansion of the GPF and other activities of GAIN;
- A critical factor in this project was the fact that there were some difficulties in dealing with matching the 40% Schokland funding (as a donation). GAIN was able to successfully fundraise with the Gates Foundation and other donors for the 60% contribution. While the GPF in itself is sustainable in linking supply and demand, the facility does need continuous external funding for its core operations and ongoing technical assistance which is provided free of charge to Ministries of Industry, Ministries of Health, industries, WFP and UNICEF;
- GAIN needed more time for project implementation to match the 60% own contribution for the project: a no-cost extension of the project until the end of 2013 was requested. The Schokland funding modality was not an optimal fit with the project's needs.

Factors that have contributed to the results of the GPF at the country level were:

- Local partnerships were continued through the national working group which was set up during the GAIN support to the Ministry of Health in Uganda in the period 2007-2012. This working group is coordinated by the Ministry of Health;
- Development of manuals and guides to monitor standards and food quality and practices of maintaining quality assurance have helped rolling out premix;
- Starting with a voluntary participation at the start of the project to attract industries. In a first phase free premix and equipment was provided to the first adopters in the programme. Later adopters had to pay from the start. This phased approach from a voluntary participation to fortification to a mandatory compliance at a later stage has helped to scale up the fortification program;
- Links of the project with the Spring Project funded by USAID in Uganda help to continue and expand outreach of the project;
- Ensuring and enabling and active role of private sector partners in Uganda in the development of the mandatory regulation that has ensured ownership and compliancy with food-fortification policies;

Critical factors:

- Outreach, awareness and education of the final consumers are needed to ensure that consumer see the value of fortified foods and oils and buy these products. The approach of the project has very much been on the Government and the private sector buyers and producers;
- The partnerships in GPF and the support given to suppliers of premix are currently benefiting larger international companies and not yet sufficiently local producers of nutrients. More national level capacity development and value-chain development for premixes are needed to create more local capacity, continuity and sustainability;
- Similar as above there is a need to strengthen national level capacities within the private sector facilities for quality control and certification of premixes and fortified foods.

### **Innovation aspects**

The GPF project combines different forms of innovations:

- Process innovation in the project was achieved by introducing a facility in which supply and demand for nutrients and premixes for food-fortification was matched in a cost-effective way and with the additional mechanism of ensuring quality control and certification. The facility has create a quick process to achieve this;
- Technological innovation was achieved by improving quality of premixes, provision of equipment to local industries and by conducting research on quality and composition of premixes;
- A financial innovation was introduced at two levels. In the first place the global facility and the scale of operations allowed for an increased availability of premix for a decreased cost-price. The second innovation in this area was the provision of grants and credit to accelerate the adoption of premixes in food-fortification initiatives at the local level;
- Finally, output innovation was achieved by providing higher quality premixes in a large number of developing countries where before such quality premixes were not or more limitedly available.

### **Organisational sustainability**

The GPF operations require external funding for its support activities (technical assistance and advice). But clients pay fully for the premix itself and the services as certification. Dalberg Global Development Advisors completed an analysis of sustainability of the GPF in September 2012 and



found that it will take at until 2018 to reach financial viability once it has reached sufficient scale of operations and is not dependent of future funding for its continuation. This is somewhat longer than presented in the original project proposal, but in that proposal the focus was very much on the GPF facility only.

Technical support, awareness raising and replication and expansion of outreach of food-fortification initiatives among other countries and other food-products, does require additional projects and funding. This is the organisational strategy and mandate of GAIN and the organisation has a wide network of partners and donors to continue this work. Also MoFA is engaged in a follow-up partnership and project with GAIN on food-fortification in Africa.

### **Project sustainability**

The GPF core service provision of premix procurement is sustainable with increased volumes, but the provision of required services such as technical assistance and advise to government and development actors require continued external funding. The GPF must reach a scale where the premix sales fees and technical assistance can be charged to cover all operational costs. This full sustainability of the GPF plus its services can be reached in 2018 according to current growth forecasts of GAIN.

### **Institutional sustainability**

The work that GAIN does with national governments and international developments on creating an enabling environment and policies and strategies on food-fortification has borne fruit. The countries where GAIN/GPF is active all have policies and frameworks for mandatory food-fortification and in many countries Ministries of health or industry have programmes and projects to support the development and expansion of food-fortification in different sectors. This active engagement of the Governments could be clearly observed in Uganda and Bangladesh and is an important guarantee for institutional sustainability.

The international partnership agreements of GAIN/GPF with UNICEF and WFP are an important mechanism for sustainability of the GPF, because these partners have committed themselves to work with GPF as a preferred supplier on the long-term.

Sustainability at the national level could still be further strengthened by avoiding dependency on the supply of nutrients from governments, donors and large international companies and to develop and strengthen local capacity of government and private sector companies to procure these quality nutrients/fortificants. This need is recognised by GAIN and the challenge is taken in continuation of the GPF and in new projects of GAIN.

## 6. Internet for water and sanitation, Akvo (project number 18404)

### Context and main features of the project and partnership

The Akvo project and the establishment of the Akvo foundation by the Netherlands' Water Partnership was motivated by the fact that worldwide about 1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water and 2.6 billion people lack basic sanitation services. In order to book progress in improving Water and Sanitation (WASH) related aspects of Millennium development well-coordinated efforts of a great number of actors is needed and not only at the level of WASH interventions on the ground but also facilitating services to create a better conditions for implementation of WASH projects and coordination of these projects.

Akvo addresses the following challenges:

- Information exchange: Information about low cost sustainable water and sanitation solutions is available, but spread over a large number of sources, and essentially disorganised;
- Funding: The water and sanitation community struggles to attract additional flows of money and connect funds directly to where the demand is.
- Reporting: the WASH sector is stuck in a 'thick Word report' process, and struggles to share and visualise results in an appealing way to funders and the general public.

The Schokland project of Akvo developed in 2007 can be considered a start-up subsidy to the Akvo foundation and the funding was aiming at the entire range of actions and services provided by it. This can be summarised as developing Internet based tools to supply information on WASH issues and to equip local beneficiaries with tools for improved reporting and relations management and brokerage with international partners.

In the framework of this evaluation, the evaluators have spoken with Netherlands' and international partners and stakeholders in the project and interviewed beneficiaries, users and clients on specific locations in Bangladesh and Uganda and a regional support hub of Akvo in Kenya.

Relevant contextual aspects observed in Uganda:

- The 2040 Vision for Uganda focuses on strengthening the national capacity to harness its national resources including oil, gas, tourism, minerals, ICT, business, abundant labour force, geographical location and trade, water resources, industrialization, and agriculture. Water resources are an aspect in this vision, but not specific WASH themes. Additionally, the focus on the government to use ICT as one of the engines for growth provides an enabling environment of Akvo's ICT related services;
- The National Development Plan (NDP) 2011-2015 is titled 'Growth, Employment and socio-economic Transformation'. It provides a frame of reference for all national and international development partners. WASH again isn't a specific point of attention but it features in this plan, but under other areas;
- The WASH sector is important in the development strategy of the government, as there is a growing attention not only to accelerated socio-economic growth in terms of improved employment levels, higher per capita income and improved labour force distribution, but also to substantially improved human development and gender equality. These human development aspects need investments in physical infrastructure, human resource development through better education and skills development, quality health services, and improved water and sanitation facilities for all communities in Uganda.
- The MFS II WASH alliance is active in Uganda. Akvo is a partner in this alliance and provides its services to local WASH partners in Uganda.

- The users of Akvo services over time can be found not only in the WASH sector. Other partners have also seen the usefulness of the services of Akvo in other sectors and therefore at the time of the case-study visit we could also observe support activities in the health sector.

Relevant contextual factors in Bangladesh were:

- In the “Vision 2021” of the Bangladesh Government: Digital Bangladesh, the ICT sector is declared as a priority area for development;
- The Government and different development actors such as UNDP are investing in and providing technical assistance to establish national web portals and access to information projects. Government departments are increasingly using ICT for monitoring and evaluation activities, which creates an opportunity for replication of Akvo services with Government partners;
- The Government also shows increased interest in setting up and supporting PPP’s in the area of ICT and information management;
- Water management and WASH are important areas of cooperation between the Netherlands and Bangladesh. The Dutch Government is supporting a BRAC WASH project with 58 million Euro to contribute towards achieving MDG 7 “Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” and regional development programmes in Water Management. The Dutch MFS II, WASH alliance has established a Bangladesh WASH alliance to develop and coordinate WASH actions of many different partners. Akvo is a partner in this alliance and provides its services to local WASH partners.

### **Theory of Change and result chain**

The Theory of Change of Akvo is straightforward and simple and can be summarised as follows: Providing tools and access to information to partners in development projects contributes to greater effectiveness and on the longer-term more development results obtained by these partners.

From the perspective of Akvo the result chain contain a clear output and outcome level, but the impact that can be obtained by partners at the level of ultimate target groups (and MDG’s) through using tools and information provided by Akvo is in the hand of these partners and therefore not part of the result chain of Akvo. Direct impact that can be attributed to Akvo’s services is increased access of WASH partners (and increasingly also other user groups) to sustainable funding and support, through an increased capacity to develop interventions and particularly to monitor and report on them.

Akvo’s services contain the provision of three integrated products to support the international WASH community in sharing knowledge, raising funds and simplifying reporting:

- The *Akvopedia* is an online open knowledge-sharing database for easy to implement, sustainable and low cost water and sanitation solutions. It works just like Wikipedia. Akvopedia provides easy access to up to date water and sanitation information and as it is a tool on the internet it greatly reduce the costs of knowledge sharing;
- A Matchmaking system (*Akvo Marketplace*) support partners to attract funds for water and sanitation project;
- Akvo’s *Really Simple Reporting* system is a tool for field teams to monitor and report on projects with short text and picture based updates (online or SMS). RSR focuses on easy visualisation of results to donors through short text messages, pictures, YouTube-style movies. The tool allows for partners to upload more information and users of this information can select. The RSR system also supports comparing and sharing best practices

In the final report on the Schokland project, Akvo indicates to expect in 2015 that at least €1 billion worth of projects will benefit from Akvo’s services and these projects can impact on the lives of over

50 million people. But as observed above the impact at the level of ultimate beneficiaries is not part of the project intervention.

In the years after Schokland (2011-2013), Akvo has further expanded its products and services to:

- Akvo Flow: a software tool to enable field-base surveys and researched applying mobile appliances;
- Akvo Openaid: a tool for open and transparent reporting and tracking development expenditures.

The matchmaking function (Market-place) of Akvo over the years was integrated in the other products and services and is not a specific separate service offered by Akvo anymore.

The service delivery of Akvo is not for free, because Akvo is a not-for-profit/not-for-loss foundation. The fees against delivery of services are covering the costs of operations of Akvo.

### **Results obtained at output, outcome and impact level**

Akvo is primarily a global on-line facility for service-delivery on water-related information, brokerage and reporting services available on the Internet. Additionally Akvo provides technical assistance in installing equipment and software of its tools and for training of users. This is done with the users and also online (helpdesk).

The Akvo project has developed almost exactly as described in the original project plan. At the end of 2010 Akvo had produced a large output of services and achieved outcomes at the level of the users of the services. Although not part of the research period in this evaluation, the Akvo services after the finalisation of the Schokland have further expanded both in terms of diversity of services as well as outreach over users and countries.

At output level, the Akvopedia was viewed by over 150.000 viewers in 2010 (end of Schokland project). The Akvo Platform was used by 220 partners and the number of projects that were active on the Akvo market-place was 214, representing a total value of over 10 million Euro.

At outcome level Akvo's services and products are widely used in water sector but also are increasingly used in other sectors and by other users. This outcome could be confirmed during the case-study visits in this project to Uganda and Bangladesh

Another important outcome of the Schokland project is the fact the experiences in cooperation between Akvo and MoFA were so good that MoFA has continued to work with Akvo after the Schokland project and that Akvo has become an important partner of MoFA in the area of aid transparency. The DMW directory is interested to use RSR and Openaid in its own reporting and publications. Furthermore, particularly the Akvo flow tool is used in several other projects and programmes funded by MoFA.

Impact at the overall global level is difficult to establish, because users in different countries and contexts are using the Akvo services and information differently. In this evaluation we have observed a clear impact in Uganda where Akvo's RSR system and the new software of Flow is now not only used in the WASH sector but also replicated in the health sector and in this sector the direct (private) users of Akvo services and software have been successful in expanding the use of these instruments in the public health sector. In Bangladesh the Akvo services are not only used by individual users, but these are also shared between the different members of the Bangladesh WASH alliance and by the alliance collectively. Also in this project the indirect impact in the form of improved WASH conditions at the level of ultimate target groups of Akvo clients and users is not possible to establish and to attribute to Akvo. This indirect impact is not part of the theory of change of Akvo.

More specifically, in Uganda we have seen the following outputs and outcomes:

- The Diocese of Jinja has applied RSR and particularly FLOW in monitoring the satisfaction of patients in its health services and is now using the monitoring data to improve the quality of its service delivery. Contacts were established with Public health facilities and a number of public facilities are now also using the FLOW tool;
- The national ICCO office in Uganda is using the RSR and FLOW of Akvo in its monitoring and reporting practices and it is highly satisfied in the gains in terms of time and quality of data-collection;
- Users in Uganda indicate that the tools of Akvo are simple and very mobile. The use of mobile phones for data collection is very practical in the context of Uganda and other countries. After a basic training partners can use the tools by themselves;
- Users have gradually understood the possibilities of the software and are now using it successfully to carry out surveys in the field and on WASH, Health and Food Security.

In Bangladesh during the visit we have seen:

- The Bangladesh WASH alliance partners are using actively several products and services of Akvo: a) Akvo flow for monitoring in conducting surveys and processing survey results and b) Akvo RSR for reporting and sharing of learning between the alliance partners;
- Survey and reporting are now considered by partners as useful and required monitoring activities in development projects. These functions are now being done with ICT aid, which is greatly reducing time and efforts and improving quality of data;
- Also in Bangladesh, NGOs find it interesting and useful to use Akvo tools and several NGO's have already conducted a significant number of surveys using Akvo flow.
- The WASH partners indicate that they have received sufficient training and technical support from Akvo to be able to use the new tools.


#### Timeline and milestones in the partnership and project

Time	Milestones
2012/2013	Ongoing cooperation Akvo and MoFA around aid transparency and instruments (FLOW and RSR) and preparation of a follow cooperation around FLOW and RSR in the framework of aid transparency
Jan 2012	Opening of Akvo Hub in Kenya
Oct 2011	Expansion of Akvo to 30 staff and moving of Akvo to a new own office in Amsterdam
20-7-2011	Final approval and closure Akvo project by MoFA
2011	Introduction and development of Flow and Openaid as new products
Jan 2011	Kick of the MFS II programme of the Dutch WASH alliance of which Akvo is a partner
31-12-2010	End of Schokland project Akvo
21-1-2010	Approval of additional Schokland subsidy to expand the scope of the Akvo project in the remaining final year of 2010
2009	Development of Akvopedia, Marketplace and RSR
2009	Approval of loan Rabobank to Akvo and support in development of payment system for digital services
14-8-2008	Start of Akvo Schokland project
2008	Establishment of the Akvo Foundation and since then Akvo became a member of the NWP
30 June 2007	Schokland Agreements meeting
2007	Formal Establishment of the Akvo Foundation
2005	Start of Akvo as a project by Dutch water-partners (NWP) and a direct result of the Stockholm Water-week

#### Partnership configuration and development over time

The formal contract partner at the start of the Akvo Schokland project was the Netherland's Water Partnership (NWP). Immediately after the start of the project, the contract was transferred to the Akvo Foundation. In formal terms Akvo is not a partnership, and therefore does not fully comply with the Schokland regulations. But de-facto Akvo is a tool and instruments in the hands of a partnership: NWP. And furthermore Akvo's main activity in fact is establishing partnerships and linking organisations through information. Akvo maintains many relations with southern organisations, but these partners should actually be considered more users than partners. However the support to local partners is done and enabled through partnerships between Akvo and other organisations, most notably Akvo's participation in the WASH alliance in MFS II. In Bangladesh we have seen that this partnership in WASH is enabling rolling out Akvo's services to many organisations. In Uganda similar arrangements existed with Cordaid and ICCO, through which organisations Akvo's services became available to local user organisations.

The Akvo partnership configuration therefore in formal terms only includes Akvo as a foundation in which board different stakeholders and partner-organisations are represented. But when looking at de-facto activities of Akvo, we can identify more partners around the Akvo foundation. The Akvo partnership configuration is presented in the following figure:



*Legend: blue = MoFA/Embassies; Orange = NGO's; Green = Private Sector; Purple = Public Sector (local and international). Bottom part of the picture is implementation on the ground in developing countries. Light coloured circles with dotted line are not very active partners during the implementation of the project.*

At the level of users or clients we have seen the following examples in Uganda and Bangladesh:

- ICCO started working with Akvo in 2010 to start using web tools for carrying out surveys in their project areas to monitor progress in projects and programs;
- Diocese of Jinja, with support of Cordaid is using the services (FLOW) of Akvo to conduct patient satisfaction monitoring surveys in their health clinics;

- Hope Alive Uganda (AQUA for All in Kamuli District) has recently started working in Jinja and Kamuli where they support groups of women in small businesses and WASH projects. Hope Alive is one of the new users of Akvo and still have to start implementing the Akvo tools on the ground;
- The main partners of Akvo in Bangladesh are the 14 Bangladesh WASH alliance partners supported by the Dutch WASH Alliance. Eleven of these partners are actively using Akvo systems for reporting and monitoring

In addition to these local users, we can identify other partners that are working with Akvo, but these partnerships are not directly related to the Schokland project, but should be considered institutional partner relations:

- The private company MARS is using RSR to report on its micro-finance support programme to cocoa farmers in Ivory Coast;
- UNICEF is currently together with Akvo FLOW tools and methods for water-point mapping and monitoring in West Africa. This project is supported with MoFA funding.
- Akvo's Openaid software was used for an open data portal of UN Habitat: Open UN-Habitat;
- WASH alliance (Simavi lead partner), is using Akvo's RSR and Flow with approximately 100 field partners in different countries

The partnership relation between Akvo and MoFA is very strong and this strong relation is a direct offspring and result of the Schokland fund. The cooperation between Akvo and MoFA is around the issue of aid transparency in international development cooperation. In a follow-up funding of MOFA, Akvo has designed and developed the Flow product. MoFA and Akvo work together to provide RSR services to PPP's that receive funding in the "Sustainable Water Fund" and in the development of "Openaid.nl" that will show the Dutch Global Aid on the internet. Both Akvo and MoFA indicate that the partnership between the two is strong and directly related to the possibility provided by the Schokland fund for supporting this project and the high quality performance of Akvo during this project.

A final partnership that needs to be mentioned is the relation between Rabobank and Akvo. Both partners in interviews indicate that the provision of a loan by the Rabobank to this project has been innovative and supportive to the success of starting up the activities of Akvo. For Akvo this loan has provided the incentive to develop a sound business case for its operations in a not-for-profit/not-for-loss model. For Rabobank the provision of a loan to an initiative like Akvo was unorthodox, particularly in times of the economic crisis. But Rabobank has been willing to take the risk and help starting up Akvo (and providing a part of the own contribution that Akvo needed to match in Schokland funding. At the time of the case study it was foreseen that loan would be fully repaid during 2014 and 2015.

### **Critical success-factors**

- The set-up of Akvo as a foundation with the partners involved in its board has greatly facilitated effective and quick daily operations. Akvo could focus on the development of its organisation and its service without constant need for discussions and decisions on operational issues
- The Akvo project was built on a very sound business-case that included a bank-loan in the mix of financing. Sustainable operation after ending the Schokland project were right from the start a key area of focus and progress in this direction was constantly monitored. Although at the end of the Schokland period Akvo was not yet fully sustainable, with further growth of clients and services it has reached near sustainability in 2013 (80% income from services)
- The Akvo foundation at its start was already integrated in a widely extended existing network of water partners and this provided a very good starting point for the project. Later Akvo's

participation in the WASH (MFS II) alliance provided a good platform for further extension and replication of its services;

- Akvo has applied a good communication strategy among worldwide “clients” and partners, using the internet as a cost-effective tool;
- Akvo has invested in good and intensive relations management with MoFA during the Schokland project and this has resulted in a strategic cooperation between the two after the Schokland project;
- The products and services of Akvo are Internet based and therefore have the potential for a very broad coverage. However, how at the level of developing countries the users of Akvo tools reach increased development results and sustainability is outside the project intervention and no information is available on impact at that level, which would require a special impact study of the Akvo services and products;

### **Critical failure-factors**

- During the case study visit we have observed that cost-awareness of using the Akvo tools and services is almost non-existent at the level of end-users. This is because international partners pick up the bill of the Akvo tools and services. The weak cost-awareness at the level of end-users is a risk to sustainability when organisations stop funding these services for their partners;
- The awareness and capacities to deal with privacy and security aspects of Akvo technology among local users is not always optimal. Although this aspect receives attention in training and technical support to end-users, this might need more attention. There are two risks: mismanagement of confidential private information and Internet theft of confidential data.
- Akvo provides technical support and training to its users, which makes the adoption and use of the tools easier. Although the software is not complex and easy to use, training is always required. Some partners and users visited in the case study have indicated that the training and support given by Akvo has not been enough and should be extended to achieve a more sustainable use of these services.

Akvo has indicated that it has noticed the critical points mentioned above and it is working on improving its service delivery in these areas.

### **Innovation aspects**

- The core innovation process in this project has been technological innovation: Akvo has developed new ICT based tools for reporting and research and transparency that are highly innovative and much needed in the development sector;
- The project has also achieved financial innovation. At the level of Akvo by combining subsidy with a bank-loan to acquire the budget needed for the start-up of the Akvo Foundation. At the level of its service delivery to clients, by introducing pricing mechanisms of its cost-effective open-source tools that are accessible for users and at the same time enable cost-recovery for Akvo;
- Output innovation is achieved in developing new ICT tools for users that are filling a niche in the market. Aid transparency, monitoring and reporting are increasingly important in international development cooperation. Akvo has developed a series of extremely interesting new products and services to deal with these challenges.

### **Organisational (among partners) sustainability**

Akvo is well on track to become fully sustainable. The costs of its operations are covered by the fees for services and products of Akvo. For new product development and special projects Akvo acquires funding. The partnership with MoFA is very instrumental in this.



### **Project sustainability**

The Schokland project was a start-up subsidy of Akvo. Now that the Akvo foundation has almost become sustainable, the project is transferred into a sustainable organisation.

### **Institutional sustainability**

Institutional sustainability at the level of users is being achieved because an increasing number of users are applying the Akvo tools and also interest of other partners (also public sector) and other sectors in applying the Akvo tools is still growing.

A risk factor in institutional sustainability is the fact that many end-users are not aware of the costs of the Akvo products and services, because they don't directly pay for them (their back-donors do). This poses a threat, when donors stop funding these services these partners are not prepared to pay for them. Overall the Akvo tools present opportunities for cost saving to partners compared with previous monitoring and reporting practices. If partners could be motivated to put these cost-savings on a savings account, this could create an awareness of the value of the service and a willingness to continue to pay for them if donors stop funding.

## Annex 4: Project summaries (results of basic & intermediate assessments)

### Annex 4: Project summaries of non-case study projects

#### Dutch National Action plan (1325/17225)

##### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 410,878
Total Subsidy	€ 72,500 (18%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	97%
Target area	Conflict areas where Dutch female immigrants came from
Partners	MoFA/DGIS, Amnesty International (the Netherlands), 7 other NGOs, three ministries and two research institutes
Lead partner	MoFA/DGIS
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Human rights / Equal rights
Ultimate goal (MDG)	3
Goal(s)	Promoting implementation of UN resolutions, VR 1325 and 1820 with regard to equal rights for women.
Intervention logic	In many developing countries human rights violations, political instability, violent outbursts take place and the position of women is weak. Increasing involvement and empowerment of women contributes to conflict resolution and to a safe, stable and sustainable world. The strategy of the Dutch council of women (NVR) and the Women and lasting peace (VDV) is collaboration, knowledge building and knowledge sharing through a conference, a public event, an exhibition, and some introductory visits for some 30 foreign partners. The NVR ensures dissemination of information and motivating women's organizations. The women come up with their own problems.
Results	<p>Among others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting "Women in Armed Forces' in Madrid</li> <li>• Conference "women in war zones' in The Hague</li> <li>• Regular consultation to make Dutch efforts in fragile states more gender effective</li> <li>• Study carried out by Resolution 1325 in practice with recommendations to the NATO</li> </ul>

### *Analysis of the partnership*

This partnership is not separately funded by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). This decision was made in order to motivate the ministries to include it in their own budgets. There are three ministries represented (Education, Culture and Science, Foreign Affairs and Defence). MoFA/DGIS coordinates the implementation. At the ministry of Defense and the ministry of Foreign Affairs there is money to carry out gender-related projects, as it is part of the existing policy. All the partners were already working on gender-related issues, but are now united under this project. The Platform Women & lasting peace (VDV) with combined knowledge and experience contributes to the prevention of conflicts and is working on conflict resolution and peace building. The following organizations are actively involved in the platform: NEAG (Liberia), WLPP (Colombia), IFOR / WPP (Croatia), Women for Peace (Afghanistan), BPW Peace Brokers (Sri Lanka), MWP.NL / COS, Gender Concerns International (Kashmir), foundation FOUND (Darfur), the commission rights of the women (CieVR) and the NVR.

### *Analysis of Results*

The agreement is innovative because of the fact that government and civil society organizations developed and execute the plan together. Organizations of Dutch immigrants know the local situation in (former) conflict areas where they came from. They keep close contacts with people in their countries of origin. The large and strong network of women (organizations) enables them to have easy access to information about political instability, human rights violations and violence in the areas where gender inequality is a serious problem. With their experience in combating gender inequalities they can help with practical solutions. The connections are strong and therefore likely to be sustainable.

## Millennium municipalities in business (15369)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 334,920
Total Subsidy	€ 250,000 (75%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Target area	10 countries: Benin, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Sudan, Surinam, Tanzania, Uganda
Partners	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), VNG International (VNG-I), Nicis, CREM (4 in total)
Lead partner	VNG International
Type of partnership	Undefined
Type of Issue	Local development / Public-Private partnership
Ultimate goal (MDG)	Unspecified
Goal(s)	Contribute to the Millennium Development Goals, through cooperation between local governments and companies from the Netherlands with southern actors.
Intervention logic	The local governments are weak in many municipalities in developing countries. Exchange about local government issues, research, awareness raising and involvement in policy dialogue will in the long term enhances living conditions, raise opportunities for individual development and reduce poverty in developing countries.
Results	VNG-I began with pilot projects in eight municipalities whose experiences are used in a manual for municipalities for PPPs in international cooperation. 6 projects have been used for the manual with concrete recommendations for Millennium municipalities and businesses based on best practices.

### Analysis of the partnership

The project is part of the Logo South Program. The budget is for the total program. The key partner is VNG-I. They worked with PPPs and Millennium municipalities before and perform the secretariat and the project management. Cooperation with Nicis and CREM descended from a VNG congress early 2007. Nicis is knowledge provider. The co-operation with Nicis has been terminated. CREM is knowledge supplier of sustainable development and provides coaches. Outside CREM and Nicis no formal partners were involved in the project, but they worked together with many other parties such as the FSC and Fair Trade, as well as individual companies. Most PPPs are implemented at the local level.

An evaluation of the total Logo South Program activities in 2007-2010 (University of Utrecht and University of Amsterdam, 2010) shows that Dutch partners feel patronized because of the compulsory character of taking part in training sessions organized by VNG-I. According to MoFA the training is important to prevent municipalities with too much amateurism in international cooperation to collapse. Municipalities have a lot of good will, but little experience. The municipals/local authorities should receive more attention in the partnership strategies and tools in the Dutch development cooperation. MoFA states that the added value of this partnership is the development of a methodology to foster the collaboration between Dutch municipalities and private companies to promote local economic development in municipalities or similar local government entities in partner countries. However in order to make their collaboration effective municipalities en private companies should understand mutual interests.

VNG-I is politically supported by the ministers for development cooperation. However, the project relationship is less durable: there have been many changes in the contacts from MoFA.

The Second chamber of parliament decided to stop financing the LOGO-South program for the provision of local government in developing countries at the first of January 2011. However, VNG-I is involved in a follow-up program in 2011 or 2012. After finishing the budget VNG-I had to contribute money itself.

### *Analysis of Results*

The total LOGO South, according to its own final report obtained 88% of the planned results. The program was evaluated in January 2010 (by University of Utrecht and University of Amsterdam). This evaluation concludes that LOGO South is a relevant, efficient and effective program. The evaluation recommends to involve people at the political level. It was found that the targets in a number of cases had to be adjusted because they were overambitious in the first instance and this caused all kinds of problems (rapid staff turnover, politicization, difficult communication).

The millennium municipalities in business project was carried out with an initial eight municipalities of which 2 dropped out. Six projects have been developed as pilot projects. Especially projects in Nicaragua and South Africa were successful. Existing twinnings (e.g. the Netherlands-Nicaragua) were the embedding of the new activities. The project has not led to concrete replication and deployment of similar projects focused on Millennium Development Goals, but it resulted in a guide for municipalities and businesses to work together more broadly in international policy to help address problems in developing countries. In this sense, there are two tracks of impact: a) There are 150 millennium municipalities, all of which seek to work with companies in various fields, and b) within those municipalities there is specific interest in working with BRIC countries (and sometimes poorer countries). This means that doing business seems to be more important to the partners than poverty reduction.

The six municipalities in which the Schokland projects are set up, are still active and are now available as a sounding board involved in cooperation with CREM and NL Agency to organize roadshows on international cooperation. According to VNG-I the project certainly lasted in the six municipalities. VNG-I is currently also developing new projects in this area of cooperation between municipalities and companies including the Dutch Goof Growth Fund of MFA.

## Knowledge for Health (16707)

### Characteristics

Total budget	unknown (not mentioned in project file)
Total Subsidy	€ 285,000 (67%)
Target area	The Netherlands
Percentage of subsidy spent	95%
Partners	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Healthcare, Dutch knowledge institutes and NGOs (16 in total)
Lead partner	NWO-WOTRO
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Knowledge Management / Health
Ultimate goal (MDG)	4,5 & 6
Goal(s)	Creating synergy between policy, practice and scientific research in the field of global health policy and health systems research
Intervention logic	In the Netherlands, many entities are involved with development-related health issues, but they did not work together efficiently. The Dutch government also wanted to shift the sector's focus from the treatment of illnesses like HIV/AIDS to a more integral vision on health care systems. Therefore, the cross-sectorial Netherlands Platform for Global Health Policy and Health Systems Research (Global Health Platform) was established. It was initiated the ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to the 'Mexico Statement' and a Round Table Conference on the issue organised by the Ministries of FA and Healthcare.
Results	The Platform organised meetings, wrote policy advice documents and visited an international congress to advocate the importance of health systems research.

### Analysis of the partnership

The Global Health Platform is a consortium of institutions gathered around a common theme. There is no formal contract between the members. The Schokland subsidy only covered the secretariat, provided by NWO/WOTRO. Members covered time spent, office space and other costs as in kind contributions. Because of its role as a financier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had observer status and was thus officially no full member of the Platform. The Ministry's delegate did participate actively in Platform meetings, however. A new fund for health systems research was set up some time after the start of the Platform. This was administered as a separate project. The project files mention some initial discussions about the interrelatedness of the Platform and the research fund, as conflicts of interest might arise when Platform members wish to apply for funding. This has been dealt with early on. Cooperation between platform members has reportedly worked out well.

### Analysis of Results

An external evaluation of activities in 2007-2009 (Learning for Development, 2010) quotes interviewees who feel that the Platform's mission is highly relevant for development. However, according to the evaluation, the Platform's activities at that moment had had little impact on policy making. The Platform has continued to exist after the subsidy was ended (2010) and has grown into a 'knowledge circle' for the ministry of Foreign Affairs. It currently has 18 member organisations, mostly the same as at the start. It is unclear how it is currently financed. According to interviewees in the current evaluation, knowledge sharing between the members of the Platform was effective and useful. This implies some influencing of policy may have occurred, but the impact on development goals was indirect, at best.

## Sustainable Energy Solutions for Africa (16717)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 6,300,000
Total Subsidy	€ 3,300,000 (52%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	8%
Target area	13 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
Partners	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Philips Lighting BV, and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), which was replaced by a consortium of ETC Foundation & Triodos Facet (3)
Lead partner	Philips Lighting BV
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Energy
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,7
Goal(s)	Providing sustainable and affordable energy products to 10 million 'bottom of the pyramid' people in Sub-Saharan Africa
Intervention logic	Millions of people in Sub-Saharan Africa have no access to energy, which contributes to sustained poverty. The partnership therefore will develop and market energy products (photovoltaic phone chargers annex reading lamps, and community solar floodlights) that are affordable for the poorest. Such products were already available in India, but needed adjustment for the African market.
Results	A pilot was carried out in Ghana in 2008-2010. Two Market Entry Reports have been published since, for Kenya and Mali.

### Analysis of the partnership

Originally there were three partners, MoFA, the German Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, represented by GTZ, and Philips Lighting BV, who would provide equal financial contributions (3 mln. per partner). The weight of each partner's contribution could differ per pilot project. GTZ withdrew early on, and MoFA decided to organise a tender so that a market party could take up this role, thus considerably increasing the weight of MoFA's contribution. ETC/Triodos Facet entered the partnership through the tendering procedure. Among the reasons underlying the original composition were GTZ's experience in South-Saharan Africa and the assumption that partnering would lead to synergy and harmonisation between the Dutch and German ministries. It was further expected that Philips would be able to develop and provide energy products tailored to the 'bottom of the pyramid' that are commercially viable, whilst Philips' product development activities within the partnership would be non-exclusive. The project documents do not specify to what extent ETC/Triodos Facet cover the competencies missed out by GTZ's departure. The division of tasks between partners was not completely clear at the start, which might have contributed to the early break-up. In practice, ETC has developed into a full-fledged project implementer and main counterpart for MoFA. After some disappointing intermediate results, the partnership was temporarily frozen. In September 2013, a new subsidy agreement was closed between ETC and MoFA, based on a revised project plan to which Philips also committed. The partnership thus continues.

### Analysis of Results

The partnership does not yet seem to have delivered products that are affordable enough for the 'bottom of the pyramid', which casts some serious doubts over the relevance of this activity in light of the MDGs. The original goal of providing 500,000 products to 3 million people in 13 countries in 2012 has not been reached as yet. According to the project file, the results of the Ghana pilot were less than expected. Nonetheless, MoFA at that time decided continuation of the partnership was important and new Market Entry studies were

supported. No reports of follow-up have been found. In addition, the project file contains information about other parties that are reportedly providing similar energy products for a lower price, while a misunderstanding has arisen between MoFA and Philips about the implications of the condition of non-exclusiveness. This may all change with the renewal of the partnership and the project plan, but it is too early to assess the results.



## Universal Access to Female Condom (17269)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€17,804,354(Project extended until 2015)
Total Subsidy	€ 5,000,000
Target area	Global (market development, advocacy) Nigeria, Cameroon, Mozambique (country specific programmes)
% subsidy spent	68%
Partners	Oxfam Novib, Rutgers WPF, I+solutions , Jippy (withdrew at an early stage) (4)
Lead partner	Oxfam Novib
Type of partnership	Independent project unit
Type of Issue	SRHR
Ultimate goal (MDG)	3, 6
Goal(s)	Promoting the use, production, development of the female condom (FC) and to put FC on the international agenda.
Intervention logic	The FC potentially offers woman a contraceptive over which they have control. However it is little used around the world and mostly by sex workers. The UAFC wants to change this by stimulating the production of new FC brands, developing markets and advocating the issue with international organisations. Furthermore they are actively promoting FCs in two countries (Nigeria and Cameroon).
Results	Through UAFC support once condom manufacturer has already produced a WHO certified FC and other producers are following. The country programs show some promise, proving that demand for FCs can be created.

### Analysis of the partnership

The initiative for the partnership came from Oxfam/Novib and Rutgers WPF. The Schokland Fund gave a stimulus to set up the project. Partners were contacted for their expertise. In an early stage condom producer Jippy withdrew from the partnership after it appeared that they could not meet their contractual obligations (they had a contract with Oxfam). I+Solutions took over Jippy's tasks (in cooperation with other organisations). In order to build trust and to ensure that one partner would not get too much influence over the project the UAFC was set up to coordinate efforts. The UAFC does not have a formal legal status, however it is the face of the partnership. Day-to-day activity is embedded within the individual partners. Above the UAFC there is a steering group in which all partners have a seat and which is chaired by an independent chairwoman. The partnership offers advantages because all knowledge and expertise is embedded in the partnership. Good Communication between partners adds credibility to the message and increases the quality of each individual partner's output.

Over time UAFC has developed into a brand name in the area of FCs. After the subsidy ends in 2015 the partnership plans to seek more funding.

### Analysis of Results

In the area of advocacy the partnership has made great strides, the FC is now on the UN list of (...). The issue is on the international agenda. The partnership successfully supported 1 producer to design a new FC brand (certified by the WHO) and others are following. According to the coordinator of UAFC the increased competition already had some effect on the price. The country specific programmes have demonstrated that demand for FCs can be created. One of the problems is that there is currently little demand for the product. The UAFC relates this to lack of knowledge about FCs. In the last year the project is becoming increasingly focused on the international FC market component of the project. The consortium is also looking to expand the country specific programmes to other countries.

The project is not demand driven. Instead it advocates the use of female condoms to empower woman.

## Mesofinance Development fund (18329)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 6,450,000
Total Subsidy	€ 3,450,000 (53%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	9%
Target area	Vietnam, Georgia, Mozambique
Partners	Economic advisory (EVD). The millennium agreement (MA) has no literal partners as it relates to a fund that is only funded by DGIS and operated by EVD. The projects financed by this fund do consist of partners. In Vietnam, performers: FACP, SEAF SME Finance LLC, re-financing and shareholder: Techcom Bank, Project partner: CTC BV: owner / developer of TREFI. In Mozambique: Applicant: BiD Network; project partner: Rabo Foundation; Local partner: Gapi; funders: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NCDO, ICCO, Postcode lottery.
Lead partner	EVD
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1
Goal(s)	Increasing the supply of credit and financial services for small and medium sized enterprises in Georgia, Mozambique and Vietnam in the period 2008-2011.
Intervention logic	Small and medium-sized enterprises in many developing countries are struggling to finance investments. With this mesofinance agreement the signatories agreed that Vietnam and some other countries can act to develop innovative projects for achieving greater access to intermediate finance as a pilot country. Mesocredits are loans for small businesses that are not served by microfinance institutions or banks, the so-called "missing middle segment".
Results	Initial programs are not all started. The deal flow is disappointing. The fund has not been able to use its resources.

### Analysis of the partnership

Interesting combination of Northern and Southern partners. There are also various product suppliers involved in the process to gain information about the SMEs which are normally not accessible to commercial banks in the South. In Mozambique, the partners have 49% co-ownership so they also have a say in the business and eventually take over the remaining portion as part of the exit strategy (source: Aidenvironment).

### Analysis of Results

A study of Foreign Affairs about Vietnam shows that the climate for lending has significantly improved there. The promotion of mesofinance proved possible by offering technical assistance to banks and to improve training for staff working in the financial sector. Nevertheless, due to lack of confidence in banks and companies access to intermediate finance remains limited. The same goes for Georgia and Mozambique. During this evaluation all projects are terminated or put on hold. The project in Georgia could not be continued because of conflicts.

## Barefoot Hydrologists (18401 / 21439)

### *Characteristics*

Total budget	€ 383,534
Total Subsidy	€ 153,534
Target area	India
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Partners	Deltares, TNO, ICCO and Gram Vikas
Lead partner	Deltares
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	WASH
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,4,7
Goal(s)	Capacity-building in the field of hydrology, through integrating scientific and local knowledge
Intervention logic	In Orissa, India, the pressure on water resources is growing as a result of Gram Vikas' work on promoting the use of water and sanitation facilities and a growing population. A need was identified for a simple method of identifying suitable spots for wells and sanitation. The partnership developed a method and a toolkit that could be used to turn Gram Vikas employees into 'barefoot hydrologists' who could operate independently in the field. If successful, this method could be upscaled and transferred to other locations.
Results	According to Deltares, the local partner Gram Vikas had reached 66.564 households in 1100 villages in 2011. No comparison with a baseline was made. There are no reports of follow-up activities.

### *Analysis of the partnership*

Deltares, a Netherlands-based expert centre on water infrastructure, and Gram Vikas, a local development organisation in the Indian state of Orissa, seem to be the main executing partners, but the partnership also involves TNO (a knowledge institute) and ICCO (a development organisation). ICCO, TNO and Gram Vikas were already partners outside of this project. It is unknown whether the partnership was continued.

### *Analysis of Results*

The idea of educating and constituting barefoot hydrologists seems innovative and it was certainly new to Gram Vikas. Results have reportedly come into existence slowly due to cultural differences, but the technology transfer seemed well-secured at the time of exit, which can be considered a success. Local partner Gram Vikas was a well-established organisation and was motivated to continue working with what they learned in the project. However, Deltares has signalled a need for further advice at Gram Vikas, while there was no prospect of financing this advice. It is unclear to what extent this threatens the sustainability of the results attained. It is also unknown whether this method of educating barefoot hydrologists has been transferred to other locations.

## Fragile states and education (18428)

### Characteristics

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Total budget	€ 722,419
Total Subsidy	€ 288,309 (40%)
Target area	Sudan, Afghanistan, Colombia
Partners	War Child, Oxfam/Novib, Dark & light, Save the Children, kerk in Actie ICCO, Woord en Daad (6)
Lead partner	Save the Children NL
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Safety and security / Education
Ultimate goal (MDG)	2,3
Goal(s)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Better coordination between governments and NGOs in fragile states leads to better access to education.</li><li>2) Promotional campaigns in the Netherlands lead to more awareness about education in fragile states</li></ol>
Intervention logic	Of the 77 million children out of school, 39 million live in conflict-affected countries. One of the major challenges in supporting education in fragile states is to find suitable management and coordination mechanisms, while education is improved in a sustainable way. The project aims to strengthen partnerships between NGOs and government to support education. Creating linkages and learning from one another at all levels will help efficiency.
Results	<p>In each of the three target countries activities were organised. The goals at the country-level were threefold. First to organise peer-to-peer learning meetings to exchange good practises and lessons learned. Second to develop a joint action plan on the basis of results of peer review. And third, to strengthen advocacy and lobbying.</p> <p>In the Netherlands the partnership started an information campaign which included a special edition of the free newspaper 'metro' and activities at a school in Voorschoten.</p>

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### Analysis of the partnership

The partnership consists of a 6 NGOs with a broad range of expertise. At the beginning of the project the partners had some difficulty coordinating activities.

### Analysis of Results

The partnership targeted three countries (Colobmia, Afghanistan and Sudan). In each of the three countries peer-to-peer learning sessions were held to exchange good practices and ideas. Activities were implemented in each country, but it is unclear what the results of the activities are.

Of the total budget a large part was spent on a promotional campaign in the Netherlands.

## Pilots Commodity Business Support Centres - Solidaridad (18429)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€16,000,000
Total Subsidy	€ 4,800,000 (30%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Target area	Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Cambodia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Vietnam
Partners	Solidaridad, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 5 companies in the field of (sustainable) palm oil, soy and sugar cane and three roundtable initiatives (RSPO, RTRS, BSI) (9 in total).
Lead partner	Solidaridad
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Value chain development
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,7,8
Goal(s)	Create sustainable international trade chains
Intervention logic	Consumers all over the world are becoming increasingly critical and demand that certain quality standards are being adhered to. The quality considerations include not only consumer product safety, but also quality in production, processing and trade. There is growing concern about climate change, water availability and the continuing growth of the world population. The solution is supporting small farmers in the certification of the palm oil, soy and sugar cane sector so that small farmers can increase productivity and revenues worldwide and inform small farmers and plantation workers about labor rights, including the benefits of sustainable agriculture and certification. (Schokland proposal, 2008)
Results	54.402 small scale farmers are able to supply certified products to a certified sustainable supply chain: - 17.454 sugarcane farmers; - 28.283 soy farmers; - 8.665 palm oil farmers.

### Analysis of the partnership

In the Soy production Friesland Campina and Unilever conduct a program. Unilever supports the program financially and Friesland Campina arranges the premium: technical assistance and cash for the farmers. Nutreco and Nevedi are directly involved in a soy project in Brazil for a year. In the sugarcane project Coca Cola joined the partnership through WWF and Sugar Union joined through the Dutch industry. The Palm oil project is conducted by Sainsbury. Solidaridad is the lead partner. WWF is involved in the pre-screening committee and steering committee. Presidents of RT (Round Tables: RTRS, RSPO, RSB) are in the steering committee, together with Rabobank, Moore Foundation and IDH. A Large proportion of the projects is arranged by Solidaridad and a part is arranged by WWF. There is made a proposal to scale (and accepted on August 9 by Paul Schoenmakers, MoFA) of 29.5 million euros, excluding the old budget (total budget for the period 2009 to 2012 amounted to 16 million Euros of which 4.8 million Euro was granted by DGIS) until 2015. The total budget proposal amounts to 68.5 million euros (contributions from private partners of 39 million euros in total).

### *Analysis of Results*

The main actors in the different chains are involved in this project. Once best management practices and certification in the field are achieved the chances are very high that the certified products can enter the market. If it succeeds to achieve sustainable chains then this will be for the long term. Moreover, replication is very plausible. However, to really get sustainable results chain players will have to grasp sustainability of the chain so that they actively invest in improvements. Now the project is mainly (co-)funded by donors. Hence there is a multiplier effect. The contribution of third parties increased from 40% in 2009 to 76% in 2012. This enables Solidaridad to continue and upscale its interventions under the Farmer Support Programme and create new partnerships (de Bruin, 2013).

## In Return East Africa Fund - Rebel group (18430)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 1,739,286
Total Subsidy	€ 487,000 (28%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Target area	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Partners	Cordaid, InReturn, Ayon Africa (consultancy firm in Kenya) and several partners joining later: foundation DO and Jacana Venture (Southern partner) (5 in total)
Lead partner	Rebel Group
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,2,4,6,7,8
Goal(s)	The provision of commercial equity funding to SMEs in emerging markets, with the aim of setting up a company that can manage independently and can provide technical assistance and that is competitive. Another goal is maximizing social returns.
Intervention logic	Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) can have a key role in reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs in African countries. African SMEs historically lack access to finance. In order to make use of their potential, SMEs need increased access to finance. This is realized by setting up a fund.
Results	The fund is realised, however a year later than planned. The fundraising for the project in the Netherlands and Kenya is also slightly delayed. The target for the end of 2010 has been adjusted to 8 million. This target is achieved and the team is fully build and operational. In 2009, six deals were closed. In 2010, 80 applications were received within the first 4 months.

### Analysis of the partnership

The Schokland Mesofinance agreement was signed on June 20, 2007 by EZ, DGIS, stas and 19 external parties. The InReturn fund is part of an umbrella fund. Other funds covered by this umbrella are Triodos Sustainable trade fund (19305), Oikocredit/Cegesti sustainable credit fund (19285), Financial Access/SEAF MSE Access to Financial markets in Vietnam (18329), BidNetwork/Rabobank Foundation BIDx: an online auction for investing in SMEs. Cordaid is the first (lead) investor in the fund and catalyst against other investors. InReturn is investment manager and is a leader in attracting additional investors. Cordaid and InReturn together are first loss takers. Jacana Venture, a major Southern partner, joined the partnership later. It contributes a fund manager who is well versed in the local market. DGIS funds the costs of technical assistance and is not a carrier of losses in the fund. Funding from Schokland is very modest compared to the total investment of the partners. Actually, the requested grant was too low and InReturn is facing cost overruns that they must pay for themselves. Building local teams takes more time and more money than expected.

### Analysis of Results

InReturn indicated that the fund can be substantive when 8 million euros are raised, DGIS concluded at the original proposal that the minimal size of the fund should be 10 million to be able to become independent. In 2010 the team was fully build and operational. It is a revolving fund but they would like to grow further. In the final report many recommendations were made, but little is known about the continuation of the project and the sustainability. By training the SMEs to be more competitive its impact is expected to be permanent. Other operators in the region are likely to respond. The fund still existed in 2013.





## More than the Sum of Parts: 3D Interaction Forum (18503)

### *Characteristics*

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Total budget	€ 1,614,865
Total Subsidy	€ 740,500 (46%)
Target area	Fragile states
Partners	Instituut Clingendael, HCSS, Centrum voor conflict studies, Cordaid (4)
Lead partner	HCSS
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Safety and security / Knowledge Management
Ultimate goal (MDG)	The project aims to improve communication between Dutch actors working in fragile states so that they are more effective in reaching the MDGs
Goal(s)	The Programme has two goals: 1) to improve communication between Dutch government actors who work in fragile states, and 2) to gain insight into ways in which Dutch government actors can cooperate in fragile states.
Intervention logic	The '3d' actors active in fragile states do not communicate effectively. Therefore support is not as effective as it could be. The project proposes an integrated approach in which actors work together.
Results	The partners set up an online forum and a training module on the basis of insights into the way actors work together in fragile states.

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### *Analysis of the partnership*

The partnership set up three separate modules which focus on different aspects of the project and which involve different partners. The first module 1) building an online interaction forum for actors involved in Burundi and Sudan, the second module 2) focuses on analysis and modelling, and the final module 3) focuses on developing a methodology for trainings.

### *Analysis of Results*

The partnership designed an online forum in which actors involved could communicate. However the forum never really took off. Few people visited the website. The forum will close when the subsidy ends. The partners analysed why actors were hesitant to use the forum, they found there was a lack of confidence and a technological, political and institutional hurdle in using the tool.

On the basis of the insights gained in the analysis module, a training course was set up. This course covered cooperation between actors and was well received.

## Learn for work Edukans (18512)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 5,284,000
Total Subsidy	€ 2,000,000 (38%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	78%
Target area	Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya
Partners	Edukans, five other NGOs, 10 research institutes, MBO Council CINOP (company), DGIS started (18 in total)
Lead partner	Edukans
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Technical and Vocational Training
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,2,3,8
Goal(s)	Improving the access to and quality of technical and vocational education and training in four developing countries
Intervention logic	“Vocational education has received little attention in the past few decades. Due to the main focus on basic education and primary education in particular in the MDGs and the Education for all goals, access to and quality of vocational education has been of low standards. Large numbers of youth that enter the labour market face difficulties in finding decent work. Within the Netherlands, much experience has been gained throughout the years on the aspects of access and quality of vocational education. A variety of institutions is active on vocational education within and beyond the borders of the country. This proposal aims at the enhancement of vocational education in four African countries by means of a network. The network will be initiated to link and learn, share experiences and implement new activities to improve access to good quality vocational education” (source: Schokland proposal).
Results	Access to and quality of TVET has improved; A broad Dutch and Southern network is established, which is open to new members, leading to linking and learning on a regular basis; Vocational education providers in the south (and in the North) strengthened both institutionally and in terms of capacity; Awareness is raised in Dutch society (Annual report, Edukans, 2011).

### Analysis of the partnership

The agreement was signed by 18 parties. Meanwhile, there are 40 parties through the eight projects (each project at least two Dutch and two African partners). There are two committees: an evaluation and an advisory committee. The advisory committee advises Edukans on major lines of program and lobbying twice a year. The committee consists of several parties (also DGIS). The evaluation committee evaluated the proposals, looks at the annual plans, etc. This group consists of Word & Deed, Cisco Systems (IT company), MBO Council and two southern partners. This committee meets four times a year. DGIS is actively involved and MoFA provides funding. This enables Learn4Work to provide co-financing, training and advice to Dutch-African partnerships of organisations, schools, companies and private initiatives. These partnerships can submit proposals for vocational education projects in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. All projects must be based on actual demand in Africa (Edukans, 2014). Embassies also play a role. In Ethiopia and Zambia there is an educationist who amongst others keeps an eye on the projects (especially information exchange).

### *Analysis of Results*

It is an innovative form of vocational training which is directly connected to practice and employment. One example is a project in which students begin to develop their own business at school with guidance and in the end they can continue the business on their own. Organizations from different sectors and levels of intervention work together in this partnership. It also includes new players on this theme. In particular, the coupling of Dutch schools to sustainable employment in the South is innovative. These partnerships consist of at least two Dutch partners and two Southern partners. The annual report of 2011 states that the construction of the partnerships is challenging. It means that different administration systems need to be adjusted to each other. This requires a new way of thinking and knowing each other's systems. Clear formats and instructions by Edukans aims to minimize administrative obstacles. For one lead partner, it probably results in no continuation.

## Text to Change (19248)

### Characteristics

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Total budget	€260,500
Total Subsidy	€104,020 (40%)
Target area	Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania
Partners	MSD, NCDO, Dutch Embassy Uganda, Philips, Pharm Access foundation, Aids info centre Uganda, Celtel Uganda, MTN Uganda, PWC, Clifford Change (10)
Lead partner	Text to change
Type of partnership	Undefined
Type of Issue	New communication technologies
Ultimate goal (MDG)	6
Goal(s)	Making use of increasing mobile phone ownership by targeting Aids information campaign via text messages. Increasing the number of people who get tested for HIV. To collect data to monitor the results of existing campaigns. Setting up a sustainable texting platform to be used in healthcare in Africa.
Intervention logic	People between 15-30 years old have the largest chance to get infected with HIV. This group is increasingly using mobile phones. Therefore the project focuses on this age group.
Results	The partnership developed an SMS quiz which asked questions about HIV. The project reached about 70.000 people in three programmes (the target was 100.000). The response rate was 12% in the first programme, 18% in the second and 21% in the third (The target was 20%). The number of people which was reached was higher due to higher than expected costs for sending text messages.

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### Analysis of the partnership

The lead partner is Text to Change. This organisation developed the concept of the text system and coordinated efforts between partners. The partners were included for their complementary knowledge and expertise. The project has a number of aspects including developing an SMS tool, HIV testing and counselling and research.

### Analysis of Results

The For TTC the project served as a trial to see whether their approach worked. They qualify the project as a success and plan to use the programme in other target areas as well.

In the first two programmes the results were not reached. According to the final report to MoFa the partners decided to keep the programmes relatively small so that they could experiment with the approach and observe the effects on efficiency. This is the reason that the targets were reached in the third programme.

In the third programme the response rate was 21%, however on average the respondents answered 77% of the question correctly. It is unclear how much the target group learned from the quiz and whether there were any consistent gaps in their knowledge.

## MDG Profs - Improved access to intellectual property rights (IPR) and opportunities for innovation in Africa (19278)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 633,869
Total Subsidy	€ 435,000 (69%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	96%
Target area	Africa
Partners	VSNU, PIE, NWO-WOTRO, KNAW, DPRN, SAIL, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, LNV en DGIS, 3 technological top institutes (PPPs) and a number of Southern partners, depending on the sub-projects. PharmAccess, ACODE NGO in Uganda, Tilburg university, Wageningen University, Centre for poverty related communicable diseases (CPCD), Amsterdam medical Centre (AMC), University of Cape Town (more than 12 in total).
Lead partner	The initiative came from MDG+. This was a consultation consisting of colleges, universities, VSNU, DGIS, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and WOTRO (part of NWO).
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Knowledge Management
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,6,8
Goal(s)	Improved access to intellectual property rights (IPR) and opportunities for innovation in Africa.
Intervention logic	Due to poverty, lack of knowledge protection and lack of knowledge to guard against climate change it is impossible to guarantee a stable income from farming and food and medicine are not easily available. Access to IPR in Africa is weak. Thereby the Center for Global Development has shown that the strict Dutch intellectual property rules severely restrict developing countries in the area of technology transfer and the flow of innovation to developing countries. The partners examined how to improve these issues. The recommendations of the report are partially focused on Dutch actors such as the government and the Dutch knowledge institutions. Another part focuses on African governments, research institutions and civil society organizations.
Results	This type of cooperation has brought a lot of attention / large impact that was otherwise never reached. The most important results were the book, policy letters and parliamentary questions in the Netherlands and the fact that the IPR rules have been changed.

### Analysis of the partnership

The millennium agreement (research for development) has a broad goal of development: the mainstreaming of Dutch knowledge institutions. The project funded by DGIS is one of the activities of this millennium agreement. Within the University of Tilburg there have been discussions for a long time about the

arrangements of intellectual property with respect to developing countries. The need in Africa was high, since many people die from diseases that you actually would not have to die of because there already exist medications and there is hungry while there is enough food production. They have chosen to conduct the projects in Uganda, Kenya and South Africa, where they already had connections. The project consists of two pilots focusing on eradicating poverty by IPR: Pilot 1. includes a scientific-technological cooperation between African and Dutch centres in the field of biotechnology for the development of climate-resistant crops. Pilot 2. consists of a similar partnership engaged in biotechnology for developing heat-resistant medicine / diagnostics. Thereby there is an overarching project regarding IPR. The two pilot projects are implemented by technological top institutes (TTIs) and the associated universities (Wageningen and Amsterdam Medical Centre (AMC)) and African research centres. The Dutch universities contributed to the project in the form of knowledge and development processes in the area of crops and drugs/diagnostics respectively and their (practical) experience with product-specific laws and regulations and intellectual property rights in technology and knowledge. Furthermore, they each supervised an African postdoc and co-supervised another African postdoc. The legal project is run by a Dutch university (Tilburg) and an African law faculty. All partners were doing "practical" instead of scientific research. They were trying to figure out how the Netherlands could better handle Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) with respect to African countries. The universities had a more executive role. WOTRO made contacts towards politics and was the only partner contributing money. The collaboration brings groups that are not able to face development issues together with groups that have been involved in development-oriented research, but may not have sufficient visibility into the potential of high technology and the hindering or facilitating aspects of intellectual property. According to the university of Tilburg the perspectives of both the global South and the North became visible in input, analysis, results, outreach. Thereby multidisciplinary ( medical, agricultural, international legal) provides insights and perspectives and mutual learning. NWO-WOTRO states that the added value of the partnership was that a comparison could be made between IPR challenges in different sectors while NOW-WOTRO could draw more general conclusions and concrete policy advices to (research) funding organisations. As a result, also the Ministry of FA put IPR on the agenda. NOW-WOTRO has adjusted its rules for PPP research collaboration between Northern and Southern institutions.

### *Analysis of Results*

In the summer of 2011 there was a budget-neutral extension because they had money left and wanted to continue to disseminate the results. They made a report and published a book and provided workshops in Africa. There were seminars in Uganda and Cape Town. After receiving recommendations the Hague Institute for Global Justice is working on further development. The project is innovative because researchers who are normally very theoretically now make an important contribution to practical issues related to development. Thereby lawyers often make things look more complicated, while the partners in the Schokland agreement exposed the legislation.

During the final discussion about the Dutch budget for foreign trade and development policies Mr. Sjoerdsma (D66) filed a motion (nr. 33). He asked the Dutch government to investigate how Dutch policy on intellectual property for innovation can be less restrictive for developing countries. In the next consultation of the Second chamber of parliament the biotechnology and agriculture issues are on the agenda (MoFA).

The university of Tilburg is now in deliberation with Oxfam Novib to put the answers to the parliamentary questions into practice. The possibilities of setting up a center of excellence are still being investigated in conjunction with The Hague Institute for Global Justice (University of Tilburg).

## Oikocredit (19285)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 3,700,000
Total Subsidy	€ 1,480,000 (40%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Target area	
Partners	Oikocredit, Cegestie, ICCO and (later) Woord & Daad. The Memorandum of Understanding is between Oikocredit and Cegesti. (4 in total)
Lead partner	Oikocredit
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 2, 8
Goal(s)	Encouraging social and environmental business opportunities in Central America and the Dominican Republic by making available innovative financial and technical resources. Establish a fund and ensure that at least seven high-risk high impact projects of SMEs have access to an innovative investment package.
Intervention logic	The competitiveness and therewith the growth of SME is limited by difficult access to long term investment capital and lack of knowledge on modern management related methodologies. The Oikocredit, ICCO and CEGESTI alliance proposes an innovative approach in which technical assistance and easy access risk bearing capital are being combined into an integral approach geared towards sustainable responsible competitiveness of SMEs.
Results	<p>Most important results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- They financed 11 projects in the first phase and now they finance 7 projects. So they already financed 17 projects.</li> <li>- The consultancy was very well received.</li> <li>- The fund still exists and the interests cover the projects.</li> </ul> <p>Objectives not met: They actually planned to have an interest rate of 10%, however 3 out of the 17 projects failed so they couldn't reach this goal. They wanted a repayment ratio of 90%. It turned out to be 82% (for now).</p>

### Analysis of the partnership

The main partnership was between Cegesti and Oikocredit. ICCO was more on the side. The added value of the partnership was the complementarity. CEGESTI is a regional consultancy. They already performed many projects for the ministry of foreign affairs. They assess projects on governance, environmental and social aspects and provide technical assistance. With ICCO they already worked with based on an agreement on guarantees. The role of ICCO is to give guarantees for high risk projects. In these projects ICCO sometimes gives technical assistance. The Schokland project is funded by DGIS and Oikocredit. For the projects using the investment opportunities some other partners have joined, namely Word & Daad (in Guatemala) and Cordaid (SME fund in Nicaragua). Oikocredit and ICCO took most of the risks: Oikocredit 80-90% and ICCO about 10%.

### Analysis of Results

In the past Oikocredit in the region was mostly financing Microcredit and Coffee. The project allows Oikocredit to explore new markets such as milk, fruits, vegetables and forestry. Although most of the main results are achieved, this does not apply to all, including additional funding from third parties. The Dutch managing board of Sustainable Economic development notes that this could harm the (financial) sustainability of the fund in

the long term. The initial focus was environmental and social. However in 2009, the time the project started, the financial crisis also began. This caused some cash flow problems for all projects. Now they also focus more on financial management. They have different financing structures. In the beginning it was mostly long-term funding, now they also perform more short-term funding. There were some losses but the interest payments on successful projects covered these losses. The original idea was to have return on the project. The projects continues, however the profit is zero. They don't receive any subsidies anymore. It is a re-allocating fund, so it is sustainable.



## Smarter futures – improving the quality of wheat and maize flour in Africa (19293)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€838,050
Total Subsidy	€319,050 (38%)
% subsidy spent	100%
Target area	Africa
Partners	Akzo Nobel, BOSK, FFI, Internatiol federation for spinda bifinda & hydrocephalus, Hellen Keller foundation (5)
Lead partner	IFSBH
Type of partnership	Undefined
Type of Issue	Food security
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,2,3,4,5,8
Goal(s)	1) Increase production and distribution of fortified wheat and maize flour in Africa, by supporting millers and regulators. 2) set up a PPP in Africa which promotes fortified flour.
Intervention Logic	Deficiencies of minerals and vitamins such as iron and folic acid impair intellectual development, compromise the immune system and provoke birth defects, and consigns millions of people in SSH Africa to live below their physical and mental potential. One way of increasing the intake of the minerals is by fortifying flour in the milling process.
Results	During the project life much progress has been made in the area of fortified flour in Africa. Smarter Futures contributed to this development in the area of advocacy, training, technical support and standards harmonisation.

### Analysis of the partnership

The partners each have different backgrounds and different expertise to cover all the aspects of promoting fortified flour. FFI is an umbrella organisation which promotes fortified flour worldwide. All of the partners are a member of FFI.

According to the project proposal fortified flour is a multi-stakeholder issue, including both private sector and public sector actors. Smarter Futures targets both millers and regulators. Millers need training to produce and market good quality fortified flour. On the regulatory front clear regulations and guidelines need to be implemented to assure quality and safety. In each country the partnership works closely with these target groups.

After the end of the initial subsidy from the Schokland Fund the subsidy was renewed for another five years.

### Analysis of Results

According to the project proposal the acceptance of fortified flour has grown in recent years. What has not been sufficiently addressed is the willingness of millers to produce fortified flour. The smarter futures project aimed to encourage 'national' millers fortify their flour. Initially trials were started in six countries. However, due to interest from other countries the programme has been expanded. In these countries training sessions were organised.

Countries in which fortified flour is produced need clear regulations and standards. Smarter Futures promotes the use of internationally accepted standards and mandatory fortification. During the project life much progress has been made with fortified flour in Africa. In 2011 the project made great strides towards mandatory flour fortification in the ECOWAS region, in ten out of 15 member states it is now mandatory to fortify flour. In The Industries of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) up to 70% of 55

million people now have access to fortified flour. From the project file it is unclear to what extent the project contributed to this. There are also other organisations in Africa promoting fortified flour. According to the contact person at MoFa the project did have an impact. This is reflected in the fact that the subsidy was renewed.

## Food Early Solutions for Africa (19296)

### Characteristics

Total budget	Project not yet completed
Total Subsidy	€645,000 (37,5%, according to project proposal)
Target area	All African countries
Percentage of subsidy spent	95%
Partners	EARS, ECORYS, MicroEnsure (dropped out) Rabo Development (played no role whatsoever)
Lead partner	EARS
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 4, 5, 6, 8
Goal(s)	Designing a micro insurance product against drought on the basis of satellite images.
Intervention logic	Designing drought insurance products is often not possible because of a lack of data. EARS uses satellite images to create a dataset going back 25 years.
Results	The insurance index was designed and several micro insurance agencies are interested in using it. The number of beneficiaries reached in the pilot project exceeded the target of 20.000. EARS is currently negotiating with several partners about implementing the insurance product on a larger scale.

### Analysis of the partnership

The drought insurance index is the brainchild of EARS, a Dutch satellite imaging company. The Schokland fund was the trigger for the company to come up with the product. The other partners were contacted for their expertise. ECORYS for their economic/market knowledge and MicroEnsure to create the insurance index on the basis of the dataset compiled by EARS. However MicroEnsure pulled out of the project at an early stage due to technical disagreements with EARS (for instance the insurance index measures perspiration instead of actual drought). The development tasks were then taken over by EARS and other insurance partners were contacted to market the pilot product. Initially Rabo Development was also part of the partnership, in an advisory capacity. However in practice they did not play any part.

Over the years the project has become increasingly commercialized. After the subsidy ends in 2013 the partnership will disband, however EARS will continue marketing and developing their insurance index with several insurance partners.

### Analysis of Results

The pilot project proved that insurance products on the basis of the index developed by the partnership works. The target of 20.000 beneficiaries was matched and the number is increasing. Micro insurance products against drought are important for farmers so as to be able to obtain credit and to reduce the risk of major losses due to crop failure. The product developed by EARS is commercially viable and the company sees it as part of their core business. This means that if successful the project results are sustainable. Ears is currently negotiating a deal which would increase the number of beneficiaries to 150,000.

There already have been several instances in which the insurers had to pay out farmers. The product seems to be viable. It is too early to say whether it is profitable for insurers. Literature on the topic of micro insurance indicates that farmers may be hesitant to buy complicated insurance products. The partnership has taken this into account. However the partnership is not involved in marketing the product (this is left to insurers).

## Farming Livelihood Improvement Programme (19297)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 1,267,334
Total Subsidy	€ 317,334 (25%)
% subsidy spent	-
Target area	Ghana
Partners	SOS Children's Villages, GOAN, FAO, Avalon, SOS Children's Villages Ghana (5)
Lead partner	SOS Children's Villages
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	Food security
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,2, 8
Goal(s)	Improving access to education & reduction of youth unemployment
Intervention logic	Rural youth unemployment in the targeted communities was high in 2008. Therefore the partnership decided to pilot a holistic solution, involving simultaneously enabling families to send their children to school, and training youth in organic farming and marketing. The partnership was forged because of the combination of agricultural and educational knowledge needed.
Results	The project showed some positive results. All the performance indicators which were set at the onset of the project were (nearly) met. Some 400 families in four communities were supported so they could take better care of their children. 600 youths were selected for the agricultural training (85%) completed the training and enrolment rates amongst children with financial support for education (820) decreased.

### Analysis of the partnership

The project combines agricultural and educational knowledge by including partners with know-how in both these sectors. For instance, SOS Children's Villages has experience in education and FOA and Avalon have agricultural expertise. The partners indicated that the inclusion of organisations with diverse backgrounds, expertise and working methods led to miscommunications during the implementation of the project. The management of the partnership was also slightly chaotic, this led to misunderstandings on the ground. It was not always clear what was expected of each partner, more time could have been spent on the practical organisation of the partnership. The holistic approach and combination of partners can be characterised as innovative.

Notwithstanding the problems with the organisation of the partnership the complementary nature of the expertise of each partner ensured that it was clear who was responsible for what part of the project, at the operational level. This contributed to the success of the project.

### Analysis of Results

The results reported were as planned. The number of families supported and youths trained was in line with expectations. In the supported families dropout rates declined. It is unknown whether the training in organic agriculture led to more employment in the area for young people. The project did not focus enough on market development, so the market was underdeveloped. There was also not always enough land available to start up a business. In one location gold was also found which caught a lot of local attention. All in all the project was deemed a success, but more results would have been able if more attention was paid to market development.

## Design and local production of ergonomic tools for farmers in northern region in Ghana (21496)

### Characteristics

Total budget	
Total Subsidy	€541,046
% subsidy spent	63%
Target area	Northern Ghana
Partners	TNO, Kalabash, UDS Tamala, University of Kumasi, Polytechnic ...
Lead partner	TNO
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	Food security
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1
Goal(s)	To improve the quality of life for farmers in Ghana by developing ergonomically designed hand tools. To start up sustainable economic development by establishing a value chain for the production of these hand tools. Capacity building and knowledge transfers by using a participatory design approach.
Intervention Logic	Farmers in Ghana traditionally use unsuitable tools for farming. This poses health risks and decreases productivity. The partnership designed and marketed a new tool which should minimize these problems.
Results	The partnership designed a new 'long handled hoe', and set up a market chain to produce and market the product. Farmers are slow to use the new tool, as the method of farming whilst bent down is deeply rooted in culture.

### Analysis of the partnership

TNO was interested in setting up a developing programme and organised a work visit to Ghana to see how they could contribute. Kalabash Ghana suggested designing new ergonomically designed farming tools. The starting point of the project was the participatory design method. This means that all stakeholders were involved in the design of the product. The actual design of the product was done by TNO and the local knowledge institutions, however farmers were consulted for their input as well. The latter contributed to the adaptation of the tool.

The original idea was to produce the tools in a central factory, however a suitable location was not found. Instead the partners trained local blacksmiths and carpenters to produce and market the product.

At the beginning of the project Kalabash Ghana was responsible for the coordination of the pilot project. They had a contract with TNO based on certain milestones. The project was upscaled and implemented in more areas. In this phase another partner took over the coordination of the project in the new areas.

### Analysis of Results

The partnership successfully designed a new handheld tool which would decrease the health risk for farmers and increase productivity. Because using the hoe involves a new method of farming (upright instead of bent down) not all farmers use the hoe regularly. According to the final report acceptance of the new work method is a gradual process.

The tool was developed in partnership with the local knowledge institutions, this ensured knowledge was transferred. The University for Development Studies in Tamale now offers courses in the participatory design method. Furthermore its students were also given assignments to promote the new tool in their local community. For the production of the tool local blacksmiths and carpenters were trained in producing the tools.

## Financing sustainable value chains - Triodos (19305)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 3,070,000
Total Subsidy	€ 3,058,000 (100%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	100%
Target area	Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, Bolivia, Guatemala
Partners	Triodos, Tradin, IDH, KIT, ICCO and HIVOS (6 in total)
Lead partner	Triodos
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,6,7,8
Goal(s)	Catalyzing availability of value chains by third parties in order to create sustainable supply chains for farmers.
Intervention logic	To be able to engage in sustainable value chains, farmers need to be guaranteed payment upon delivery of their products to the point of entry to the value chain: the farmer cooperative (or rural SME). They lack the necessary cash to bridge the period of sourcing until payment by their buyers and are therefore forced to sell their products to local middlemen at strongly discounted prices. Formal financial services build on the established relationships between the actors in the value chain.
Results	The output is a revolving fund. The outcome are higher premium incomes for small farmers (on average 92,071 per year) and growing employment: 100,000 small holder farmers and 7,500 employees of exporting organizations. KIT also published a book and organized a seminar.

### Analysis of the partnership

Triodos was just thinking about starting a new private/commercial investment fund. However, guarantees were needed. The Schokland fund provided these guarantees. Triodos is responsible for the management and the secretariat. Tradin is an organic food ingredients trader and was mainly a supplier to a number of funded projects (e.g. Ethiopia, Bolivia). IDH and KIT are the knowledge components and ICCO and HIVOS co-finance and deliver projects. Especially the financial knowledge of Triodos in combination with the practical Knowledge of KIT made the project successful. For KIT it was important to publish a book with best practices. The partnership with Triodos made this possible, because of many different connections to business partners with a lot of practical knowledge. According to KIT it would have been even more diverse if there were more big companies/ multinationals, such as Cargo, involved. There was no financial risk for the partners, because everything was funded from the Schokland fund, except for KIT who were paid afterwards. Through the project Triodos learned that partners need to have an economic incentive underlying the partnership.

### Analysis of Results

According to Triodos the most important result was the demonstration of Value Chain Finance as an effective development finance tool. Therewith the possibility is created for the farmers to plan ahead, i.e. the assurance that one is able to sell one's product to the same buyer again next year, allows farmers to invest in the quantitative and qualitative output of their farms. The facility was used most to increase export volumes to existing buyers or expand volumes to create new long term relationships. An interim report to MFA, however, states that sustainable refurbishment of crops is not a priority. It is the yield per hectare that is important.

However, it is certainly on the agenda and sustainable construction is growing. There is a limited risk that the results will not be realized in full. This depends on the extent to which private third party guarantors will provide additional guarantees, further leveraging the Schokland Grant. The dramatic fall in commodity prices in the second half of 2011 is a major challenge for clients of Triodos Sustainable Trade fund. They risk to have bought their product at too high price levels. Prudent price fixation is more important than ever before. The increasing price volatility leads to insecurity in the market. This results in reluctance to engage in seasonal contracts. Instead, there is a general tendency towards more spot buying, which undermines the efforts in sustainable value chains to build long term business relationships. KIT published a book about best practices all over the world. The revenues are used to print new editions and to finance training activities. Later at IDH the best practises were used to improve the cacao sector.

## Heat Stable Oxytocin - Top Institute Pharma (TIP) (19836)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 86,750
Total Subsidy	€ 86,750 (100%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	31%
Target area	In general: areas where they do not have cooling capability.
Partners	Top Institute Pharma (TIP) (a PPP with companies and research institutions, the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) is part of this PPP), VWS and DGIS
Lead partner	Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)
Type of partnership	Undefined
Type of Issue	Health
Ultimate goal (MDG)	5
Goal(s)	Development of heat-stable oxytocin, identification, and market authorization in 20 developing countries where the product can be introduced; Relocation of production to developing countries
Intervention logic	There is lack of oxytocin for pregnant women that are in need of the product in areas where the current cold chain product is not available because of lack of cold storage capabilities. This problem is addressed by developing a heat-stable oxytocin product.
Results	A heat stable oxytocin product has not yet been developed.

### Analysis of the partnership

The project has a direct relationship with one of the six projects within the MDG 5 Meshwork program. This project concerns the development of heat-resistant Oxytocin. TIP, VWS and DGIS have signed a Millennium Agreement and it was later supported further from the Second chamber of parliament because the 'Guillard Amendment' was adopted. It has 1.5 million vacant that is intended solely for research and design. However, until now TIP has not received any money and implements the project independently, with its own funding from the public-private partnership (industry and academia). Yet little of the available money (13,600 euro) has been used to finance the evaluation of the first product carried out by a third party (Kinesis Pharma). It showed that the product is not yet suitable, after which DGIS decided to set up an advisory committee (without TIP) to advise DGIS about the progress of the program. This group is financed from policies supporting funds. Thereby it is decided to do a comparative analysis to compare alternative products. TIP is not acquainted. TIP continues with the development of a proper product. According to TIP the role of DGIS is limited and they think that DGIS has little knowledge and infers too much .

### Analysis of Results

The research continues and the plan for implementation and the establishment of an infrastructure are ready. However, until now there is no heat stable oxytocin product developed.



## Aqua for All (19884)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 11.849.020
Total Subsidy	€ 7.000.000 (56%)
Target area	Worldwide, mainly Africa
Percentage of subsidy spent	99%
Partners	KVWN, NVA, the Dutch Waterpartnership (NWP), and various local project developers and implementers, none mentioned in evaluation
Lead partner	Aqua for All Foundation
Type of partnership	Independent project unit
Type of Issue	WASH
Ultimate goal (MDG)	7
Goal(s)	To provide 1 million people access to safe drinking water and 750,000 people to improved sanitation through (a) mobilising public opinion and funding in the Netherlands and (b) assisting third parties in the implementation of WASH projects
Intervention logic	Providing access to clean drinking water and sanitation facilities is vital to development (MDG7c). A4A believes that to reach this goal, innovation in the water sector is needed. A4A facilitates innovation by brokering WASH PPP initiatives and canalising funds from the Dutch MoFA and the water sector in order to support small projects that would otherwise not have been supported by the bigger, existing water funds.
Results	An external evaluation mentions results on output and outcome level mobilisatiedoelstelling is “ruimschoots gerealiseerd” MDG-doelstelling wordt “wat betreft het kernprogramma gehaald, maar wordt in het totaal programma net niet gehaald vanwege het feit dat de innovatiesporen in aanloop minder directe outputs hebben in de vorm van toegang tot water of sanitatie” De duurzaamheidsdoelstelling wordt ex ante gehaald. Ex post wordt niet gemeten.

### Analysis of the partnership

A4A is a foundation, created by the Dutch water associations KVWN and NVA in 2002, which acts as an intermediate and administers funds to multiple WASH projects. The foundation is governed by a Board of Directors with 7 members who represent the Dutch water sector. A4A came to a Millennium Agreement (partnership) with MoFA when an earlier funding arrangement was depleted before the end of the contract period. This was a result of A4A's quicker-than-expected success in leveraging private funds for WASH projects. Both A4A and MoFA wished to expand the funding arrangement and to focus more on supporting private WASH initiatives. In response to the Schokland WASH Agreement, to which A4A was also a signatory, A4A was offered additional funding from the Schokland budget. A4A originates from a partnership and supports public-private partnerships in the international water sector. The partnership between A4A and MoFA can be characterised as a regular grantor-grantee relation, built on trust and a large degree of liberty for A4A to respond to changing needs.

### Analysis of Results

An external evaluation (Esbroeck & Caplan, 2013) concludes that “The A4A program is highly relevant in view of the policies and goals set by the Dutch government for the water sector, particularly with regard to

supporting the Dutch contribution to global efforts to meeting the MDGs.” Even if this conclusion concerns the 2011 onward program, seeing that A4A’s approach was essentially unchanged, it also applies to the 2009-2011 period. A4A’s combined role of broker, funder and innovator is praised especially. The Schokland Agreement in particular has provided the extra financial space needed to continue operations and moving space to shift the focus towards supporting private initiatives. Assuming this is indeed the way forward in water and sanitation, this can be seen as added value of the Schokland fund.

## Fair Climate Fund (FCF) (20100)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 10,923,000
Total Subsidy	€ 4,370,000 (40%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	53%
Target area	India, South Africa and ten other countries in Africa (including Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia)
Partners	ICCO/Fair & Sustainable Participations B.V., Green choice, Wind union trading, TNO, NOVA, ADATS
Lead partner	ICCO/Fair & Sustainable Participations B.V.
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1,3,6,7
Goal(s)	The increase of income in the South by selling CO2 credits in the West: a new method of funding for renewable energy projects
Intervention logic	“Western countries have a responsibility to compensate developing countries for the fact that they emit less CO2 emissions while still suffering from global warming, and that the current mechanisms do not do enough to compensate those that contribute the most to low CO2 emissions reductions. The FCF invests in sustainable energy measures, so that the local partner can implement these measures and generate certified emission rights that enables the local partner to pay back the initial investment. These credits are produced during operation of these sustainable energy measures at household level and generate carbon credits. These carbon credits are traded for a fair price to parties in the North who want to compensate their surplus CO2 emissions” (Annual report Fair Climate Fund, 2010).
Results	Marketing study on opportunities for sales; Several events were made climate neutral with Fair Climate Fund; Total volume of carbon credits traded in 2010 was 1,805 tons verified emission reductions (VERs) from the South African partner NOVA; etc.

### Analysis of the partnership

At first the Schokland grant application was rejected because of lack of innovation, possible market disruption, imbalance of the partnership and lack of mutual complementary expertise, high level of start-up costs and the lack of a direct contribution to the millennium development goals. After refutation of these objections the fund was granted, while the proposal was still lacking a sufficiently detailed budget and an elaborated strategy with regard to sustainability. ICCO/Fair & Sustainable Participations B.V., Green choice, Wind union trading signed the Memorandum of Understanding. Funding problems were resolved with a loan at the ING bank with ICCO as guarantor. MoFA asked the Fair Climate Fund to establish a guarantee fund to ensure sustainability. ICCO invested 1,5000,000 euro and provides projects through southern partners. Green choice is responsible for marketing and communication. Wind union Trading registers and manages the carbon credits. TNO developed a monitoring instrument (wireless/ mobile sensor network) and conducts the monitoring. The southern partners, ADATS in India and NOVA in South-Africa, are indispensable in the execution of the project. The collaboration with DGIS is perceived as cooperative. For example, they facilitated the launch meeting of the agreement. There was a budget-neutral extension until 2013 (source: aidenvironment).

### *Analysis of Results*

The project is innovative because an existing market mechanism is used to compensate CO2 emission in the North by sustainable development in the South. Also innovative technologies are used: TNO developed a monitoring system to determine the amount of CO2 emission of a company.

The sales activities started only mid-2010 and the time investment per ton sales is much higher than anticipated. As a result the sales were lower than expected.

The Schokland contribution acts as a catalyst for the rest of the investors. The fund should in the long term be able to function as an independent company and invest as much money as possible back into renewable energy projects in the South. In the first phase financial risks are spread as far as possible across the parties involved. In many cases, the actual CO2 rights are not generated until after a few years. For the sustainability of the fund this is an important aspect, in the initial phase FCF will have to find a balance between profitable investments through funding and projects in which CO2 allowances already exist (source: aidenvironment).

## The World Mortgage: A House for a House (20191)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 4,375,000
Total Subsidy	€ 1,750,000 (40%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	95%
Target area	Bangladesh, India, Colombia
Partners	World foundation, World mortgage, ING, CSS (4in total)
Lead partner	Worldfoundation
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Financial Services
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 3, 4, 6, 7
Goal(s)	Improving the conditions of life of vulnerable people by providing housing.
Intervention logic	Worldfoundation wants to build 8,750 houses through mortgages averaging 500 euro per house in a 5-year period. In this way, the number of people living in slums will reduce and more people will have access to clean water and sanitation.
Results	In 2011 Worldfoundation launched the project in collaboration with LAMP (an Indian NGO) with the construction of 200 houses. A house costs 1,750 euros. Of these, 700 euros is financed by the Worldmortgage. Nearly 1,300 houses have been built in 2012. Most of them in Bangladesh. Compared to the original objective, the project greatly lags behind. The prices of houses are higher than planned. As a result of this, fewer homes are built. They now just focus on Bangladesh, because Worldfoundation is just a small organization. Also important are the side effects: better health, better results at school etc..

### Analysis of the partnership

The project already existed but they had a gap in the budget. The Schokland fund provided the solution. Worldfoundation was forced to contribute money (€ 2 million) itself because of the price rises whereby the subsidy was not sufficient. Because of problems with mortgages that were caused by the financial crisis the earnings were disappointing so they had to look for new funding sources. First they wanted to start their own company to raise money, but the conceived business model was no longer suitable after changes in regulations. ING Bank therefore became involved at the end of 2009. They were looking for a social project to improve their image of community involvement. They asked € 300 to the Dutch customer and contributed € 300 themselves. ING pledged to generate € 300,000. Worldmortgage focuses on homeowners in the Netherlands, who for various reasons want a mortgage. The money is channelled to the foundation through Worldmortgage, so for her income Worldfoundation is mainly dependent on Worldmortgage. Worldfoundation builds houses with this money. CSS is a Southern partner (Bangladesh). Word and Deed coordinates and monitors the executive work in Bangladesh. The collaboration with the Indian partner is terminated. The reason is that (after the first project) it was shown that this method was not profitable in India. The Colombian partners because of political problems are also not further involved. Now they totally focus on Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the cost for the construction of dwellings were relatively low, although the costs have risen since the start of the project. There was relatively high housing shortage and they were already accustomed to microcredits. Some of the NGO's in Bangladesh turned out to be unreliable. Bangladesh is corrupt. The cultural differences were bridged by proper screening of NGO's, many calls, controls and many visits. Also Willem Geest (Danja foundation, Belgium) was very helpful with his connections.

Because of adjustments in the laws and regulations and the financial crisis ING got other priorities. That is why they had to look for alternatives to raise money. Now every year a.o. there is a gala and they organize 'Cycle for a house' with Bauke Mollema (a Dutch cyclist) as ambassador.

The Worldfoundation runs the board and has 100% of the shares in the Worldmortgage. The main partner is the government. Without the government the project had never come this far. Worldfoundation always sends its reports to MoFA. Worldfoundation is a small company compared to for example Cordaid. The costs are low relative to the turnover. Worldfoundation/Worldmortgage would like to have more frequent meetings with MoFA to learn from each other and to motivate each other.

### *Analysis of Results*

The innovative nature of the project is, firstly, from the fact that a commercial operating company was established to provide funds to a foundation only. Worldmortgage mediates in obtaining a competitive mortgage. Because a mortgage commission is being paid to the intermediary the organization makes profit. The gains are passed on in full to the Worldfoundation. In this way, the Dutch citizen taking a mortgage is involved in charity while it costs him or her nothing. The innovative character is also embedded in the way the funds are spent. Prospective homeowners, who are normally not able to get a high mortgage, are now provided a loan with which a house is built. The owners are obliged to repay this micro-loan to local organizations. In this way, new funds are created for new home owners so it is a revolving fund.

## Ananthagiri 2009-2014 (20192/21499)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 1,700,000
Total Subsidy	€ 680,000 (40%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	8%
Target area	India
Partners	Friends Indeed (FI), Association for Rural Development and Action Research (ARDAR), Microcredit for Mothers
Lead partner	Friends Indeed
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	Local development
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1-7
Goal(s)	Socio-economic development in 12 villages in India through a holistic approach in one region.
Intervention logic	The Mandel Ananthagiri is a very remote mountain area. There is a poor education situation, extreme poverty, bad healthcare and high HIV-risks. These problems are reduced by a.o. the construction of 12 schools, repairing existing classrooms, providing microcredits for single mothers, providing medical care and education for children with disabilities and street children and a program about HIV and agriculture (in collaboration with the University of Wageningen).
Results	Schools have been built. There are less drop-outs. Provision of scholarships and of English education and computer education. 983 mothers have micro-credit loans. With these loan a.o. a rope factory was funded. Wells and toilets have been built. People with malaria and HIV are identified and medicine are provided.

### Analysis of the partnership

The proposal was approved after objection. In the first place the project was assessed not to be innovative enough. It is a traditional holistic approach and has a charitable character. In addition to the contribution from the Schokland fund the project will be financed by contributions from individuals, corporations and foundations. FI is stakeholder for 80%. ARDAR is the local partner. 80% of the budget of ARDAR is financed by FI. Later a new partner became involved in de partnership, namely Microcredits for Mothers. Their input is € 72,500.

### Analysis of Results

The project is an integration of different programs at regional level with a focus on the socio-economic position of the poorest (single mothers, street children and disabled children). Furthermore, there are innovative elements in the program such as the campus for disabled children. It is a donor driven project and it is not an economic approach. As a matter of course the sustainability of the results is not guaranteed. ARDAR is encouraged to raise funds themselves. The microcredits could be sustainable. However, all other parts of the project should change in order to be able to continue without external funding. They have to bear their own costs.

## SMS combat AIDS (20460)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€324,778
Total Subsidy	€124,436 (38%)
% subsidy spent	44%
Target area	Malawi
Partners	Humana, DAPP, OneSixty (3)
Lead partner	Humana
Type of partnership	Focused business case
Type of Issue	Health
Ultimate goal (MDG)	6, 7
Goal(s)	To better inform people in two regions in Malawi about HIV/AIDS on the basis of information collected with an SMS tool.
Intervention Logic	The project addresses the limited options for data collection for collecting necessary data to target HIV related information campaigns. The partners developed an SMS tool with which door-to-door data can be collected. The resulting dataset can then be used to design the information campaigns.
Results	The partners managed to develop the SMS tool and use it to collect door-to-door data in two regions in Malawi. The data which as collected was then used to better target information campaigns.

### Analysis of the partnership

The SMS tool is developed for a larger HIV/AIDS campaign of Humana and DAPP. The project had trouble collecting the necessary data. Humana and DAPP came up with the idea to use mobile phones to do the door-to-door survey. OneSixty was contacted to design the SMS tool. The subsidy from the Schokland fund only covered the development of the SMS tool. However the tool was part of the larger Humana project, so the results are hard to separate. The initial proposal foresaw a larger budget, but due to problems attracting financing the project was limited in size.

The experience with OneSixty was good; Humana asked them to be part of other projects as well, to develop similar tools.

### Analysis of Results

OneSixty managed to develop an SMS tool with which data could be collected and analysed more efficiently. During the project the technical specifications of the tool changed several times due to unforeseen circumstances. For instance the data was to be analysed by DAPP using excel sheets. However it appeared that DAPP lacked the capacity for this, so a new tool was developed with which the data could more easily be analysed. There were also several technical issues. For this reason the project got a no-cost extension.

When the SMS tool was up and running door-to-door data was collected. This resulted in a dataset on the knowledge of HIV aids with 104,763 observations. This provided several of insights for the development of information campaigns. For instance it appeared that people knew little about mother to child transmission and access to condoms was a problem (only available from bars and health clinics).

The project left a trove of data, which is still being used by other organisations. Humana makes them freely available.



## Access to Medicine (20639)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 2,308,098
Total Subsidy	€ 750,000 (32%)
% subsidy spent	98%
Target area	Worldwide
Partners	Access to Medicine, DFIF, Bill and Melinda gates foundation, Oxfam/Novib, ICCO, HIVOS, Cordaid (6)
Lead partner	Access to Medicine
Type of partnership	Independent project unit
Type of Issue	Health
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 4, 5, 8
Goal(s)	Increasing access to medicine in developing countries.
Intervention Logic	One in three people in the world lack access to affordable drugs or vaccines. Access to Medicine developed a ranking of large pharmaceutical companies to increase transparency, create a platform for stakeholders to discuss best practises, supply all stakeholders with impartial information about the effort of large pharmaceutical companies to supply cheap medicine to developing countries.
Results	The ranking has now been published three times (2008, 2010, 2012) the next one will be published in 2014. Over 20 companies now provide the information needed to construct the index. The index gained much press coverage between 2010-2012 and it is widely used, research firms and major banks use the index to evaluate pharmaceutical firms.

### Analysis of the partnership

It can be questioned whether this project is truly a partnership. The index is developed by Access to Medicine, the other parties just finance the project. However the organisation thinks a partnership is important as the support of a wide variety of organisations gives the index more authority and makes it more sustainable. Access to Medicine is in the process of professionalising the organisation. This will make it more sustainable over time. At the time of the final report for MoFa Access to Medicine was seeking new funding from different parties.

### Analysis of Results

Over time the number of firms which were included in the index has risen from 8 in 2008 to more than 20 in 2012. The exposure of the index in the press has also increased. This has increased transparency in pharmaceutical industry. The extent to which companies will change their behaviour depends upon how the index is used and how widely it is quoted. The press exposure is a positive result in this regard. The fact that the index is used by several major banks is also a good sign.

## Cassava+ (20279)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 21,428,000
Total Subsidy	€ 6,000,000 (28%)
% subsidy spent	-
Target area	Several countries in Africa, including Nigeria, Ghana, Mozambique and Benin
Partners	IFDC, DADCTO (2)
Lead partner	IFDC
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	Value chain development
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 7
Goal(s)	Increasing the profitability of cassava for farmers in sub Saharan Africa.
Intervention Logic	There is a huge unmet demand in Africa for cassava (traditionally a subsistence crop) farmers have not been able to meet this demand for several reasons (low quality processing system, weak management, inability to lower costs to compete with imports). DADCTO has developed a mobile processing unit, which can bring cassava processing closer to the farmers, The IFDC will work with farmers to promote better practises.
Results	Commercial production of high quality cassava cakes started in 2012 since then the amount of cassava supplied has increased. However it appeared that the demand for cassava flour and cassava cakes was smaller than expected. For this reason the chain never took off.

### Analysis of the partnership

DADCTO developed a mobile processing unit for Cassava. This innovation can increase demand for cassava tubers. However for the project to be successful this demand has to be matched by supply from farmers. Therefore farmers need help to organize in such a way that they can take advantage of the new technology. The IFDC's role in the partnership is to help farmers increase output and profitability of cassava, which is part of their core business. In this way the partners are complementary.

During the project there was some disagreement between partners about the division of responsibilities. In 2013 DADCTO ended the partnership, even though there was interest from MoFa to renew the subsidy.

### Analysis of Results

The project aimed to set up an industrial cassava chain. The mobile processing plants were supplied with 920 MT of tubers in Taraba and 1589 MT in the first half of 2012 in Bantaje. This is 3 times as high as the total for 2011. The project will reach 15,000 people in 2013. On the supply side some 1300 farmers were trained in best agronomic practice and 32 demonstration plants were established.

However market demand for cassava flour and cassava cakes was lower than expected. For this reason the industrial cassava chains did not take off and the number of farmers included remained behind expectations. Part of the reason for this was that the Nigerian government had put in place legislation which required wheat flour to be mixed with 10% cassava flour, but in practice this was never implemented.

The partnership did make a deal with a beer brewer in Mozambique for the production of cassava beer. The chain was implemented, but the number of farmers included was not as high as initially planned.

## Schoon drinkwater en verbeterde sanitair en hygiëne voor achtergestelde gemeenschappen in Nepal / Foundation 2015 (20778)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 1,773,427
Total Subsidy	€ 600,000 (34%)
% subsidy spent	14%
Target area	Africa, Asia
Partners	Gemeente Hardenberg, Unicef, WASH, Vitens, Stichting 2015 (5)
Lead partner	Gemeente Hardenberg
Type of partnership	Decentralised/traditional
Type of Issue	WASH
Ultimate goal (MDG)	All
Goal(s)	The municipality of Hardenberg aims to increase the awareness of the millennium goals by funding several project of local NGOs and one lead project (which changes annually). The projects are combined with fundraising and informational activities in schools and other places. The first lead project was the UNICEF project in Nepal, from which the project title is derived.
Intervention Logic	More awareness about the millennium goals will increase public support.
Results	Several projects were supported and activities were organised around these projects. The partners also raised money for the projects they supported.

### Analysis of the partnership

Activities are implemented by Stichting 2015. The municipality of Hardenberg finances the project and other partners are involved in an advisory capacity. The project depends on subsidy to implement activities.

### Analysis of Results

Every year the project chooses one project to be the lead project. Activities organised in local schools and other places should increase awareness about the millennium goals and raise funds. In the first year the lead project was the UNICEF project for clean drinking water in Nepal, hence the name of the partnership. Apart from fundraising and promotional activities for the lead project, the partnership also supports several smaller projects of local NGOs. After the first UNICEF project was completed the lead project changed to a similar UNICEF project in Bhutan.

In the area of fundraising the partnership set a target of €50,000 a year. This target was not met in 2008 and 2009. However in 2010 the partners managed to raise the target amount with one activity. The municipality of Hardenberg made a pledge to double the money raised (up to a maximum), the maximum amount was reached every year.

## Fighting violence to ensure education for all (21496)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 1,485,582
Total Subsidy	€ 541,046 (36%)
% subsidy spent	63%
Target area	Kenya
Partners	Plan Nederland, Plan Kenya, Childline Kenya, Child Helpline International, ICDI, DCI/ECPAT, VAC Task Force Members, IREWOC (8)
Lead partner	VAC
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Safety and security
Ultimate goal (MDG)	2, 3
Goal(s)	Decreasing levels of violence against children. There is a high correlation between violence against children and school enrolment. Less violence against children should increase enrolment rates.
Intervention Logic	Violence to children is a barrier for education and learning. Especially in schools and at home. The project uses an integrated approach to decrease levels of violence against children. It raises awareness with a large scale information campaign, it aims to improve child protection structures, and children are trained to be agents of change (signal violence at an early stage, mediate and take action).
Results	Most planned activities were implemented (except a community radio station). Key informants indicate levels of violence against children in schools have decreased. Violence at home is too deeply rooted in culture to stop in such a short time span. Call centres have been strengthened and the number of calls has increased. The child protection structures in the target areas have improved, cases of violence are acted upon by prosecuting perpetrators and by supporting victims.

### Analysis of the partnership

The project is based on a multi-sector approach in which partners from different sectors participate. The partners spent the first year of the project on the practical organisation of the consortium. Overall coordination was in the hands of plan Nederland together with the local partners. According to the final report to MoFa the appointment of a liaison officer in Kenya improved the project, improving communication. The report also mentions that learning between partners was good.

### Analysis of Results

The project targeted over 300,000 children in three coastal areas in Kenya. Notwithstanding a slow start (high staff turnover at Plan Kenya) most planned activities were implemented. The project aimed to promote child rights and to strengthen the child protection structure in Kenya.

According to the final evaluation key informants indicated violence against children decreased in target areas. Several schools abolished corporal punishment. In general both children and adults are more aware of child rights. violence at home is harder to combat, as it is deeply rooted in local culture.

## Knowledge network for peace, security and development (30700)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 4,796,720
Total Subsidy	€ 2,633,569 (55%)
Percentage of subsidy spent	95%
Target area	Worldwide
Partners	four initiators (CCS CRU (Clingendael), Cordaid, HCSS and 30 other partners (including DGIS),
Lead partner	Clingendael
Type of partnership	Umbrella
Type of Issue	Safety and security
Ultimate goal (MDG)	Not specified
Goal(s)	Get to know whether or not, and why, the multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) contributed to better services and to increased state legitimacy.
Intervention logic	<p>“The provision of utility services, such as drinking water, electricity, waste management and infrastructures, is a crucial aspect of development. The extent to which the state can provide such services – or enable and support other actors to do so – moreover influences people’s appreciation of their government. Hence, utility service provision initiatives can serve a powerful role in strengthening state-society relations and state resilience in post-conflict and fragile situations. In such situations, however, where the state lacks the willingness, capacity or opportunity to deliver services, it is common practice for non-state actors to develop alternative and hybrid service provision arrangements. These actors (NGOs, international agencies, community based associations, or insurgency groups) may do so with or without government cooperation. The partners defined such MSPs as initiatives aimed at bringing together different stakeholders (state, civil society, private sector, beneficiary communities and international organizations) to engage them in a process of dialogue and collective action for service delivery.” (Stel, N. et al, 2012).</p>
Results	<p>“An applied research project conducted in four countries under the auspices of the Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions’ working group of the Peace, Security and Development Network (PSDN). The study explored arrangements between multiple state and non-state actors for the governance and implementation of basic services in fragile situations.” (Stel, N. et al, 2012).</p>

### Analysis of the partnership

It was a large network but very well managed by the Conflict Resolution Unit of Clingendael. Through CRU MoFA had access to a wide network in an efficient manner. The Unit for Fragility and Peacebuilding was new in the partnership and learned a great deal by the Knowledge network, especially during the Schokland project. They were actively involved. The Network consists of five theme groups, including private sector development in fragile states, with each specific parties and coordination.

Private parties unfortunately gradually lost interest because the network was mainly based on discussion and research and there was little action. However, trade missions were supported in for example South Sudan and Burundi.

The role of NGOs is to carry out specific activities. The importance of NGOs is mainly that they are present locally and that they have knowledge at the micro-level and the context which is essential in peacebuilding processes. NGOs can also make a useful contribution to policy-making.

According to MoFA knowledge work is an important partner for MoFA and MoFA was an active partner in the project. The role of MoFA was modest at the beginning. The network has had an impact on policy making. The network was excellently coordinated.

After Schokland the network has formally come to an end. However many relationships remained. Many members of the network have submitted new project proposals for the peacebuilding tender of the Unit for Fragility and Peacebuilding and therefore the relationship between MoFA and the members of the network are still good.

### *Analysis of Results*

Research is done on participatory basis in multi-stakeholder consultation. A lot of knowledge is being generated. Embassies and MoFA regularly took part in missions and research. Concrete policy inputs were supplied for the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Constitutional Development in Guatemala. Hence, the results are used by MoFA and embassies.

## Foundation Rural Energy Services (18233)

### Characteristics

Total budget	€ 20,000,000
Total Subsidy	€ 10,000,000
Target area	Sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso, Uganda)
Percentage of subsidy spent	46%
Partners	FRES, NUON, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (+ country-specific partnerships)
Lead partner	Foundation for Rural Energy Services (FRES)
Type of partnership	PM
Type of Issue	3. Energy and lighting
Ultimate goal (MDG)	1, 7
Goal(s)	To promote rural electrification in developing countries, preferably by Solar Home Systems (SHSs)
Intervention logic	Access to energy in Sub-Saharan Africa is lacking, especially in rural areas, which hinders development. FRES promotes rural electrification with Solar Home Systems and minigrids, through its Fee for service (FFS) concept: customers pay a monthly price for access to electricity and have no investment or unexpected repair costs.
Results	Joint ventures have been active South Africa, Mali and Burkina Faso and start-up activities in Uganda have been reported. In response to lagging results, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to freeze further disbursements to FRES in 2010. The Ministry's doubts about the FRES response to these developments were confirmed by an external review (BGP Engineers, 2012), which concluded that the total number of connections had not substantially increased since 2008, that projections had been overly optimistic and that the business plan had significant weaknesses. FRES however contests this view (see annex on next page).

### Analysis of the partnership

FRES was founded by Nuon, an energy company, in 2004 and has operated independently since. The main partnership consists of FRES, MoFA and Nuon, such that Nuon and MoFa provide FRES with funds for its electrification activities in Africa. On the level of the countries of implementation, partnerships exist between FRES, the EU, national governments, Nuon, the Netherlands' embassies and others.

The partnership between FRES and Nuon dates from 2005. In 2007 FRES initiated a discussion with Nuon on its wish to expand its activities and developed an investment plan aiming at 100.000 customers. Sustainable electrification of rural Africa was core business to MoFa at the time, while it was no longer core business to Nuon, so it appeared logical for FRES to include them in the discussion. The partnership was formalized after Nuon decided it would financially support FRES' investment plan.

Communication in and/or management of the partnership between FRES and MoFA can be considered suboptimal as trust was lost along the way, to the point that MoFa stopped disbursements under the grant agreement because of results they considered disappointing. After an initial 6 month extension, MoFA decided against a FRES request to further extend the subsidy period; FRES is challenging this decision in court. FRES also challenges the agreed methodology to calculate the number of connections, as well as the proposed method of determining the MoFA contribution. The fact that MoFA has been represented by various account managers over the years may not have benefited communication within the partnership.

### *Analysis of Results*

The number of energy connections has not grown as planned. This is unfortunate as a mid-term review found positive impact-level effects where connections were realised (Aidenvironment 2010). The slower expansion is a result longer start-up times for new joint ventures on the one hand, and considerable fall-out among existing customers on the other. There was already a considerable number of existing customers at the start of the Schokland subsidy, as two of the three active joint ventures (Yeelen Kura and SSD FRES in Mali and NuRa in South Africa) were already active. They were set up with the help of other subsidies, partly from the Dutch Government (ORET/MILIEV & PSOM).

In May 2011, FRES submitted a new business plan for the period 2011-2015 to DGIS. According to this business plan, the target of 100,000 customers originally set for 2015 was now set for 2020. For 2015, the target was put at 46,000 customers. The 28,000 additional customers should be reached shortly after 2014. The change of targets diminishes, in the view of the current evaluation team, the relevance of this activity in terms of realising the MDGs. However, FRES argues that one of the reasons that FRES could not reach the targets set in the grant agreement has been the freezing of the disbursement of the subsidy by DGIS in 2010. This is one of the issues between FRES and MoFA that still need to be resolved.

The FRES methodology can be considered innovative in the sense that the fee-for-service system differs from traditional ways of providing electricity in the target countries. The 2012 review above also mentions that the business plans developed for Uganda and West Africa contain some innovative components. The business case for the fee-for service system was however still not proven, according to the same review. This threatens the sustainability of results that were attained and are still being realised.

*(continued on next page)*



**In response to project summary ‘Foundation Rural Energy Services (18233)’, the president of FRES communicated the following:**

FRES would like to point out that two other consultancy reports that had been produced in 2010 as requested by the subsidy agreement between MoFa and FRES: a **Mid Term Review** by Aidenvironment and an **Organisatieanalyse en -advies** by Twijnstra Gudde came to different conclusions on the (quality of the) approach of FRES than the external review commissioned by MoFa (BGP Engineers, 2012).

Right after the publication of the report by BGP FRES has pointed out to MoFa that their report could not be a basis for any evaluation of the activities of FRES due to its poor quality. FRES gave examples to substantiate its opinion. And within six months FRES could even prove an important conclusion and prognosis of BGP incorrect. FRES had 21,120 customers by the end of August 2012, while the BGP report stated: *“The current business plan, which aims at more than 55,000 customers by 2016, is too optimistic as for the numbers of households to be connected during the next 4 years. A further increase with approx. 5,000 customers – to a total of approx. 21,000 customers by 2016 – seems realistic. Any expansion beyond that number is uncertain.”*

FRES deplors that the results of the partnership focus on a contested report and not on the real results that add substantially to the MDG’s set for 2015.

Results of FRES since the signing of the PPP:

- over 28,000 new electricity customers ;
- over 2,5 MW extra solar capacity installed ;
- new FRES companies in Burkina Faso, Uganda and Guinea Bissau;
- direct and indirect employment in and for FRES companies more than doubled;
- improved health care, improved education, improved living conditions for the local population of the rural areas where FRES is active;
- in 2013 MT’s of FRES companies consisted for 28% of women;
- FRES gave a substantial boost to the rural economies where it is active;
- FRES diminished CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by replacing diesel powered power plants by solar powered plants.

If MoFa would not have frozen disbursements to FRES in 2010, FRES would have been able to achieve even more.

FRES and Nuon would have welcomed a thorough analysis of PPP’s as an instrument to achieve fruitful cooperation between private companies and public authorities based also on our experience with this PPP. We deplore that our PPP has not been selected for a detailed evaluation in this study.

Dr. A.M.C. Goedmakers  
President FRES  
8.3.2014

## Annex 5: Analysis of survey results

A survey was conducted among partners participating in the partnerships that were subjected to the intermediate analysis and the detailed case studies. 44 respondents submitted their appreciation on partnership aspects in this survey. The response rate was not very high, due to the fact that many projects and partnerships already have been finalised and people have moved on and have no clear recollection anymore on what has happened in the partnerships. Furthermore not all projects qualified for this analysis as in some cases we could not obtain a balanced mix of different stakeholder's opinions participating in the partnerships. The survey was only administered to participants in 15 Schokland projects in the intermediate analysis and in 6 case-studies, because the survey set-up and format (see below) requires that participants are interviewed before they submit their answers to questionnaire. The final spread of respondents was highly concentrated among the 6 case-studies: 22 of the respondents were participants in 4 case-studies. Among the other 22 respondents the spread was among 14 different projects.

Therefore the results of this survey should be interpreted with caution and not be quoted from stand-alone sources of information. In the main text of this report, results of the survey have been crosschecked with other findings to increase validity. Where possible on specific aspects the assessments of the evaluators on performance of the partnerships and development results are compared with partner's own assessments.

The survey had two components.

### **1. Appreciation of the partnership by partners at the start of the Schokland project (2008/2009) and at the end or at present.**

Respondents were asked to give their opinions on a number of success factors and innovation aspects that are listed in the table below.


1. Common objectives/shared vision
2. Added value
3. Balance inputs/efforts partners
4. Mutual trust
5. Complementarity competencies
6. Integration partnership in organisational strategy
7. Integration partnership in organisational operations
8. Learning & incorporating lessons in partnership
9. Process innovation
10. Technological innovation
11. Financial innovation
12. Output innovation
13. Effective leadership & management
14. External visibility partnership
15. Management cultural differences

The appreciation of partners has been analysed according to three different sub-categories:


- a) (sub)sector of the partner-organisation;
- b) Location of the partner (in the North or in the South).

The results of the survey are presented in the figures below.


**Sectoral identity partner and appreciation of partnership’s overall performance at the start and end of the Schokland project**



**Location partner and appreciation of partnership’s overall performance at the start and end of the Schokland project**



**Average appreciation of partners of 15 specific aspects of the partnership's performance at the start and end of the Schokland project**



*N.B. The numbers of the questions refer to the numbered items in the table above.*

**2. Appreciation of own inputs and those of other partners in the partnership**


The section question was related to the appreciation of inputs of the different partners on the aspects of the partnership presented in the table below:

1. Efforts build & nourish partnership by partners
2. Provision cash inputs partners
3. Inputs in kind partners
4. Time inputs partners
5. Trust shown by partners
6. Leadership/ management
7. Solving problems or conflicts
8. Commitment to continue in future
9. Contribution problem analysis & theory of change


As with the first question the analysis of the responses was done on the same three sub-categories:

- a) (sub)sector of the partner-organisation;
- b) Location of the partner (in the North or in the South).


**Sectoral identity partner and appreciation of own (self) and other partners (peers) inputs in the partnership and project during the implementation of the Schokland project**



**Location partner and appreciation of own (self) and other partners (peers) inputs in the partnership and project during the implementation of the Schokland project**



**Average appreciation of partners of 9 specific aspects of balance of inputs of different during the implementation of the Schokland project**



*N.B. The numbers of the questions refer to the numbered items in the table above*

Survey questionnaire format:

**Questionnaire on quality and process of PPP (for members of partnerships)**

*Your answers to this questionnaire are strictly confidential and results will be processed anonymously.*

Name of organisation: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Function of interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Identity of your organisation (tick box; only one)

NGO	Not for profit/ Not for loss organisation	Knowledge institute	Private Sector company	Semi-Public company	Government Institution	Minbuza	Embassy
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please assess the following quality aspects of the partnership at two moments in time. Tick the box that matches you expectations at the start of the partnership first (left part of table). Next, answer the same questions for the partnership today (right part).

Aspect of Partnership	At the start/"then"					At the end/"now"				
	Not at all	A bit	Sufficient	Good	Excellent	Not at all	A bit	Sufficient	Good	Excellent
Common understanding of the overall objective of the partnership and a shared vision between partners	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Value added for you own organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Balance in inputs/effort of all partners in partnership	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mutual trust between partners	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Complementarity of skills and competencies in partnership	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Embedding/integration of this partnership in the overall	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

strategy of your organisation										
Embedding/integration of this partnership in the overall operations of your organisation										
(Anticipated) room/opportunities for partners to learn from working together and incorporate these lessons into the partnership”										
Process innovation in the partnership										
Technological innovation in the partnership										
Financial innovation in the partnership										
Output (products/services) innovation in the partnership										
Effective leadership/ management of the partnership										
Visibility of your partnership in the external environment										
	<b>At the start/”then”</b>					<b>At the end/”now”</b>				
<b>Aspect of Partnership</b>	Very negative	negative	Neutral	Positive	Very positive	Very negative	negative	Neutral	positive	Very positive
Degree in which differences in organisational cultures have affected the process of cooperation in your partnership										

**Please assess the performance of the primary partners in the partnership, today (if the project is still active) or at the end of the PPP project.**

Can you rate the performance of the (maximum of 5 most important) different partners in the partnership? 1 =very bad; 2 = bad; 3 = sufficient; 4 = good;; 5 = excellent. Also assess the performance of your own organisation.

	Your Organisation	Partner 1	Partner 2	Partner 3	Partner 4	Partner 5
<b>Name</b>						
<b>Sector (see the options above)</b>						
<b>Aspect of Partnership</b>						

Initiative and pro-activeness to build and nourish the partnership						
Problem analysis and theory of change						
Provision of inputs in partnership in cash						
Provision of inputs in partnership in kind (materials, office space, transport etc.)						
Provision of inputs in partnership in time						
Degree of trust shown by this partner towards the other partners in the partnership						
Leadership/ management of the partnership						
Solving problems or conflicts in the partnership						
Commitment to continue with the partnership in the future						

**Can you mention your best experience in the partnership?**

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**Can you mention your worst experience in the partnership?**

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**Thank you for your cooperation!**



## Annex 6: Assessment-results of 39 Schokland projects

For the purpose of the assessment of the 39 Schokland portfolio projects, the evaluation team has developed an assessment tool and methodology. This tool and methodology is briefly explained before presenting the table.

### Assessment tool:

In the assessment tool, four different aspects were integrated; three of these elements were used to calculate an overall performance assessment of the project and partnership:

- a) Development Score: for development results, three categories of scores were identified that were plotted on a 100-points scale. Poor development results were given a score of 33 points, medium development results were given a score of 66 points and good development results were given a score of 100 points.
- b) Sustainability score: under sustainability the evaluators have categorized 4 different degrees of sustainability that were plotted on a 100 points scale: a) replication and expansion = 100 points; b) institutionalization = 50 points; c) implementation/partnership (re)building = 25 points and; d) extinction/termination = 0 points
- c) Innovation score: Under innovation five different categories were distinguished that were plotted on a 125-points scale: a) Existence of all four innovation aspects = 100 points; b) existence of three innovation aspects = 75 points; c) existence of 2 innovation aspects = 50 points; d) existence of 1 innovation aspect = 25 points and e) when no innovation elements could be encountered a negative score of -25 points was assigned to the project.
- d) On aspects where no or not sufficient information was available no score was assigned and this aspect was not taken into consideration of the overall final score.

The overall development score was established by adding the scores on development results and sustainability and 25% of the value on innovation aspects. This was done to assign different weights to the development and sustainability aspects vis-à-vis innovation. The total score was subsequently plotted on a 100 points scale by dividing the total score with 2,25.

Ad a): Development results have been formulated by the evaluation team as those results at outcome level in the Schokland projects. There were limited information on outcomes was available also outputs of the projects have been taken into account. The outcomes and outputs were viewed against two criteria: a) the degree in which outcomes (and outputs) were obtained against planning and b) the degree in which outcomes and outputs made a contribution towards accelerated achievement of MDG's.

### Assessment methodology:

The Assessment tool was applied as followed:

- a) The evaluation members of the time that had conducted the basic, intermediate or case-study in this evaluation assigned the scores for each project analysed by them;
- b) The evaluation team discussed those projects where the primary evaluator of that project him/herself was not sure about how to score all aspects of the assessment;

- c) The individual members completed the scoring after the discussion session;
- d) All scores were finally again reviewed by the three main evaluators in the assessment process, in a chain moving from evaluator 1, to 2 to finally the lead evaluator;
- e) The final scores were submitted again to the evaluators that had scored the projects initially and these evaluators had the opportunity to protest against the final score assigned (this was done in two cases and in one case it led to re-assigning a new final score).

The results of the scoring exercises are presented in two tables below. The first table presents the scores for the different assessment aspects in the composite score. The second table, presents the analysis of success-factors and innovation aspects in the project sample

**Table: Development performance scores of 39 Schokland Projects**

	Name	Overall Score	Development Results Score	Sustainability score	Innovation Score
<b>very good development results</b>		<b>96,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>58,3</b>
1	Partnering to improve availability premix for food fortification		100	100	100
2	Smarter futures- Improving quality Wheat & Maize flour in Africa		100	100	
3	Improved food security & livelihoods rice & sorghum producers		100	100	75
4	Internet for Water and Sanitation		100	100	75
5	Learn4Work /Technical and Vocational Training / TVET		100	100	50
6	Food Early Solutions for Africa - Micro Insurance		100	100	25
7	Helping farmers produce cassava for profit		100	100	25
<b>good development results</b>		<b>74,8</b>	<b>79,6</b>	<b>80,0</b>	<b>25,0</b>
8	sms combats hiv/aids		66	100	25
9	Text to change		66	100	25
10	Universal access to Female Condom (UAFC)		66	100	25
11	Aqua for all		100	50	
12	Access to Medicine (ATM)		100	50	25
<b>medium development results</b>		<b>56,5</b>	<b>66,0</b>	<b>48,1</b>	<b>50,0</b>
13	Catalysing Finance for Sustainable Value Chains		66	50	100
14	Fair Climate Fund (FCF)		66	50	100
15	Oikocredit		66	50	75
16	Clean and improved WASH in Nepal		66	50	
17	Dutch National Action Plan 1325 (NAP1325)		66	50	
18	Platform for Health Insurance for the Poor		66	50	
19	Millennium Municipalities in Business		66	50	50
20	Best of Both Worlds		66	50	25
21	Design & local production tools for farmers in Ghana		66	50	25
22	Farming & Livelihood Improvement Programme		66	50	25
23	InReturn's East Africa Fund		66	50	25
24	World Mortgage: A house for us, a house for them		66	50	25
25	Piloting Commodity Business Support Centres		66	25	50
<b>Insufficient development results</b>			<b>55,0</b>	<b>16,7</b>	<b>43,8</b>
26	Fragile states and Education		33	50	
27	Ananthagiri 2009-2014		33	50	25
28	Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge		66	0	50
29	Intellectual property rights and innovation for MDGs		66	0	50
30	MDG5 Meshwork for Mother Care		66	0	50
31	Fighting violence to ensure education for all		66	0	
<b>Poor development results</b>		<b>17,3</b>	<b>33,0</b>	<b>3,1</b>	<b>10,7</b>
32	Green light for Africa		33	25	-25
33	Mesofinancing in Developing Countries		33	0	75
34	Access to Internet and ICT		33	0	25
35	Energy Services for Rural Areas		33	0	25
36	Knowledge Network Peace, Security & Development		33	0	25
37	More than the sum of its parts: 3D interactive forum		33	0	
38	Heat stable Oxytocin		33	0	-25
39	Knowledge for Health		33	0	-25

**Table: Presence of Success Factors and Innovation Aspects in 39 Schokland Projects**

	Name	Clarity roles, responsibilities & ground-rules	Clear understanding mutual benefits / Shared interests	Clear & shared vision Objectives / Shared ambition	Clear communication, shared planning & decision making	Good / Professional leadership	Complementary competencies	Balance of inputs/ efforts to achieve results	Level of effort to maintain relations and build trust	Existence Theory of Change & related KPI's	Achieving cultural / cross-sector synergy	Willingness to learn (and make mistakes)
<b>very good development results</b>												
1	Partnering to improve availability premix for food fortification	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
2	Smarter futures- Improving quality Wheat & Maize flour in Africa	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
3	Improved food security & livelihoods rice & sorghum producers	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
4	Internet for Water and Sanitation	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
5	Learn4Work /Technical and Vocational Training / TVET	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
6	Food Early Solutions for Africa - Micro Insurance	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
7	Helping farmers produce cassava for profit	1	1	1	?	?	1	?	?	1	?	?
<b>good development results</b>												
8	sms combats hiv/aids	1	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	1	1	0
9	Text to change	1	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	1	0	?
10	Universal access to Female Condom (UAFC)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
11	Aqua for all	1	1	1	?	1	?	?	?	1	?	1
12	Access to Medicine (ATM)	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
<b>medium development results</b>												
13	Catalysing Finance for Sustainable Value Chains	1	1	1	?	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
14	Fair Climate Fund (FCF)	1	?	?	?	?	1	?	?	1	?	?
15	Oikocredit	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
16	Clean and improved WASH in Nepal	?	1	1	?	1	1	?	?	1	?	?
17	Dutch National Action Plan 1325 (NAP1325)	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
18	Platform for Health Insurance for the Poor	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
19	Millennium Municipalities in Business	1	1	1	?	1	1	1	1	1	1	?
20	Best of Both Worlds	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
21	Design & local production tools for farmers in Ghana	0	1	1	1	1	0	?	1	1	1	1
22	Farming & Livelihood Improvement Programme	0	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	1	0	1
23	InReturn's East Africa Fund	?	?	?	?	?	1	?	?	?	?	?
24	World Mortgage: A house for us, a house for them	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1	?	?
25	Piloting Commodity Business Support Centres	?	1	?	?	?	1	?	?	?	?	?
<b>Insufficient development results</b>												
26	Fragile states and Education	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	?
27	Ananthagiri 2009-2014	1	1	?	?	?	0	?	?	1	1	?
28	Demystifying Groundwater Knowledge	1	1	1	?	?	1	?	?	1	?	?
29	Intellectual property rights and innovation for MDGs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	?	1
30	MDG5 Meshwork for Mother Care	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1

31	Fighting violence to ensure education for all	0	1	1	?	?	?	?	?	1	1	?
<b>Poor development results</b>												
32	Green light for Africa	1	0	0	0	?	1	?	1	0	0	1
33	Mesofinancing in Developing Countries	?	?	?	?	?	1	?	?	?	?	?
34	Access to Internet and ICT	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
35	Energy Services for Rural Areas	0	1	1	0	?	1	?	?	0	0	?
36	Knowledge Network Peace, Security & Development	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	1	1	?	1
37	More than the sum of its parts: 3D interactive forum	?	?	?	?	?	?	0	?	?	?	?
38	Heat stable Oxytocin	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	?	0
39	Knowledge for Health	0	?	0	0	?	1	?	?	0	?	?

Note: 0 = no; 1 = yes; ? = unknown

## Annex 7: Evaluation of non-Schokland partnerships

### Introduction

This annex concerns four partnerships that were supported by the Dutch government and for which an evaluation report was available.

Project nr.	Title	Main Involved Parties	Evaluation Reference
12162	P3SW	Water Fund Holland, Waterleidingmaatschappij Drenthe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Esbroeck, D. van et al., Final Evaluation of the P3SW Public Private Partnership, Pilot Programme for Pekanbaru and East Indonesia, Executive Summary, 2013
n.a.	World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) public-private partnership programme for 'Capacity Building and Market Access' in East African export- oriented horticulture	Governments and private sector in the partner countries, Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries	Pfisterer, S. et al. The Effectiveness of Public Private Partnerships in East African Export-Oriented Horticulture. Review of the World Summit on Sustainable Development Public-Private Partnership Programme in Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia (Zambia and Uganda), ECSAD 2009
n.a.	World Summit on Sustainable Development Partnership Programme in Palm Oil, Shrimps and Fruits & Vegetables	Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic Indonesia, Ministry of the Agriculture and Cooperatives of Malaysia, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries of the Netherlands/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Pfisterer, S., M.P. van Dijk & R. van Tulder, The Effectiveness of the Trilateral Partnership between The Netherlands, Malaysia and Indonesia. Review of the World Summit on Sustainable Development Partnership Programme in Palm Oil, Shrimps and Fruits &

n.a.	Quality and Sustainability Improvement of Robusta Production and Trade	Douwe Egberts Foundation, Rabobank Foundation, Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD),	Quality and Sustainability Improvement of Robusta Production and Trade in Gia Lai, Dak Lak and Lam Dong. An evaluation. Final Report Submitted to Rabobank Foundation, 2012
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The first project, P3SW (a PPP in the water sector) was established in 2002. The programme aimed at investigating how PPPs could contribute to the water infrastructure for urban populations in the South. In 2005, two pilot projects in Indonesia were implemented in the partnership.

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) horticulture partnership programme was established in 2004 and aimed at contributing to capacity building and strengthening of the horticulture sector in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zambia. The PPP entailed tripartite cooperation between business, public organization and civil society organizations. The projects in the WSSD partnership were managed by a so-called Partnership Committee. This Partnership Committee consisted of representatives of all parties and was chaired by a representative of the public sector. Beside the management the Partnership Committee was approval, guidance and monitoring of projects.

The WSSD partnership in palm oil, shrimps and fruits and vegetables was established in 2004 and aimed and enhancing market access through capacity building in Malaysia and Indonesia. The partnership entailed trilateral cooperation between the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Netherlands on palm oil, shrimps, tropical fruits and vegetables.

The Robusta production and trade partnership was established in 2010 and aims at improving the competitive position of coffee production and trade in several Vietnamese regions. The PPP involves cooperation between public and private parties in the Netherlands and Vietnam.

### ***Findings from the evaluations studied***

The evaluation documents the Ministry has presented, have been analysed for potential lessons learned regarding partnerships in general, and regarding success and failure factors in particular. The overall conclusion is that these partnerships were not (yet) very successful in terms of development outcomes or impact. The evaluation reports mention multiple reasons why projects did not deliver the expected results or that the intended and necessary follow-up was not yet realised. In one case (WSSD Horticulture) an interesting view was presented: although an internal monitoring mechanism for the partnership was in place, this was deemed insufficient because there was no sanction mechanism in case the partners would not deliver. This is interesting because in the Schokland

evaluation we have not seen any sanction mechanisms in any of the partnerships (other than the standard option for MoFA to 'sanction' lead parties with a drawback on the grant when output is less than expected). The other WSSD evaluation also mentions a lack of sanction mechanisms, but there were many other problems at the level of partnership management, so it is difficult to say whether this was the main failure factor. In aggregate, this problem of 'multiple problems' arises: it is difficult to draw conclusions on the reasons for failure of a partnership project when multiple problematic issues have been brought forward. Also, the evaluations do not go into detail on what could or should have been done to improve the partnership/ project and we do not have the opportunity to investigate these cases any further.

An important, although less surprising finding from one of these evaluations (WSSD palm oil, shrimps, fruits and vegetables), that can easily be translated to other contexts, is that simply including local partners in development projects is no sufficient condition for success. If a partnership is to create local ownership, this will only happen if basic quality conditions are met, such as involving local partners at an early stage and proper managing of the relationship with these partners throughout the project. One of the evaluations testifies that local ownership was lacking because stakeholders were not involved from the start.

It is further interesting to note that the evaluations of these four partnerships do not mention any type of innovation. This could be a result of a specific evaluation focus (different from ours) but it may also signify that partnering does not automatically lead to innovation.

# Annex 8: Description of the Millennium Development Goals

This description of the Millennium Development Goals is taken from Wikipedia.

The MDGs were developed out of several commitments set forth in the Millennium Declaration, signed in September 2000. There are eight goals with 21 targets and a series of measurable health indicators and economic indicators for each target.

## Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

### Target 1A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living on less than \$1.25 a day

- *Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty]*
- *Share of poorest quintile in national consumption*

### Target 1B: Achieve Decent Employment for Women, Men, and Young People

- *GDP Growth per Employed Person*
- *Employment Rate*
- *Proportion of employed population below \$1.25 per day (PPP values)*
- *Proportion of family-based workers in employed population*

### Target 1C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

- *Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age*
- *Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption*

## Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education

### Target 2A: By 2015, all children can complete a full course of primary schooling, girls and boys

- *Enrollment in primary education*
- *Completion of primary education*

## Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

### Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015

- *Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education*
- *Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector*
- *Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament*

## Goal 4: Reduce child mortality rates

- **Target 4A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate**
- *Under-five mortality rate*
- *Infant (under 1) mortality rate*
- *Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles*

## Goal 5: Improve maternal health



- **Target 5A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio**
- *Maternal mortality ratio*
- *Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel*
- **Target 5B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health**
- *Contraceptive prevalence rate*
- *Adolescent birth rate*
- *Antenatal care coverage*
- *Unmet need for family planning*

## **Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases**

### **Target 6A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS**

- *HIV prevalence among population aged 15–24 years*
- *Condom use at last high-risk sex*
- *Proportion of population aged 15–24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS*

### **Target 6B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it**

- *Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs*

### **Target 6C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases**

- *Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria*
- *Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bed-nets*
- *Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs*
- *Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis*
- *Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course)*

## **Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**

- **Target 7A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs; reverse loss of environmental resources**

### **Target 7B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss**

- *Proportion of land area covered by forest*
- *CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, total, per capita and per \$1 GDP (PPP)*
- *Consumption of ozone-depleting substances*
- *Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits*
- *Proportion of total water resources used*
- *Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected*
- *Proportion of species threatened with extinction*

### **Target 7C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation (for more information see the entry on water supply)**

- *Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural*
- *Proportion of urban population with access to improved sanitation*

### **Target 7D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers**

- *Proportion of urban population living in slums*

## **Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development**

### **Target 8A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system**

- *Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally*

### **Target 8B: Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**

- *Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA (Official Development Assistance) for countries committed to poverty reduction*

### **Target 8C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States**

- *Through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly*

### **Target 8D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term**

- *Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States.*
- *Official development assistance (ODA):*
- *Net ODA, total and to LDCs, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors' GNI*
- *Proportion of total sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)*
- *Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied*
- *ODA received in landlocked countries as proportion of their GNIs*
- *ODA received in small island developing States as proportion of their GNIs*
- *Market access:*
- *Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and from LDCs, admitted free of duty*
- *Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries*
- *Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of their GDP*
- *Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity*
- *Debt sustainability:*
- *Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative)*
- *Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative, US\$*
- *Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services*

### **Target 8E: In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries**

- *Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis*

### **Target 8F: In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications**

- *Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population*

- *Personal computers in use per 100 population*
- *Internet users per 100 Population*

## Annex 9: ToR of the Schokland/PPP evaluation

### Terms of reference for the evaluation of public private partnerships, including the Schokland agreements

#### Background

In 2000 all the member states of the United Nations committed to substantially reducing global poverty within 15 years. Their pledge was expressed in the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for health, hunger, the environment, education, fair trade and equal rights. Achieving the MDGs by 2015 became one of the policy priorities of the fourth Balkenende government.

The main thrust of 'Project 2015: Working towards the MDGs', also known as 'Schokland', was to contribute towards achieving the MDGs. The project revolved around global cooperation. The following goals were formulated:

- increasing awareness of and support for the MDGs in the Netherlands
- a stronger focus on the MDGs
- an innovative approach and new ideas
- more intensive cooperation between actors
- a focus on the areas and groups that lag furthest behind
- an integrated approach, because the MDGs are closely interrelated
- changing and strengthening underlying systems in order to achieve the MDGs.

The aim was to draw all these elements together and undertake concrete initiatives to narrow the gaps to achieving the MDGs. The emphasis was on boosting the involvement of a variety of partners and forging alliances, particularly with less traditional partners. Potential new partners included civil society organisations, private individuals, knowledge institutions, and most especially the business community. The underlying intention was that working together with these new partners, for example in public-private partnerships (PPPs) would generate a modern and innovative form of development cooperation.

In order to achieve this, a meeting was organised on 30 June 2007 in the Dutch village of Schokland, and a number of public-private partnerships were forged by a range of Dutch organisations and companies. They were known as the Schokland agreements. The idea was that the signatories would work together to achieve the MDGs, with the help of a dedicated resource – the Schokland Fund. The Schokland Fund was designed to facilitate and boost cooperative ventures and innovative ideas. The main conditions were:

- the proposals had to contribute directly, in a demonstrable and effective way, towards achieving one or more MDGs;
- the applicants had to belong to a formal partnership with a clear joint development objective;
- the ideas had to be innovative, involving new parties, new resources, new technology and/or a new approach;

- the partners had to make a substantial contribution of their own towards implementing the initiative. Grant funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not exceed 40% of the project costs of any single venture.<sup>35</sup>

The two grant application rounds held in 2008 for the Schokland Fund resulted in 28 agreements.

New agreements were signed from early 2009 onwards, by which time they had become known as the Millennium agreements. These agreements were not based on a formal policy framework, since the activities were partly generated by individual initiatives. However, the Schokland Fund conditions were taken into account by the Ministry in its deliberations about allocating funding.

In 2010 Aid Environment carried out a mid-term review of the Schokland agreements. It yielded valuable insights on what made partnerships successful, and drew cautious conclusions about the results achieved up to that point. Since it was a mid-term review, proper impact measurement was not yet possible.

In addition to the mid-term review, file research was conducted in preparation for the final evaluation. The findings are recorded in Appendix 1. The conclusion was that the files on most of the Schokland agreements contained information that made it possible to assess the degree to which planned results were achieved at output level. Results at outcome level were more difficult to assess on the basis of the files because in most cases there was no baseline measurement. It would therefore be necessary to work with supporting methods such as field visits and interviews when drawing conclusions at outcome level, and – more especially – when evaluating impact. The guideline here would be the World Bank definition of outcome and impact evaluation: to establish whether an approach has worked or not, beyond the output stage, also taking into account the accuracy of the theory of change.

Based on the examination of the files pertaining to all the Schokland agreements, recommendations were made for the evaluation set-up and for possible evaluation questions. The Terms of Reference draw extensively on these recommendations.

In addition to the Schokland agreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has supported other PPPs over the years, some of which have already been evaluated. The conclusions of this forthcoming evaluation should incorporate lessons learned from previous evaluations, in order to obtain a broader picture of the results achieved by PPPs.

### **Objective of the evaluation**

In development cooperation, partnerships between a range of actors (public and private entities, civil society organisations and knowledge institutions) are increasingly being used to pool expertise and thus to achieve economies of scale and innovative solutions to development problems. Indeed, with efforts currently focused on achieving policy cohesion between foreign trade and development cooperation, PPPs of this kind are a useful tool for working with a variety of partners on joint

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<sup>35</sup> Schokland Fund Policy Framework, 27 November 2007 (Government Gazette, 4 December 2007, no. 235).

objectives. An evaluation of results achieved in the past through PPPs is therefore vital input for new policy.

The Sustainable Economic Development Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently responsible for PPP policy. One of the objectives of the PPP Expertise Centre, which falls under this department, is to acquire PPP experience and share information about the lessons learned. DDE has therefore commissioned the PPP evaluation, primarily in order to gain greater insight into how the results were achieved and identify what made the programmes successful. Based on these findings, a general appraisal can be given of the success of the supported PPPs to date, including the Schokland agreements. Exploring the potential of PPPs as a tool is also an evaluation objective.

The primary objectives of the PPP evaluation are:

1. To deliver an appraisal of the individual Schokland agreements at output level, and where possible, also at outcome and impact level. This should entail a more in-depth evaluation of six of the agreements<sup>36</sup> and desk research on the others.<sup>37</sup>
2. To synthesise the results of the Schokland agreements and other PPPs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of previously conducted evaluations.
3. To make policy recommendations concerning the factors that determine the success and failure of PPPs.

#### **Elaborated objective and key questions**

*1. To deliver an appraisal of the individual Schokland agreements at output level, and where possible, also at outcome and impact level. This should entail a more in-depth evaluation of six agreements and desk research on the others.*

##### Main question:

- How do the Schokland agreements rank in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability?

##### Sub-questions:

- To what extent have the objectives of the agreement been achieved? (*effectiveness*)
- Has the agreement contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the Schokland Fund? <sup>38</sup> (*relevance* and *impact*)
- Was the agreement implemented in a cost-effective manner? (*efficiency*)
- Are the results sustainable? (*sustainability*)

*2. To synthesise the results of the Schokland agreements and other PPPs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of previously conducted evaluations.*

##### Main question:

- Have the PPPs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to innovative results in development cooperation? If so, how? If not, why not?

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<sup>36</sup> For a description of the six agreements, see the Methodology section in these Terms of Reference.

<sup>37</sup> See Appendix 2 for an overview of the agreements.

<sup>38</sup> Achieving the MDGs through cooperation between partners, in an innovative fashion and with substantial individual contributions.

#### Sub-questions:

- Is the agreement or the partnership innovative (for example because it introduces new parties, new resources, new technology and/or a new approach?)
- What has been done with the insights achieved through this innovation (local spin-off)?
- Has the PPP generated commercial activities?
- Which partner was significant in achieving the results, and in what situation?

3. To make policy recommendations concerning the factors that determine the success and failure of PPPs.

#### Main question:

- What are the specific success and failure factors of the partnership?<sup>39</sup>

#### Sub-questions:

- Was there a balance between the input of profit-organisations and not-for-profit organisations?
- Do the project results indicate that the cooperation between partners in the partnership generated added value? Could the results also have been achieved without the partnership?
- Is it possible to determine in which situations or sectors PPPs are likely to provide added value?
- Did particular governance factors influence the partnership?
- What specific risk factors affect partnerships and how can these be mitigated?
- What agreements were made about the sharing of inputs, costs, results, profit and risk?
- In what way was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the Dutch embassy involved in the organisation, management or strategic advice, and did this contribute to the results?
- What best practices (including context-specific elements) can be identified?
- What are the recommendations for future PPP-type programmes, based on the evaluation of the Schokland agreements and previous evaluations?

### **Methodology**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy documents about the Schokland Fund, the mid-term review carried out by Aid Environment in 2010, and the file research conducted by Berenschot in January 2013 all serve as primary documentation for this evaluation. The IOB systemic literature review of PPPs (study no. 378) also provides valuable background information. In addition, all project files on the Schokland agreements, including previous evaluations of these agreements and of other PPPs, are valuable sources. They should be included by the evaluators in their study.

As a nonmarket participant, the Partnerships Resource Centre (PRC) has offered to assist the evaluation by working with the evaluators and providing expertise on partnerships. Copies of the PRC's *Partnerships Effectiveness Model* and *Ingredients for Successful Partnerships* will be made available to the evaluators.

The evaluators are also expected to do in-depth research, including field visits (supplementary to the information from the files), into the following six agreements:

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<sup>39</sup> Use can be made in this context of previous PRC research on success and failure factors, as well as the findings of the planned evaluation.

1. MDG 5: Meshwork for Mother Care (project number 19474).

*A six-part project about maternal mortality; a field-based programme also geared to knowledge-sharing and cooperation.*

2. Partnering to improve availability of premix for food fortification (project number 19299)

*Improving availability, use and affordability of quality-assured micro-nutrient premix for food fortification.*

3. Internet for water and sanitation (project number 18404)

*Matching water and sanitation projects with interested public and private donors through the use of Wikipedia.*

4. Best of Both Worlds (project number 19471)

*A seven-part project to develop the village of Yele in Sierra Leone.*

5. Increase food security and improve livelihoods of rice and sorghum producers (project number 19292)

*Helping farmers to set up an education fund and produce basic ingredients for beer making.*

6. Access to Internet and ICT (project number 18407)

*Rural development with ICT as an innovative enabler in Zambia.*

Desk research is expected on the remaining Schokland agreements (see overview in Appendix 2), supplemented with a survey (in writing or by telephone) among the file holders and implementing organisations.

Finally, Appendix 2 also contains an overview of past PPP evaluations, the conclusions of which should be incorporated in this study.

The tender should indicate which evaluation method (quantitative, qualitative or mixed method) is envisaged for the various elements in this evaluation. The evaluation approach should be elaborated in the tender. No inception report will be required.

**Please note:** The source documents (programme proposals of the six Schokland project agreements, Ministry policy documents, the mid-term review and the Berenschot study plus previous evaluations) will be made available online.

### **Requirements for evaluators**

In view of the large number of files involved and the fact that field visits and desk research/surveys need to be carried out, a team of evaluators will be required. The following criteria apply:

Team leader:

- university graduate;
- at least 10 years' experience with evaluation and development projects in various countries



- knowledge of Dutch
- knowledge of Dutch development policy
- knowledge of public-private partnerships and/or multi-stakeholder approach.

Team members:

- graduate in at least higher professional education (equivalent to Dutch HBO)
- at least 5 years' experience with evaluation and development projects in various countries, in the field of socioeconomic development, institutional development and financial and economic development, and preferably with Dutch governmental projects
- knowledge of Dutch
- affinity with all parties involved in PPPs (NGOs, knowledge institutions, businesses, government).

### Activities and indicative time-plan

- **Tender**

Request for Concept Notes:	11 July 2013
Assessment of concept notes:	Week of 22 July 2013
Request for full proposal to winning consortia:	Week of 5 August 2013
Assessment full proposal:	Week of 2 September 2013
Award of contract:	Week of 16 September 2013

### Evaluation

Week 1-2 of evaluation:	file study of 6 agreements (case studies) and preparation of online survey
Week 3-4 of evaluation:	interviews in the Netherlands, desk research and dispatch of online survey
Week 5-7 of evaluation:	field visits
Week 8-9 of evaluation:	analysis of case studies, online survey and desk research
Week 10-11 of evaluation:	draft report (to be discussed with reference group)
Week 12-13 of evaluation:	definitive report